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This dissertation examines the cluster of agricultural trading and colonisation companies that 
emerged in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. It argues that company colonisation in Britain’s 
settler empire was driven by developments in the City of London. While scholars have long 
studied emigration and colonisation in relation to the so-called colonial reform movement, 
1820–1840, the role of private enterprise has only been obliquely addressed. This thesis offers 
the first synoptic account of company colonisation at the dawn of the Pax Britannica. Taking 
the City as its focus, it shows how institutional and social forces in the Square Mile converged 
with broader debates about the future shape of the empire, and in so doing propelled a wave 
of company speculation that influenced the trajectory of settler colonial expansion after 1815.
 The thesis grounds itself in a close study of several colonial companies: the Australian 
Agricultural Company (1824), the Canada Company (1825), the Van Diemen’s Land Company 
(1825), the South Australian Company (1835), the New Zealand Company (1839), and the 
Western Australian Company (1840). Drawing on a wide range of materials in archives across 
the world–published writings, parliamentary testimony, company minute books, personal 
correspondence, and Colonial Office memoranda–the dissertation shows how the company 
men at the centre of these enterprises imagined, and briefly realised, a corporate empire that 
stretched across the oceans. 
Companies and colonisation have frequently been linked together in analyses of 
modern world history, but Britain’s sprawling settler empire has conventionally been omitted 
from such accounts. This dissertation offers a wide-ranging examination of company 
colonisation in a spirit of challenge to historical treatments of the period that privilege the 
imperial state. In so doing, it connects the history of Britain’s colonies of settlement to the 
new history of global capitalism, while challenging the conventional periodisation and spatial 
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Commentators on colonial or any other history who confine themselves to official 
documents are as sure to go awry as if they entirely overlooked them. In the book 
containing the charters of the old N. American colonies they are put forward as 
specimens of proposed wisdom and liberality by those who either do not or will 
not look further than the four corners of those parchments. 
 
 




























Two episodes of frontier violence in Britain’s antipodean colonies illustrate the enormous 
stakes of company colonisation. In February 1828 four convict employees of the Van Diemen’s 
Land Company, a chartered enterprise founded with the intention of sending fine wool back 
to England, killed a group of Aboriginal Tasmanians while they were gathering food on a beach 
in the remote north-west corner of the island. Although estimates vary, the Cape Grim 
massacre is commonly believed to have killed thirty indigenous people.1 No less brutal was 
the way this act of corporate violence unfolded. Having already forced the original inhabitants 
off their land, the Company’s workers now took the further step of removing them from the 
island altogether: the bodies were thrown off the cliff and into the Southern Ocean. 
 Fifteen years later, in 1843, a dispute between New Zealand Company settlers and 
Māori at Wairau in the upper reaches of the South Island also resulted in bloodshed. 
Established with the aim of planting British settlements in the South Pacific and populating 
them with poor agricultural labourers, the New Zealand Company claimed vast tracts of 
indigenous land: twenty million acres by late 1839.2 Yet, tribal authority would brook to no 
corporation, however well-fortified with capital and guns. When the Company persisted in 
surveying land in the Wairau Valley that the powerful Ngāti Toa chief Te Rauparaha asserted 
was his on account of conquest, Te Rauparaha and his nephew Te Rangihaeata razed the 
surveyor’s huts to the ground. 
The Company’s officials in the colony responded by obtaining arrest warrants for the 
two Māori men, before promptly making forth to the disputed territory with fifty armed 
settlers from their Nelson settlement. In what followed, cross-cultural contact between the 
two parties would give lie to the idea that the famous Treaty of Waitangi (1840), of which Te 
Rauparaha was a signatory, had somehow settled the conundrum thrown up by British 
settlement in the antipodes. 22 settlers were killed and at least 4 Māori, a body count that in 
the very least raised serious questions about the Company’s Panglossian vision of racial 
 
1 Ian McFarlane, “Cape Grim,” in Robert Manne, ed. Whitewash: On Keith Windschuttle’s Fabrication of History 
(Melbourne: Black Inc, 2003), 277–298.  
2 On the Company’s early purchasing, see Patricia Burns, Fatal Success: A History of the New Zealand Company 
(Auckland: Heinemann, 1989), 111–122.  
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crossings.3 It was one thing to conjure up ambitious schemes of benevolent colonisation in 
London, quite another to see it through in the Wairau Valley.    
 Yet why were companies active in this pair of island colonies in the first place? This 
dissertation takes a fresh look at company colonisation between 1820 and 1840 in order to 
explain how and why the company model emerged as an attractive option for men in the City 
of London after the Napoleonic wars. While scholars have long poured over emigration and 
colonisation during the era of colonial reform, the contribution of private colonial enterprise 
has often been tackled obliquely.4 In the wake of the Napoleonic wars, however, a suite of 
antipodean colonisation and agricultural companies were established in London, all of which 
had a profound impact on British imperial policy.      
 The study argues that company colonisation in Britain’s settler empire was driven by 
developments in the City of London. It shows how institutional and social forces in the Square 
Mile converged with broader debates about the future shape of the empire, and in so doing 
propelled a wave of company speculation that influenced the trajectory of settler colonial 
expansion after 1815.5 Companies and colonisation have frequently been linked together in 
analyses of modern world history, but Britain’s sprawling settler empire has conventionally 
been omitted from such accounts.6 This dissertation offers a wide-ranging examination of 
company colonisation in a spirit of challenge to historical treatments of the period that 
 
3 Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance: Protecting Aborigines 
Across the Nineteenth-Century British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 215–221, and Ian 
Wards, The Shadow of the Land: A Study of British Policy and Racial Conflict in New Zealand, 1832–1852 
(Wellington: A. R. Shearer, 1968), 70–94. Damon Salesa, Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the 
Victorian British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 28–53. 
4 The classic study of British imperialism during this period remains W. P. Morrell, British Colonial Policy in the 
Age of Peel and Russell (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930). Morrell’s otherwise fine account is notably light in 
its treatment of company colonisation. For an introduction to private enterprise and colonial settlement in 
relation to the Australian colonies, see Frank J. A. Broeze, “Private Enterprise and the Peopling of Australasia, 
1831–50,” Economic History Review 35 (1982): 235–253. On emigration to Britain’s settler colonies after 1815, 
see Eric Richards, “British Emigrants and the Making of the Anglosphere,” History 103 (2018): 286–306; James 
Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter 6. 
5 For the evolution of joint stock companies in the early nineteenth century, see Timothy L. Alborn, Conceiving 
Companies: Joint-Stock Politics in Victorian England (London: Routledge, 1998); Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson 
and James Taylor, Shareholder Democracies? Corporate Governance in Britain and Ireland Before 1850 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Paul Johnson, Making the Market: Victorian Origins of Corporate 
Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); James Taylor, Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock 
Enterprise in British Politics and Culture, 1800–1870 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006). 
6 Ron Harris, Going the Distance: Eurasian Trade and the Rise of the Business Corporation, 1400–1700 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020); Andrew Phillips and J. C. Sharman, Outsourcing Empire: How 
Company-States Made the Modern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020). 
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privilege the imperial state.        
 Three main implications may be said to follow from its central findings. In the first 
instance, the dissertation is motivated by an empirical desire to refactor company 
colonisation back into the history of settler colonialism, and the settler empire back into the 
history of company colonisation. More the norm than the exception in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the company model had fallen out of favour with European colonisers 
by the late eighteenth century, chartered colonial enterprise increasingly portrayed as a relic 
of what colonisation had once looked like, rather than as a portent of its future. Successively 
delegitimated by the South Sea Bubble and the East India Company’s belligerence in Bengal 
during the 1770s, the propriety of joint stock colonisation was also contested on the grounds 
of whether it was in fact the most cost-effective form of colonial expansion–one of the 
strongest arguments in its favour during earlier waves of company colonisation.7 Once the 
lynchpin of European empire building, the company model was by 1800 very much relegated 
to the margins of colonial discourse and practice.      
 And yet, at the very moment when company colonisation is conventionally 
understood to have languished, a cluster of colonial companies in London emerged which 
went on to play pivotal roles in remaking the settler world in their corporate self-image: the 
Australian Agricultural Company (1824), the Canada Company (1825), the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company (1825), the South Australian Company (1835), the New Zealand Company (1839), 
and the Western Australian Company (1840). This burst of company formation challenges the 
idea that chartered enterprise somehow extinguished itself towards the close of the 
eighteenth century, with a brief resurgence at the end of the nineteenth century when 
European powers extended their rule in Africa. As such, the dissertation puts forward a 
Pacific-oriented history of company colonisation that revises a periodisation that sees 
chartered enterprise jump from the early modern to the so-called Scramble for Africa in what 
one historian has called the century’s “last five minutes.”8 
Second, the portrait of company colonisation put forward here calls into question the 
idea that the colonial empire was the sole prerogative of the British state. Empire building 
 
7 Michael Wagner, The English Chartered Trading Companies, 1688–1763: Guns, Money and Lawyers (New 
York: Routledge, 2018). 
8 This periodisation structures the stimulating account supplied by Phillips and Sharman, Outsourcing Empire. 
David Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion,” Nordic Journal of 
International Law 65 (1996): 391.  
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and state making were in important respects coterminous, and yet historians of British 
imperialism have often marginalised the impact of private capital in syntheses of imperial 
power projection.9 While it would be misguided to draw too clean a line of separation 
between company colonisation and more centralised forms of empire, not least because 
chartered companies derived their charters from the Crown in the first place, there is a 
corresponding risk associated with not interrogating the sinews of new world power that lay 
beyond Whitehall.10  
After all, the authority to direct the men who composed these companies, and the 
money that constituted their joint stock, did not ultimately rest with the Colonial Office. 
Often, all that the civil servants responsible for colonial affairs during this time could do was 
mull over ways to temper the most egregious acts of corporate overreach. “In the erection of 
a joint stock company for the cultivation of waste lands in a Colony,” the then permanent 
counsel to the Colonial Office and Board of Trade, James Stephen, noted in an 1825 missive 
to his superior Wilmot Horton, “what is the most effectual legal security against the 
undertaking being converted into a mere Stock Jobbing Speculation?”11 As it would turn out, 
Stephen would be asking himself very much the same question, and with increasing 
frustration, fifteen years later, when he came to negotiate with the New Zealand Company.12 
The retrieval of this contested history allows us to think through the relationship between 
public and private authority in Britain’s expanding empire, and during a period conventionally 
associated with despotic governors rather than corporate leviathans.13 While historians of 
early modern imperialism have taught us to think about a political and legal topography that 
was patchy and uneven, the early nineteenth century British Empire is more often than not 
 
9 Steven Pincus, Tiraana Bains and A. Zuercher Reichardt, “Thinking the Empire Whole,” History Australia 16 
(2019): 610–637. For a critique, see Alison Bashford, “On Nations and States: A Reflection on ‘Thinking the 
Empire Whole,’” History Australia 16 (2019): 638–641. On the conceptual link between state and empire, see 
David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
1–23. 
10 On charters, see Edward Cavanagh, “Charters in the Longue Durée: The Mobility and Applicability of 
Donative Documents in Europe and America from Edward I to Chief Justice John Marshall,” Comparative Legal 
History 5 (2017): 262–295, and James Muldoon, “Colonial Charters: Possessory or Regulatory?” Law and 
History Review 36 (2018): 355–381.  
11 James Stephen to Wilmot Horton, 9 March 1825, CO 280/1, Colonial Office Correspondence Tasmania, TNA, 
Kew.  
12 Bain Attwood, Empire and the Making of Native Title: Sovereignty, Property and Indigenous People 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), Chapters 5 & 8.  
13 Chris Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830 (London: Longman, 1989).  
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shorn of a corresponding complexity.14 In foregrounding the joint stock company, the analysis 
queries historical approaches to colonial reform that place undue emphasis on a muscular 
imperial state.          
 Finally, the significance of the City of London to the story this dissertation tells alerts 
us to the influence of metropolitan capitalists in the post-Napoleonic push to expand Britain’s 
settler colonial footprint. Analyses of colonial reform tend to prioritise the inner workings of 
the Colonial Office, or the on the ground relations between transplanted Britons and the 
indigenous peoples they colonised, not the banks and boardrooms that dotted the Square 
Mile.15 In attending to the company crossings and distinct moral economy that guided 
corporate behaviour, this study seeks to reframe how we interpret this important body of 
scholarship. It does so chiefly by documenting the business history that underpinned colonial 
reform, in the conviction that the social dynamics and codes of conduct that influenced 
company life were important to the decisions the directors of these companies made.16 Often 
procedural, even mundane, the boardroom meetings and backchannel discussions were 
nonetheless central to company activity in the extra-European world. 
A brief note on method and source material. The study anchors its findings in a close 
reading of company books located in Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand. This core 
material is supplemented with the records of the more-well studied Colonial Office as well as 
private papers and correspondence. Corporations have typically been studied in terms of 
their institutional make-up, that is, their legal and economic structure, but rather less studied 
are the social and cultural dimensions of corporate life.17 The dissertation focuses on how the 
 
14 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). For an important interpretation of imperial order in the nineteenth century 
that takes due account of legal pluralism, see Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire 
and the Origins of International Law, 1800–1850 (Cambridge, MA, 2016). 
15 Alan Lester, Kate Boehme and Peter Mitchell, Ruling the World: Freedom, Civilisation and Liberalism in the 
Nineteenth-Century British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Helen Taft Manning, “Who 
Ran the British Empire 1830–1850?” Journal of British Studies 5 (1965): 88–121; Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial 
Connections, 1815–1845: Patronage, The Information Revolution and Colonial Government (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005). 
16 I draw here on the work of David Hancock, whose study of London merchants who traded with America in 
the eighteenth century deftly weaves together a social and business history of imperial commerce. See David 
Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 
1735–1785 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
17 There is a distinguished pedigree of thinking about the corporation as a legal entity. See for example: John 
Dewey, “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality,” Yale Law Journal 35 (1926): 655–673; Harold 
J. Laski, “The Early History of the Corporation in England,” Harvard Law Review 30 (1917): 561–588. See also F. 
W. Maitland, State, Trust and Corporation, ed. David Runciman and Magnus Ryan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). For the history of the corporation, see Leonardo Davoudi, Christopher McKenna and 
 14 
company men (and they were all men) experienced company colonisation from the inside, 
and so priority is given to those aspects of business history that touch upon self-
understanding.  
While the protagonists in this story were clearly preoccupied with keeping company 
colonisation afloat, they nonetheless devoted significant time and attention to tactics of self-
description that are not easily intelligible when more modern conceptions of corporate 
culture are retrospectively projected back onto business enterprise c. 1820–1840. As such, 
the dissertation takes an approach that encourages an easy commerce between social and 
cultural dimensions of imperial adventurism, on the one hand, and more conventional facets 
of business history such as committee meetings and the drafting of bye-laws on the other.18  
That several of the company promoters led active intellectual lives, such as John Galt 
and Edward Gibbon Wakefield, makes it even more important to track the interchange 
between theoretical reflection about colonisation and actual work in the boardroom. 
Accordingly, I explore how the cluster of companies were part of a shared network, bound by 
correspondence and company conversations as much as by the cross-filtration of company 
directors and brokers of knowledge: the bankers and solicitors, confidants and trusted 
advisors who could be called upon to supply weighted opinion.19 To do so, the dissertation 
investigates how norms and customs, protocol and procedure inflected day-to-day life in the 
boardroom, and how the mores of the City in turn shaped how these company men conceived 
of their imperial ventures.20 As Andrew Fitzmaurice demonstrates in a compelling new study 
of Travers Twiss, the English jurist who helped King Leopold II of Belgium transform the 
 
Rowena Olegario, “The Historical Role of the Corporation in Society,” Journal of the British Academy 6 (2018): 
17–47; Philip J. Stern, “The Corporation in History,” in Grietje Baars and Andre Spicer, eds. The Corporation: A 
Critical, Multi-Disciplinary Handbook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 21–46. On companies 
more generally, Emily Erikson, Trade and Nation: How Companies and Politics Shaped Economic Thought (New 
York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming).  
18 For studies of economic life that foreground the cultural and social, see Margot C. Finn, The Character of 
Credit: Personal Debt and English Culture, 1740–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Mary 
Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). The dissertation also speaks to recent analyses of global 
capitalism that emphasise the salience of cultural factors. See Kenneth Lipartito, “Reassembling the Economic: 
New Departures in Historical Materialism,” American Historical Review 121 (2016): 101-139. 
19 Here I redeploy an idea that animates Felicia Gottmann and Philip Stern, eds. “Crossing Companies,” Journal 
of World History 31 (2020). 
20 The focus on company men puts me in dialogue with Cain and Hopkins’s “gentlemanly capitalism” thesis: P. 
J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (Harlow: Longman, 2002). For commentary, see 
Raymond E. Dumett, ed. Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire (London: 
Longman, 1999). 
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International African Association into the Congo Free State, there is much to be gained from 
“grubbing in archives and dealing with philosophical, and legal, treatises.”21 This study seeks 
to both unpack the social dynamics of company life and examine how contemporaries 
articulated their experiences of it, and in so doing it works towards an appreciation of the 
complex interchange between two aspects of company colonisation that are often artificially 
kept apart.  
 
Company Colonisation in Historiographical Context 
 
 
Scholars of the colonial reform movement have always recognised that companies played an 
important part in the colonisation of South Australia and New Zealand, and yet there is no 
historical account that knits together the various private colonial ventures that were set up 
to implement the key ideas behind systematic colonisation.22 This is a historical landscape 
more readily associated with experiments in penal transportation, and of treaties between 
the British Crown and indigenous rangatira (chiefs).23 While a resurgent interest in 
corporations has successfully demonstrated the pivotal influence that companies exerted 
over modern world history, Britain’s settler empire in the nineteenth century has been 
ignored as a setting for corporate colonisation.24      
 At the same time, historians of colonial Australia and New Zealand have often skirted 
around the question of company colonisation, although there are promising signs that a new 
 
21 Andrew Fitzmaurice, The Metamorphoses of Travers Twiss (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
forthcoming). See also Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Expansion of International Franchise in the Late Nineteenth 
Century,” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 28 (2018): 449–462. 
22 A. J. Harrop gestured towards a sweeping history of company colonisation in his “The Companies and British 
Sovereignty, 1825-50,” in John Holland Rose, A. P. Newton and E. A. Benians, eds. The Cambridge History of the 
British Empire, vol. 7, 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), 59–82. 
23 On New South Wales as an experiment in criminal transportation, see Emma Christopher and Hamish 
Maxwell-Stewart, “Convict Transportation in Global Context, c. 1700–88,” in Alison Bashford and Stuart 
Macintyre, eds. The Cambridge History of Australia, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 68–
90. On treaties and the colonisation of New Zealand, see Peter Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in 
New Zealand, 1830–1847 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1987). 
24 Peter Borschberg, “Chartered Companies and Empire,” in Brian P. Farrell and Jack Fairey, eds. Empire in Asia: 
A New Global History: Volume 1: From Chinggisid to Qing (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 269–294; 
Edward Cavanagh, “Corporations and Business Associations from the Commercial Revolution to the Age of 
Discovery: Trade, Jurisdiction and the State, 1200–1600,” History Compass 14 (2016): 493–510; Emily Erikson, 
ed. “Chartering Capitalism: Organizing Markets, States, and Publics,” Political Power and Social Theory 29 
(2015); William A. Pettigrew and David Veevers, eds. The Corporation as a Protagonist in Global History, c. 
1550–1750 (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
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strand of settler colonial scholarship is more willing to engage with the implications of 
chartered enterprise.25 Nonetheless, the historiography has often taken for granted the role 
played by London-based companies, rarely questioning why the company model exerted so 
much influence over British colonial policy in Australasia.26     
 Historians interested in the European settlement of Australia have by and large been 
preoccupied with how the emerging colonial state asserted its political authority, with a 
particular focus since the early 1990s on incorporating Aboriginal Australians into such 
accounts.27 This is appropriate. After all, as a late eighteenth century penal colony New South 
Wales is the case-study par excellence of state-based colonisation, so the focus on the 
Colonial Secretary’s office and the person of the governor is hardly surprising, while the 
recovery of voices from the other side of the frontier, to use Henry Reynolds’s apt phrase, has 
corrected an important imbalance in Australian historiography.28 However, the corollary to 
this focus on the colonial state has been a lack of scholarly interest in company colonisation 
as a formative force in Australian history.      
 Likewise, historians of New Zealand have increasingly turned their attention towards 
analysing Māori/Pākehā relations, and away from imperial histories that prioritise 
metropolitan actors.29 A staple feature of an earlier tradition of imperial history writing, the 
New Zealand Company is now studied primarily as it concerns the making of native title, not 
 
25 Catherine Cumming, “How Finance Colonised Aotearoa: A Concise Counter-History,” Counterfutures 7 
(2019): 41–72; Aaron Graham, “Incorporation and Company Formation in Australasia, 1790–1860,” Australian 
Economic History Review 60 (2020): 322–345; Humphrey McQueen, “Born Free: Wage-Slaves and Chattel-
Slaves,” in Carolyn Collins and Paul Sendziuk, eds. Foundational Fictions in South Australian History (Adelaide: 
Wakefield Press, 2018), 43–63. 
26 Burns, Fatal Successs; Douglas Pike, Paradise of Dissent: South Australia, 1829–1857 (London: Longman, 
1957); Hannah Robert, Paved with Good Intentions: Terra Nullius, Aboriginal Land Rights and Settler-Colonial 
Law (Canberra: Halstead, 2016). 
27 Alan Atkinson, The Europeans in Australia: A History, Volume 1: The Beginning (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); Peter Cochrane, Colonial Ambition: Foundations of Australian Democracy (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2006); Michael Roe, Quest for Authority in Eastern Australia, 1835-1851 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965).  
28 Henry Reynolds, The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion and 
Settlement of Australia (Melbourne: Penguin, 1981). For an assessment of the fraught politics that 
accompanied the reorientation in Australian historiography alluded to above, see Stuart Macintyre and Anna 
Clark, The History Wars (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003); Mark McKenna, “The History 
Anxiety,” in Bashford and Macintyre, eds. The Cambridge History of Australia, vol. 1, 561–580. 
29 Michael Belgrave, Historical Frictions: Māori Claims and Reinvented Histories (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 2005); Anne Salmond, Tears of Rangi: Experiments Across Worlds (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 
2017); Shaunnagh Dorsett, Juridical Encounters: Māori and the Colonial Courts, 1840–1852 (Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 2017). 
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as a corporate entity with a history peculiar to that organisational form.30 There are again 
good reasons for these changes. The postcolonial turn in New Zealand historiography has 
revolutionised how scholars approach the entanglements between European settlers and the 
Polynesian people they encountered upon arrival, while New Zealand’s status as a Crown 
Colony (1841) has meant that colonial power has often been associated with the machinery 
of the New Zealand state in the making.31      
 These underlying trends have been amplified by the influential Waitangi Tribunal, 
which was established in 1975 to act as a commission of inquiry into claims brought by Māori 
that concern alleged breaches of the Crown’s Treaty commitments.32 As numerous scholars 
have remarked, the juridical histories produced by the Tribunal frame colonial contact around 
an iwi (tribal) and imperial-cum-colonial state axis.33 New Zealand historiography may indeed 
now be thoroughly transnational, but it is arguably still preoccupied with the sovereign state.  
What have scholars said about these settler companies, and how does the present 
study build on their findings? With the important exceptions of the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company and the Western Australian Company, the colonisation companies that focus this 
dissertation have all been subject to considerable scholarly research. There is a long-standing 
literature on the New Zealand Company, for instance, while the entities set up to colonise 
South Australia have similarly been scrutinised at length (although the South Australian 
Company has been relatively neglected). Among the 1824/25 trio, the Australia Agricultural 
Company and the Canada Company have also had their corporate records pored over.34 Yet 
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for all that has been written about the companies as individual business entities, there has 
been much less said about joint stock capital in the wider context of settler capitalism.35 Roger 
Hall, whose doctoral dissertation on the Canada Company remains the most comprehensive 
account of that company, alluded to the tantalising possibilities that might be opened up by 
situating the Canadian enterprise in the larger setting of imperial commerce.36 This 
dissertation takes up Hall’s suggestion insofar as it moves between the boardrooms of a 
cluster of colonisation companies and the environs of the City of London in a way that 
illuminates aspects of imperial history that arguably get lost when the object of attention is a 
more detailed inventory of a single corporate concern. 
In so doing, it connects the colonial reform movement to the new history of global 
capitalism, an analytical concern that moves us beyond Whitehall and the purview of the 
antipodean state.37 The City of London, therefore, assumes a centrality that scholarly 
treatments of the settler empire in the early nineteenth century have tended to overlook. 
Long recognised as a transformative period in the political economy of empire, the two 
decades in the run up to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi have infrequently been analysed 
in relation to private capital.38 This study seeks to explain and untangle the link between 
empire and capital through its analysis of company colonisation, thereby casting new light on 
old problems in imperial historiography.39 
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If the City has been peripheral to previous studies of colonial reform, then the 
company crossings between these businesses have also been largely neglected. Pennie Anne 
Pemberton’s exemplary dissertation on the Australian Agricultural Company and the social 
forces in London that shaped it is the standout exception, and the analysis of company 
colonisation advanced here owes a great deal to that pathfinding work.40 While previous 
analyses of these companies have documented their contribution to British migration and 
settlement, the company crossings between the two bursts of company formation that focus 
the discussion have escaped scholarly scrutiny. Rather than recapturing the trace of company 
colonisation through a single corporate archive, or through one of the company bubbles that 
originated in London between 1820–40, this study instead seeks to traverse company 
boardrooms and the institutional fora of the City of London. It is the first work of historical 
research to do so.          
 The dissertation also builds on several studies that have advanced our understanding 
of chartered colonial enterprise in the early modern period. While the nexus between 
companies and colonisation has long been considered central to explanations of European 
empire, the new literature on corporate colonisation is more self-consciously global.41  That 
said, there is still a pressing need for more empirical scholarship that connects company 
colonisation to more general themes in world history. As Rachel Brewster and Philip J. Stern 
remark, “We still lack the robust and extensive concepts and languages to comprehend their 
jurisdictionally ambiguous and spatially diffuse nature, as well as corporations’ relationships 
to individuals, states, and other non-state actors in a world filled with various independent or 
semi-independent political agents besides the nation-state.”42 The dissertation seeks to 
contribute to the larger historiographical project of restoring the corporation to a more 
 
1968); J. J. Eddy, Britain and the Australian Colonies, 1818–1831: The Technique of Government (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1969). For an excellent reengagement with this older literature, see Lisa Ford and 
David Andrew Roberts, “Expansion, 1820-50,” in Bashford and Macintyre, eds. The Cambridge History of 
Australia, vol. 1, 121–148. 
40 Penelope Anne Pemberton, “The London Connection: The Formation and Early Years of the Australian 
Agricultural Company,” PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 1991. 
41 Edward Cavanagh, “A Company with Sovereignty and Subjects of its Own? The Case of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company, 1670–1763,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 26 (2011): 25–50; Emily Erikson, Between 
Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); 
Rupali Mishra, A Business of State: Commerce, Politics, and the Birth of the East India Company (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); William A. Pettigrew, Freedom’s Debt: The Royal African Company and 
the Politics of the Atlantic Slave Trade (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
42 Rachel Brewster and Philip J. Stern, “Introduction to the Proceedings of the Seminar on Corporations and 
International Law,” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 28 (2018), 413–414. 
 20 
prominent place in accounts of modern world history, and it does so by focusing on a series 
of linked case-studies that draw out the centrality of the corporation to that other driver of 
world-historical change, European imperial expansion.     
 It contributes to the reappraisal of company colonisation in two key senses. In the first 
instance, it punctures a tendency in the literature to treat chartered colonial enterprise as an 
explicitly early modern phenomenon that can be easily set apart from modern European 
empire building. As Elizabeth Mancke has argued, “a broad examination of chartered 
enterprises offers a bridge between the commercial and colonial empires and between early 
modern and modern empires.”43 In shifting the focus of attention to the early nineteenth 
century, I challenge the classic periodisation of company colonisation. Historical scholarship 
on chartered colonialism has tended to overlook the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century, much like historians of international law have glanced over the same period in a rush 
to get to Martti Koskenniemi’s “men of 1873.”44 The historiography thus jumps from the early 
modern to the Scramble for Africa, from the world of the Virginia Company and the East India 
Company, to that of the Royal Niger Company and the British South Africa Company.45 The 
dissertation offers a corrective to the prevailing periodisation of chartered enterprise, which 
in turn forces us to think more discriminately about the long arc of company colonisation.
 Second, the dissertation revises our spatial understanding of company colonisation 
through the inclusion of Britain’s antipodean colonies. The Pacific, which has been the subject 
of considerable historiographical focus of late, has not conventionally been associated with 
chartered companies, the East India Company’s monopoly rights in the region never seriously 
enforced.46 Taking heed of Mancke’s attempt to collapse the space between the commercial 
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and the colonial, the early modern and the modern, the dissertation casts its net out to the 
Pacific, a region of the world frequently marginalised in panoramic global histories.47 Yet, as I 
demonstrate, company colonisation has an important Pacific dimension that connects it to 
broader developments in imperial capitalism.48 What is more, the centrality of North 
American chartered enterprise to company discourse in the antipodes suggests that there is 
historical merit in assessing the Pacific alongside its more well-known Atlantic predecessor.
 The dissertation also builds on the important work of Andrew Fitzmaurice and Philip 
J. Stern insofar as it takes company discourse seriously. Fitzmaurice’s deft treatment of the 
Virginia Company in Humanism and America (2003) stands as a model for how to write the 
intellectual history of company colonisation, his elegant recovery of how Renaissance 
humanism inflected company plans in Virginia a salutary reminder of the complex ideological 
freight that underlay early English colonial expansion.49 Fitzmaurice’s reconstruction of 
corporate culture is pertinent here as his analysis of the Virginia venture discloses how ideas 
influenced company strategy.       
 Indeed, in key respects, the interplay between ideas and corporate practice lies at the 
heart of this dissertation. That there were very real commercial pressures that bore down on 
the company men who moved between the boardrooms and merchant houses of the City of 
London only makes the examination of company discourse all the more interesting, for in 
carefully unpacking its intellectual history we are able to better grasp how corporate 
colonisation was historically rationalised.50 As Fitzmaurice notes, the “foundation of new 
commonwealths in America could not be pursued purely through study and contemplation. 
The projects demanded, and attracted, those who were committed to the highest ideals of 
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the Ciceronian conception of the active life.”51 We need not study corporations in the early 
modern period, however, to appreciate how company colonisation demanded both practical 
and theoretical engagement. As I show, committee meetings were attended at the same time 
as pamphlets and histories were mulled over in splendid isolation.    
 A sensitivity to the complexities of corporate culture is also evident in Philip J. Stern’s 
influential account of the English East India Company.52 Taking the Company “seriously as a 
political institution and its writing as a body of ideological work,” Stern demonstrates how a 
concern with government shaped the early history of that most famous of colonisation 
companies.53 The result is an account of corporate sovereignty that pushes back against the 
claim that the East India Company was simply a commercial venture, while at the same time 
also mounting an argument in favour of the early modern corporation as an incubator of 
innovation in the realm of ideas.54 “Approaching the Company as a form of state and 
sovereign, which claimed final jurisdiction and responsibility over people and places,” Stern 
writes, “suggests that the history of state formation and of political thought, only relatively 
recently extended to include the ideas and institutions of empire, might be extended even 
further, beyond the national form of those states and empires to apply to a range of corporate 
communities.”55 It is a historiographical suggestion that remains pregnant with possibility as 
the now well-developed subfield that links empire to modern political thought is still 
insufficiently alert to the generative impact of chartered colonialism.56  
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 After all, the corporation is by its very constitution a form of political society, wherein 
a group of people bind together to establish an artificial person that can act for the collective 
will of the corporators.57 A distinct legal personality, the corporation thus has a history that 
intersects with the history of political thought as much as its economic counterpart. As 
Andrew Fitzmaurice so aptly puts it, “All corporations, not only states, were understood to be 
bodies politic: that is, to be political communities whose members had a duty to act for the 
common, or public, good.”58 Yet if Fitzmaurice and Stern analyse the political implications of 
corporate sovereignty, my approach instead looks to the social dimensions of company 
colonisation.          
 This is not to suggest that these scholars are inattentive to the social character of 
corporate life; on the contrary, their respective portraits of the Virginia Company and the East 
India Company ably demonstrate how an appreciation of day-to-day business inside the 
boardroom had important ramifications for the content of ideas that flowed from the pens of 
company men to the outside world. Rather, I merely wish to point out that their work is 
primarily interested in company colonisation as a question that concerns modern political 
thought and its many entanglements with empire, not as an inquiry into the social and cultural 
history of imperial expansion.59 This dissertation aims to build on the pioneering scholarship 
of Fitzmaurice and Stern, while also extending it in new directions by focusing more explicitly 
on how company colonisation operated was socially embedded in imperial London.
 Some highly suggestive studies of colonial corporations in social context have begun 
to emerge in recent years, what David Chan Smith has judiciously called a “sociological turn” 
in corporate history.60 Margot Finn’s work on the East India Company has been especially 
influential in demonstrating the virtues of such an approach, not least for the much welcome 
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gendering of the field.61 Linking the domestic lives of families to the corporate life of the firm, 
Finn rethinks company colonisation through the family networks that made company rule in 
India possible.62 Likewise, Aske Laursen Brock’s analysis of company directors across a range 
of seventeenth century imperial ventures emphasises the social nature of chartered 
enterprise. “The directors,” remarks Brock, “were central brokers in varied social networks 
shaped by institutions, kinship, partnerships and the state,” their business operations tightly 
connected to the social constitution of their respective boards of directors.63 As William 
Pettigrew and David Veevers have observed, “Corporations were designed to be structures 
that bound individuals into one legal personality, but careful study of the prosopography of 
corporate communities proves that corporate entities provided a structural form for diverse 
groups of people–often with conflicting ideas and differing political persuasions–to enter and 
exit corporate membership.”64       
 One of the more challenging tasks for the historian of corporations is to consistently 
balance the Jekyll and Hyde nature of corporate identity, that is, to grasp the tension that 
exists between the corporators as a collective and the individuals who comprise it, and yet 
the multiple personalities that constitute any corporate actor are precisely what render it 
such a fascinating object of study. A wider frame of reference is evident in Edmond Smith’s 
analysis of the East India Company’s social network, in which he maps the centrality of 
London’s merchant community to the early history of that company.65 Such an approach, 
Smith persuasively argues, offers “new ways of thinking about institutions, communities, the 
public and the state,” while also disclosing “how a deeper understanding of social, cultural 
and economic exchange can inform the way we consider the East India Company and the 
global foundations of England’s empire.”66 However, as with the study of company 
 
61 Margot Finn, “The Female World of Love and Empire: Women, Family and East India Company Politics at the 
End of the Eighteenth Century,” Gender & History 31 (2019): 7–24. See also Margot Finn and Kate Smith, eds. 
The East India Company at Home (London: UCL Press, 2018). 
62 Finn is currently at work on a monograph, provisionally entitled Imperial Family Formations: Domestic 
Strategies and Colonial Power in British India, c. 1757–1857. 
63 Aske Laursen Brock, “The Company Director: Commerce, State and Society,” PhD dissertation, University of 
Kent, 2017, 9.  
64 William A. Pettigrew and David Veevers, “Introduction,” in Pettigrew and Veevers, eds. The Corporation as a 
Protagonist in Global History, 22–23. 
65 Edmond Joseph Smith, “Networks of the East India Company, c. 1600–1625,” PhD dissertation, University of 
Cambridge, 2016. See also Edmond Joseph Smith, “The Global Interests of London’s Commercial Community, 
1599–1625: Investment in the East India Company,” Economic History Review 71 (2018): 1118–1146. 
66 Smith, “Networks of the East India Company,” 1–2.  
 25 
colonisation more generally, this new wave of social histories has been preoccupied with the 
early modern period in general, and with the East India Company in particular. The 
dissertation seeks to apply the insights from this rich strand of writing on corporations to the 
novel context of Britain’s settler empire in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. It 
foregrounds the company as a community of men, and in so doing it shows how the 





Two interconnected moments of company colonisation focus the analysis. Part 1 examines a 
trio of corporations that emerged amidst the economic boom of 1824/25, namely the 
Australian Agricultural Company, the Canada Company, and the Van Diemen’s Land Company. 
While scholars of the British Empire have been apt to overlook them, the companies 
nevertheless acquired vast land holdings in Britain’s settler colonies, as well as injecting much 
needed capital into the economies in which they were based.     
 In chapter 2, I analyse how and why the company model reasserted itself over state-
led schemes of colonisation after 1815. This entails an exploration of both institutional and 
cultural drivers behind the unlikely return of corporate colonisation. I begin by situating the 
1824/25 trio in the long sweep of business incorporation, the better to make sense of this 
unduly neglected moment in the history of settler capitalism. The chapter then moves to an 
analysis of more proximate causes for company colonisation. In the case of the antipodean 
companies, the acceleration of pastoral development is the key factor that explains their 
formation, whereas the Canada Company was established to combat an altogether different 
problem in imperial political economy: how to transform the so-called Crown and Clergy 
Reserves, which encompassed 2/7ths of all land in the province, into cultivated property that 
could be sold for profit. 
Shifting from the institutional to the personal, Chapter 3 explores the business history 
of these firms from the vantage point of the social connections that sustained corporate 
culture. Here, I draw a distinction between the Australian Agricultural Company and the 
Canada Company, on the one hand, and the Van Diemen’s Land Company, on the other. 
Whereas the former two were networked into a social world with strong ties to the City’s 
merchant houses and the boardrooms of other colonisation companies, the latter resembled 
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something of an outlier insofar as it was distinctly more parochial, with shallow ties to the 
institutional pillars of colonial capitalism. The chapter concludes with an examination of key 
individuals: John Macarthur Junior in the case of the Australian Agricultural Company, and 
John Galt on behalf of the Canadian enterprise. Corporations may indeed be legal persons, 
but we need to ensure that we do not overlook the natural persons who compose them. 
 The final chapter in Part 1 extends the examination of company colonisation in social 
context through an interrogation of the interior lives of these firms. It focuses on the 
rhetorical self-positioning of the respective boards of directors, while also exploring the 
company crossings that united them in a shared discursive universe. I show how character 
talk was a staple feature of life inside the boardroom, and how the language of probity and 
moral economy infused corporate decision-making. Chapter 4 then turns to an excavation of 
the company conversations that were conducted across boardrooms, as well as their tactics 
of corporate espionage and commercial benchmarking. In attending to their shared discursive 
world, the chapter explores how these companies saw themselves in relation to one another 
and the broader market of joint stock colonisation companies at a moment of significant 
activity on the London Stock Exchange. It puts three sets of company books into dialogue with 
one another, reading the cultural history of the corporation as a key part of colonial strategy.  
Part 2 puts forward an original interpretation of the much-studied colonial reform 
movement, typically held to be a loose network of political economists and land speculators 
who banded together to implement the ideas of Edward Gibbon Wakefield. The three 
chapters in this section track the development of private colonial enterprise from the 
publication of Wakefield’s Letter from Sydney in 1829 to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi 
in 1840, anchoring my arguments in close studies of company colonisation in South Australia, 
Western Australia, and New Zealand. Future work on the colonial reform movement will 
benefit from taking the forward story into the 1840s, when debates about company 
colonisation intensified in the context of disputes between the companies, the Colonial 
Office, and indigenous peoples.  
A pair of chapters (5 & 6) examine how company colonisation influenced plans to 
systematically colonise South Australia, foregrounding the social context of colonial reform. 
They collectively speak to how chartered enterprise began to win out over colonial schemes 
devised in Whitehall throughout the 1830s, in which the imperial state took the lead in 
orchestrating colonisation. Chapter 5 begins with a reconstruction of Wakefield’s intellectual 
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project, and in particular how his colonial vision prioritised private capital. The chapter then 
analyses the social composition of the various boards that were founded to colonise South 
Australia, and in so doing I identify a transition from what was initially a discussion dominated 
by parliamentarians and political economists to one marked by bankers and merchants in the 
City. I argue that the company model did more than anything else to transform systematic 
colonisation from a theoretical template that preached the reform of colonial land policy into 
actual antipodean settlement plans.        
 As the core tenets of systematic colonisation were applied in service of company 
colonisation with astonishing rapidity throughout the early 1830s, the historical memory of 
past episodes of chartered enterprise began to colour how these actors understood the very 
nature of their colonial ventures. Chapter 6 demonstrates how North American precedent 
framed the plans of the colonial reformers, and it shows how American history furnished both 
a discursive and legal argument in favour of colonial speculation in the antipodes. I argue that 
the recourse to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century North America reveals a paradox at the 
heart of the systematic colonisation of South Australia. While the colonial reformers were 
eager to invoke the supposed novelty of their theory of colonisation, their textual archive also 
bears witness to a movement preoccupied with linking their theory to an older, but 
supposedly lost, tradition of colonisation.        
 The chapter then moves to an analysis of the often-overlooked South Australian 
Company, a commercial entity that arguably did more than any other body to sustain the 
colony in its fledgling years. I examine the diverse arms of the South Australian Company’s 
operations, which included banking and whaling, to illustrate how systematic colonisation had 
by the late 1830s became above all else a commercial proposition. In rethinking colonial 
reform in light of company colonisation, the two chapters on South Australia aim to situate 
the early colonial history of South Australia in the longer history of chartered colonial history, 
a discursive and legal connection that these historical actors themselves made. 
The final chapter extends the analysis of colonial reform to the twin contexts of New 
Zealand and Western Australia. In so doing, it revises our spatial understanding of systematic 
colonisation, which is typically associated with just South Australia and New Zealand. Chapter 
6 commences with a comparative examination of the Western Australian Company and the 
New Zealand Association (forerunner to the later Company). It argues that personal and 
intellectual links united the two enterprises, even as they dealt with race and indigenous 
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peoples in different ways. Attention is then devoted to the social profile of the two 
businesses. I show how merchant capital and links to the East India trade were prevalent on 
the boards of both, and how this in turn necessitates an approach to colonial reform that 
takes better account of the institutional ecology of the City of London. The chapter closes 
with reflections on what I call brokers of knowledge, the shared network of solicitors, bankers, 
and trusted advisors that made company colonisation possible. While company crossings at 
the level of the boardroom are clearly important, so too were the connections between the 
professional services industry and those lower down the chain of command. The analysis 
deepens our understanding of how colonial reform in London worked on a day-to-day basis. 
Companies and colonisation fused in halting, fragmentary and often hard to discern 
ways during the era of colonial reform, and yet fuse they did. This dissertation offers the first 
synoptic account of how company colonisation asserted itself across Britain’s settler empire 
in the years following the Napoleonic wars. It argues that the burst of company formation 
that emerged in 1824/25 is best understood in light of developments that took place in the 
City of London. Institutional and social forces in the Square Mile in the early nineteenth 
century dovetailed with a renewed interest in settler colonial expansion after 1815 to create 
the conditions for a wave of company speculation at the dawn of the Pax Britannica. The 
companies that were formed went on to reorder the British Empire in line with their corporate 
ambitions. Although fleeting and transitory, the history of company colonisation at the 
beginning of the settler revolution prompts us to see less like an imperial state and more like 
















Rage for Speculation 
 
Established amid the economic boom of 1824/25, the Australian Agricultural Company, the 
Canada Company, and the Van Diemen’s Land Company were conceived during a period of 
rampant company formation in London. United in place and time, all three staked claims on 
the future prospects of Britain’s expanding settler world. Although the relative performance 
of each firm varied over time, they proved a remarkably successful collective. The two 
antipodean companies survive to this day, while the Canada Company only dissolved in 1953. 
Yet in spite of this longevity there is little awareness of their shared history.    
This chapter argues that the emergence of company colonisation in the middle of the 
1820s was the product of a collision between long run trends in the evolution of business 
enterprise, on the one hand, and more local shifts in the composition of imperial political 
economy on the other. In so doing, the chapter advances an interpretation of company 
formation that links developments in the City with broader shifts in the nature of settler 
capitalism after 1815. Though recently overlooked, the companies had large land holdings 
and a significant financial presence in the local economies in which they operated. The 
Australian Agricultural Company was granted 1,000,000 acres of land in New South Wales, for 
instance, while the Van Diemen’s Land Company’s establishment at Circular Head was a 
significant employer of local labour.67 Not to be outdone, the Canada Company was the 
largest private landholder in Upper Canada with over 2,000,000 acres to its name.68 
 What studies we have of these companies have tended to focus on their commercial 
activities in Australia and Canada.69 However, it is important to underscore that they won 
their influence in London.70 There is consequently a need to more thoroughly contextualise 
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the metropolitan dimension of their corporate history, in particular the City of London’s 
influence on firm behaviour and identity. In that frame, the chapter opens with an account of 
the business corporation as it evolved from the invention of joint stock capital investment in 
the early seventeenth century to the rage for speculation that convulsed London in the mid-
1820s, thereby situating the company projections of 1824/25 in the long sweep of business 
enterprise. The trio of colonial companies under discussion were part of a much larger 
transformation that converged on the City and I track the institutional and cultural 
developments that made this unlikely revival of company colonisation possible. 
Yet institutions only matter insofar as they provide a general framework for actors in 
the marketplace, and to that end the chapter moves from analysing the institutional history 
of the business corporation to an approach that places greater weight on shifts in imperial 
political economy. The Australian companies were inextricably linked to the advent of 
pastoral expansion in the 1820s, when land settlement in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s 
Land began to reorient itself away from the coast and towards the interior. The much-studied 
Bigge Report was especially critical in the case of the two antipodean companies, and I explore 
how it was conscripted into the legitimation of company colonisation. While both entities 
based their business models on a pair of assumptions drawn from the Bigge Report, namely 
that vast tracts of antipodean land could be acquired cheaply and that a ready provision of 
convict labour could be taken off the hands of government in order to rear stock for the export 
of fine merino wool, I argue that only the Australian Agricultural Company foregrounded its 
projection in terms that explicitly connected it to Bigge.  
Upper Canada was another matter. While the Canada Company can usefully be placed 
alongside the Australian companies for the purposes of comparison, its origins and intentions 
were as distinct as the natural environment in which it was based. Southern Ontario was not 
Port Stephens or north-west Tasmania, and the Canada Company spoke to the peculiar nature 
of land settlement that had arisen in Upper Canada since the creation of the province in 1791. 
Whereas the Australian Agricultural Company and the Van Diemen’s Land Company aimed to 
create pastoral communities in areas with little prior European settlement, and hence at some 
remove from the colonial centres in Sydney and Hobart Town, the Canada Company strove to 
ameliorate what its founders thought was the disfigurement inflicted upon colonial society 
by the Clergy and Crown Reserves. These local considerations help explain why the Canada 
Company was primarily interested in selling colonial real estate, in the tradition of American 
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land companies such as the Ohio Company and the Holland Land Company, whereas the 
antipodean companies hitched their fortunes to the rearing of livestock.  
 
Business Incorporation and the City of London 
 
 
How and why did company colonisation boom from 1824 onwards? To answer this question, 
we need to examine structural changes to the British economy after the wars with France 
(1793–1815). Developments in the City of London and in the country more generally proved 
a fillip for company formation, and this was especially true of those with an international 
and/or imperial dimension. Low interest rates made investment in British debt unappealing, 
luring investors abroad in an effort to seek out healthy returns, while a rapidly rising 
population contributed to a deterioration in Britain’s balance of payments.71 By one estimate, 
the population of Britain more than doubled between 1783 and 1841, from a base of 13 
million to nearly 27 million.72 Demography may not be destiny, but Britain’s expanding cities 
and towns nonetheless began to place considerable strain on what was then a stagnating 
economy. As scholars have demonstrated, the dislocation caused by the sudden end of the 
Napoleonic wars, combined with pre-existing social inequities, led many to ponder the 
possibilities of emigration as a potential remedy.73     
 Victory in war had swiftly been followed by an embattled peace, and the colonial 
world beckoned as a solution to domestic trauma. There is historiographical consensus that 
the economic policies implemented by successive Tory governments after the war made 
transition more difficult than it otherwise could have been, the commitment to deflationary 
measures widely held to be a mistake.74 However, what concerns us here is the sudden switch 
to monetary easing once the 1821 reversion to the gold standard was abandoned. 1823 and 
1824 figure importantly in this account, for during the course of these two years the Liverpool 
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government engaged in a sustained campaign of credit expansion. The result was a financial 
climate conducive to speculation: low interest rates meant credit was easy to access, and 
banks engaged in purchases on the open market.75    
 Institutional change amplified market sentiments. In July 1825, after several turbulent 
months on the London Stock Exchange, Parliament repealed the Bubble Act of 1720. The Act, 
which was brought onto the statute books after the South Sea Bubble of the same year, made 
it illegal to establish a company without a royal charter.76 Founded in 1711, the South Sea 
Company was established to help the British government reduce debt sustained during the 
War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) and, from 1713, it enjoyed a monopoly on the 
slave trade to South America, the so-called Asiento contract.77 However, the audacious debt 
for equity swaps that saw Britain’s national debt transformed into Company shares proved 
an illusory basis for sustainable commerce. In the autumn of 1720, less than a decade after 
beginning operations, the Company’s share price began to plummet. A major financial crisis 
soon followed, and the Bubble Act aimed to prevent a similar spike in corporate speculation 
from occurring ever again.78  
While we should be wary of ascribing too much significance to a single stroke of the 
legislative pen, it would be unwise to wholly discount the repeal of the 1720 Act from our 
analysis. As William Quinn and John D. Turner note, the confluence of factors just described 
would not have caused a bubble were there not a “permissive attitude towards incorporation 
and the trading of shares.”79 If nothing else, the repeal of the Bubble Act contributed to this 
more emollient attitude towards joint stock equity, and it did so by making it easier to 
establish a company. Those without the means or social connections to seek incorporation 
could now constitute themselves on a joint stock basis, effectively endorsing the wave of 
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corporate speculation by then well under way. In this context company formation once again 
appeared to many an attractive proposition, not that the company model was foreordained 
to fill the breach. 
Those with income to invest in the first half of the nineteenth century typically turned 
to the national debt, though the business corporation was becoming an increasingly common 
option for capital investment.80 Consolidated annuities, more commonly referred to as 
consols, by this point constituted the largest share of the public funds, rapidly displacing other 
government-backed securities since their introduction by Lord Pelham in 1751. A capital note 
of sorts, consols paid investors a fixed interest rate, typically three or five percent per annum 
on a par price of £100. While investors had the option of turning to alternatives like exchequer 
bills and bonds, there was no active market in either; consols, on the other hand, were 
frequently traded, the queen of British gilts, with a ready market of buyers and sellers.81 
However, since the English financial revolution of the later seventeenth century, 
periodic bouts of speculation in joint stock companies had become a mainstay of what we 
would now call the business cycle.82 The development of the London capital market from the 
1690’s onwards stimulated significant financial innovation, and joint stock investment over 
the next century grew steadily as a result. In particular, investors placed bets on the so-called 
old “moneyed” companies: the English East India Company, the South Sea Company, and the 
Bank of England. This corporate triumvirate proved particularly popular among London’s 
commercial and political elite, and they played an especially important role in servicing the 
new national debt.83          
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 Yet it was not until the rise of industrial capitalism in the later eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries that the corporation began to assume a more central place in British 
economic life. Investors had long been able to turn to business enterprise as a source of 
potential profit, most often in the form of the trust or private partnership.84 But prior to the 
1850’s capital investment in joint stock ventures was comparatively rare, certainly its 
proportion of total investment was marginal  if the moneyed companies are discounted from  
analysis.85 The demands of large scale industrial projects, however, posed a direct challenge 
to the trust and partnership. Just how suitable were they for this new age of entrepreneurial 
projections? Might the joint stock company not better fulfil the needs of investors?
 While investment in joint stock companies remained sporadic and limited until the 
mid-nineteenth century, when the opening up of the railways transformed the Victorian 
economy, there was nonetheless a noticeable shift in the direction of the business 
corporation from the 1790s onwards.86 Heavy utilities and other industries with high fixed 
costs were the first sectors to embrace the corporation, in large part because of dynamics 
endemic to these markets.87 For example, the canal industry, some thirty years before the 
stock market bubble of 1824/1825, had its own speculative boom, while insurance, dock, 
water supply, and gas lighting companies all followed suit in the new century.88 As Ron Harris 
has written, “In the 1800s, for the first time since 1720, wide circles of society showed interest 
in the shares of joint-stock companies throughout the English economy, not only in those of 
the moneyed companies or of a specific sector.”89 Whereas corporate investment had 
traditionally attracted the attention of a narrow swath of society, typically among those with 
family or personal connections to a given industry or enterprise, underlying changes in the 
macroeconomy were beginning to broaden the base of investors in joint stock companies.
 Despite an initial wave of optimism after the defeat of Napoleon, the British economy 
remained muted for some time to come. Manufacturing output declined, and investment in 
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capital projects at home fared little better. Speculation in foreign markets seemed more 
attractive when set against this bleak economic backdrop, and the incentive structure of the 
economy shifted towards overseas investment as a result.90 One consequence of a stifled 
domestic economy was a number of high-profile foreign loans, much commented on by the 
contemporary press. The creation of the London loan market was in key respects also driven 
by the newfound independence of a number of Latin American states, many of whom were 
eager for fresh injections of capital to fund large infrastructure projects and more general 
economic development.91 At the same time, financiers in the City, determined to claw back 
business after the Napoleonic wars, saw in the nascent independence movements an 
opportunity to stake a leading claim in the new markets thus created.92 A convergence of 
objectives between the emerging governments of Latin America and the financial wellsprings 
of the City here collided, a fortuitous alignment that owed as much to historical accident and 
shifts in geopolitics as it did to the economic strictures of the market. 
Particularly symbolic in this respect were the loans by the merchant houses of Baring 
and Rothschild to the French government in 1824: “A loan to the unparalleled amount of 
3,300,000,000 of francs, or 132 millions sterling, has, it is said, been contracted for in Paris by 
Messrs. Baring, Rothschild, and the French banker, Laffitte … The arrangement is so extended, 
it is said, as to apply to the discharge, if necessary, of the entire national debt of France,” 
noted one prominent daily in reference to the contentious loans to Britain’s recently 
vanquished enemy.93 There was little doubt, however, that the loans reflected the City’s 
growing confidence in underwriting international commerce. As Cain and Hopkins note, the 
City began to “assume a fully international role and to perform a key function in balancing 
Britain’s payments” in the post-1815 period, a trend towards global integration that further 
entrenched connections between the banks and merchant houses of London to the far-flung 
corners of the world.94          
 It was not just London’s capital markets that were integrated into the global capitalist 
system. From the late eighteenth century onwards, British manufactured goods and finished 
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products began to circulate the globe in ever increasing quantities, fuelled by empire and also 
technical and scientific developments at home, hence the famous sobriquet that Britain was 
the “workshop of the world.”95 At the same time, commodities and raw materials sourced 
from Asia and the Americas were shipped to British ports such as Liverpool and Leith, while 
slavers in Bristol and tobacco merchants in Glasgow exploited transatlantic trade networks to 
accrue vast profits.96 The imperial political economy was always international in orientation, 
of course, and the business corporation proved a particularly adept imperial agent. Although 
historians have curiously downplayed the pivotal role of companies in the making of global 
capitalism, there is now a growing historiography that accounts for the manifold ways in 
which imperial corporations knitted together global commerce.97 Company colonisation was 
nothing new in 1824/25, and subsequent chapters unpack this in detail.   
 The upshot of all this was a vastly more expansive market for joint stock shares and 
significantly greater engagement with the stock market by ordinary investors. No longer were 
the vistas of corporate speculation confined to those of the old moneyed companies, as a 
cursory glance at the Course of the Exchange during this period will attest. A reflection of 
going concerns in London at any one moment, the Exchange broadened its coverage during 
the early nineteenth century in order to take account of the new companies then beginning 
to form.98 By the stock market boom of 1824/25 companies were no longer the marginal 
securities they had once been, even if their heyday was still to come. Although there was no 
concerted push, or transformative event, that we can point to in order to account for the rise 
of the business corporation prior to the railways, it is clear that structural shifts to Britain’s 
macroeconomy over time opened up the space for companies to take root. The settler 
corporations that focus Part 1 of this dissertation need to be placed in this framework, as do 
those that contributed to the colonial reform movement. 
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Culture of the Boom 
 
From early 1824 until a spectacular collapse in late 1825, the City of London was awash with 
corporate speculation. William Quinn and John D. Turner note that what began as a “trickle 
of company promotions in the early part of 1824 grew in the latter part of the year and had 
become a deluge by January 1825, with 65 major companies being promoted in that month 
alone.”99 Widely covered in the national press, the proliferation of companies encompassed 
everything from banking to Mexican mining. “Great public interest has been excited of late 
by the formation of companies in London,” observed the Gentleman’s Magazine, “whose 
object it is to work the silver mines of Mexico, and who have raised large capitals for that 
purpose.”100 As the anonymous author of Remarks on Joint Stock Companies by an Old 
Merchant (1826) likewise remarked, “Each day brings forth its brood; they spring up around 
us on every side; from Ocres in the earth to Pearl Oysters in the sea; from Mexico to New 
Holland … each quarter of the globe is explored, and all trades and professions are scrutinized, 
to discern if peradventure they may not afford some basis whereupon to build the goodly 
edifice of a Joint Stock Company.”101 This was company speculation with a profoundly global 
footprint, of which the trio of settler corporations that frame Part 1 form an important 
imperial subset.          
 The culture of the boom tended towards the sensational, and unalloyed exuberance 
was without question the sentiment that captured the tenor of the times. “The rage for 
speculation in this City continues unabated, and, when properly directed, is praiseworthy,” 
noted one contemporary account in the Morning Chronicle, while other articles in the print 
media amplified the private voices of those experiencing it from the inside..102 “The new 
Steam Navigation Company is rather a favourite, and we understand that shares to the 
desired amount have been written for. A new Insurance Company (The Minervar) will, it is 
said, apply to Parliament this evening for an Act of Incorporation. Such is the rumour of the 
Stock Exchange.”103 Significantly, the social credentials of board members were frequently 
foregrounded in the financial press. “A new Mining Company started yesterday, and although 
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moderate in its pretensions as to capital, yet it exceeds all others in the dignity of its patrons. 
Having one Marquess, four Earls, two Baronets, with four Right Honourables and 
Honourables, besides a committee of twenty-one respectable Gentlemen.”104  
 Far from unique in its emphasis on the composition of the directorate, such 
commentary reflected broader cultural currents insofar as it captured an abiding interest in 
the social profile of what contemporaries called public men.105 Just as English writers from 
the early modern period onwards concerned themselves with the comportment of 
individuals, so a fascination with men acting in concert with one another attracted the 
attention of public moralists and critics alike.106 Companies and the world of commerce 
proved no exception, and the nascent financial press played a key role in accelerating this 
trend in the aftermath of the stock market crash.107 As I show in Chapter 3, the social profiles 
of company directors mattered because perceptions of high standing were linked to influence 
in the City of London, on the one hand, and proper conduct and probity on the other.  
Frothy markets were also accompanied by much fear and loathing. Could the boom 
last? Was it even desirable? For many, the wave of company formation was nothing more 
than rash speculation. “Men of character in the city are too apt to lend the influence of their 
names to schemes of which they can know nothing, and seldom undergo the trouble of any 
inquiry into their merits.”108 For others, the precautionary principle was advisable. “All these 
are undertakings on a very large scale, and, in the present mania that prevails, every day may 
be expected to add to their number. There may be good in all of them; we offer no opinion 
on their merits; but, on the part of the public generally, the utmost caution and 
circumspection ought to be exercised before engaging in any of them.”109 For others still, it 
had resemblances to the South Sea Bubble, then the most notorious financial crash in world 
history. “In respect to the number of new schemes for the employment of money, London, 
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and indeed the country in general, strikingly resembles what it was at the period of the South 
Sea scheme, when scarcely any project was too absurd to obtain support.”110 Historical 
precedent could be used to legitimate company colonisation, as the remaining chapters in 
the dissertation showcase, but it could also be cited in support of quite the opposite. There 
were lessons to be learned from company crises of times past, the more risk averse (and 
potentially thoughtful) posited.       
 Antipathy towards corporate speculation, of course, had a long pedigree in English 
culture and by the early nineteenth century a well-developed tradition of satirising the 
marketplace and the “stock-jobbers” who inhabited it was firmly entrenched.111 Part of the 
reason for this scepticism towards the stock market and the company model, particularly 
acute during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was a concern that commerce would 
erode the privileges and social standing of the traditional ruling elite. Peter Cain and A. G. 
Hopkins applied this insight to British imperialism some time ago now, when they argued that 
a band of “gentlemanly capitalists” in the service of empire posed a direct challenge to the 
landed aristocracy. This hostility to the market built on more longstanding anxieties about the 
corrosive impact of commerce on civic society, namely that commercial enterprise rather 
gloomily dissolved the social bonds that encouraged the pursuit of civility. The disruption to 
the smooth operation of political economy, in particular, challenged the insulated position of 
the landed elite by exposing them to the unsentimental vicissitudes of the market.112 Periodic 
booms and busts only served to underline the point, a visible reminder that those wary of the 
market readily latched on to.      
Those with an inflated sense of confidence in the market were caustically dealt with 
in the “Lunarian Company” lampoon, one of the more colourful jibes dating from this period. 
“A joint Stock Company is in contemplation, to be called the “Lunarian Company for opening 
new sources of trade and commerce,” the fictitious prospectus read. “The capital to be 
subscribed is Two Hundred Millions, to be paid in instalments, which, it is estimated, will 
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produce about sixty and a quarter per cent. The scheme has been suggested by the late 
discovery of a Fortress in the Moon, besides vineyards, corn fields, and pasture lands.”113 
Humour aside, the lunar satire spoke to a very real concern among observant critics of the 
stock market boom, namely that a spectacular bubble was about to burst. Even the world, it 
seems, was not enough.        
 Such fears were stoked by an overseas investment market that many thought had long 
since overheated. Pushed abroad for want of better opportunities at home, British investors 
turned in droves towards foreign markets. The result was bold, often reckless, corporate 
gambling, what James Taylor has called the “sins of speculation.”114 Though there was much 
warning in the contemporary press, and in The Times in particular, there was little appetite 
for caution. Indeed, investors readily parted with their money for deposits on shares in 
companies that were barely constituted, if they were constituted at all, while a clear sense of 
risk management seems conspicuously lacking from the historical record, certainly it was far 
from rigorous. After all, these were companies that preached a high return even if they 
struggled to articulate a clear value proposition. Hence we have all the outward trappings of 
stock market speculation, what might be called the performativity of speculation: the printing 
and passing of handbills and company prospectuses, gatherings in pubs and coffee houses, 
advertisements and articles issued in the print media.115 This was a moment in time that 
epitomised the culture of the boom, where even the most untested and unproven of 
corporate propositions was amply funded by eager investors. 
Complementing these changes in the metropolitan economy was a reinvigorated 
interest in emigration and colonisation. From “booster literature” to land speculation, talk of 
colonies and colonisation was high on the agenda in the mid-1820s. Political economists, 
colonial officials and land speculators began to debate the relative merits of empire with 
renewed vigour after 1815, while growing poverty across the British Isles made emigration 
increasingly attractive for parishes struggling to support those in need.116 Mass 
demobilisation, the sudden severing of wartime contracts, rising inequality and an 
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unpredictable economy all heightened a sense that fundamental changes needed to be made. 
In this context many wondered whether emigration might provide solace for the nation’s 
troubles, what Thomas Carlyle later nominated the “Condition of England Question.”117 
 Although the political economy discussion about emigration and colonisation in the 
1820s was dominated by schemes for state-assisted emigration, most especially those put 
forward by Undersecretary of State for War and the Colonies Robert Wilmot Horton, there 
was a lingering and often pointed concern that the costs imposed would bear too great a 
charge on the exchequer.118 Might not private capitalists defray the cost of emigration, 
perhaps in the form of a colonisation company? “The question of encouraging Emigration to 
Canada is doubtless that to which Government and the Country look as of most immediate 
importance in the expected operations of the Company,” noted an 1826 Canada Company 
paper.119 It proved to be an early nod in the direction of private colonial enterprise that 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the companies he was associated with would prosecute in the 
following decade (see Part 2).  
The cascade of investment that rippled through the City in the early months of 1824 
was to a perhaps unprecedented degree channelled towards overseas markets. From South 
American mining companies to Gregor MacGregor’s infamous “Poyais” bonds, the narrow 
lanes and alleys of the Square Mile were consumed by a rage for speculation.120 Reflecting on 
the feverish state of the London market, Henry English, the contemporary chronicler of the 
stock market boom, counted no less than 624 new joint stock companies that were formed 
in 1824 and 1825.121 As a memorable 1826 letter to The Times put it, the speculative frenzy 
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saw companies sprout up “in shoals like herring from the Polar Seas.”122 Writing from his 
chambers in Lincolns Inn, John Macarthur Junior did not disagree. In a letter to his younger 
brother James in late 1824, John Junior, son of the famous wool merchant John Macarthur 
and leading light of the newly formed Australian Agricultural Company, was much taken by 
the entrepreneurial spirit of the times. “There never was a more speculative age, or one in 
which this country seemed so prosperous.”123 It was in this context, defined as much by shifts 
in the culture of the City of London as structural changes to the British economy, that this trio 
of settler companies were established. 
 
The Bigge Report and Pastoral Expansion 
 
Company colonisation in the antipodes was spurred on by the publication of the Bigge Report 
in 1822/23, one of the most discussed texts in Australian national historiography.124 Hired by 
Lord Bathurst in September 1818, John Thomas Bigge (1780–1843), an English judge and royal 
commissioner, was instructed to enquire whether it was “advisable to continue or to alter, or 
to abandon, the system which for near forty years has been pursued” in the Australian 
colonies, namely convict transportation.125 A sweeping appraisal of the political economy of 
New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, the report also recommended opening up the 
colony (Van Diemen’s Land remained under the jurisdiction of New South Wales until an 
order-in-council was passed in June 1825) to private enterprise, particularly sheep farming. 
“Upon the expediency of promoting in the colony of New South Wales the growth of fine 
wool, and creating a valuable export from thence to Great Britain,” Bigge noted in his third 
report, “no doubt can be entertained, as it appears to be the principal, if not the only source 
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of productive industry within the colony, from which the settlers can derive the means of 
repaying the advances made to them from the mother country, or supplying their own 
demands for foreign manufacture.”126        
 Much influenced by John Macarthur, who had corresponded with him on the matter, 
it also made the case for the assignment of convicts to pastoral entrepreneurs. Convict labour 
would prove a defining feature of the two Australian companies, and it was a dimension of 
their business model that set them apart from the contemporary Canada Company.127 In 
Bigge’s sights here was the more productive use of capital, what contemporaries would have 
interpreted as an injunction to adopt a more prudent political economy–an issue of acute 
concern in the age of Macquarie, where profligacy and grand public buildings went hand in 
hand.128           
 And so it transpired, with both the Australian Agricultural Company and the Van 
Diemen’s Land Company framing their corporate principles in light of the Bigge Report’s key 
provisions. Attracted by the prospect of cheap convict labour, plentiful land and a ready 
market for wool back in a rapidly industrialising England, the respective directors struck 
agreements with the Crown whereby they would be entitled to a large land grant provided 
they raised the necessary capital. For every convict employed, moreover, they would be able 
to claim a reduction in their quit rent.129 Employing a mixed labour model, that is, a labour 
force composed of both free and convict labour, though complicated by the extensive 
employment of so-called “indentured” servants on seven-year contracts (with some 
exceptions as to duration), the Australian Agricultural Company and the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company were required to take up their land grants at a remove from the colonial 
 
126 British Parliamentary Papers, “Report of the Commissioner of Inquiry on Agriculture and Trade in New 
South Wales,” 18. 
127 Ritchie, Punishment and Profit, 212.  
128 T. G. Parsons, “Governor Macquarie and the Economic Crisis in New South Wales 1810–1815,” New Zealand 
Journal of History 2 (1968): 178–200; Iain Stuart, “Macquarie and the Towns,” Journal of the Royal Australian 
Historical Society 105 (2019): 26–48. See also Malcolm Henry Ellis, Lachlan Macquarie: His Life, Adventures, 
and Times (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2010).  
129 The Australian Agricultural Company was established by Act of Parliament in 1824 (5 Geo. IV C. 86.). See An 
Act for granting Powers and Authorities to a Company to be incorporated by Charter, to be called “The 
Australian Agricultural Company,” for the Cultivation and Improvement of Waste Lands in the Colony of New 
South Wales, and for other Purposes relating thereto, 21 June 1824. The Van Diemen’s Land Company followed 
suit in 1825 (6 Geo. IV C. 39.). See An Act for granting certain Powers and Authorities to a Company, to be 
incorporated by Charter, to be called “The Van Diemen’s Land Company,” for the cultivation of Improvement of 
Waste Lands in His Majesty’s Island of Van Diemen’s Land, and for other Purposes relating thereto,” 10 June 
1825, enclosed in CO 280/1, Colonial Office Correspondence Tasmania, TNA, Kew.  
 44 
establishments at Sydney and Hobart Town.130 This insistence on removal from colonial 
society distinguishes them from the companies studied in Part 2. Whereas the Wakefield-
inspired land companies sought to concentrate settlement in tightly regulated cities and 
towns, the 1824/25 antipodean duo envisioned company settlements that did not interfere 
with the so-called settled districts. These were to be agricultural trading companies, not 
reincarnations of the Plymouth Company in the South Seas. 
It is worth pausing for a moment to reflect on the centrality of convict labour to the 
business practices of these two settler companies. Private assignment had been a staple 
feature of Australian political economy since Governor Arthur Philip first grappled with the 
peculiar circumstances of New South Wales’s foundation, but the inclusion of a corporation 
into the picture in the 1820s heralded a novel development.131 Private assignment, of course, 
was nothing new; indeed, it was widely practiced in North America, Maryland and Virginia 
most especially. And it was subsequently replicated in Australia after the American 
Revolutionary War ended in 1783, which prompted the British government to find an 
alternative site so as to resume transportation.132 As Barrie Dyster has observed, “assignment 
in New South Wales resembled the system that operated in the American colonies before 
1776,” whereby convicts were leased to private masters. Yet, as Dyster also notes, the 
preponderance of the colonial state in early New South Wales meant that things were rather 
different in the antipodes. Whereas in America the ship’s contractor who transported felons 
across the Atlantic was the legal owner of said convict labour, and derived a profit from sale 
upon arrival, in Australia ultimate authority was always vested in government.133 It was the 
colonial authorities who decided whether to contract out to private masters, and not 
intermediaries as in the case of America. 
There was also nothing new in world-historical terms about a corporation making use 
of unfree labour. Indeed, chartered companies had for many years incorporated various 
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forms of coerced labour into their business practices. Kerry Ward has demonstrated how the 
Dutch East India Company drew on a large pool of indentured labour to power company 
colonisation in Java and the Cape Colony, for instance, while scholars have documented the 
connections between slavery and the City of London in the case of the Royal African 
Company.134 Nonetheless, the practice was unknown in the Australian colonies until it was 
pioneered by the Australian Agricultural Company and the Van Diemen’s Land Company in 
the 1820s. And it is this local dynamic that makes the antipodean companies’ use of convict 
labour all the more interesting. If nothing else, it is the clearest indication that these were 
companies conceived of in a post-Bigge world.  
Prior to the assignment of convicts to the Australian Agricultural Company and the 
Van Diemen’s Land Company in the 1820s, the process of assignment was a more intimate 
affair insofar as individuals petitioned the authorities for the provision of convict workers. The 
colonial government, at the bequest of these settlers, the majority of whom were wealthy 
landowners, took on convict labourers and an agreed upon levy was offset against the quit 
rent of land grants bestowed by the Crown. It was this method that ensured prominent 
colonists such as Gregory Blaxland and John Macarthur Senior would have a supply of convict 
labourers.135 While ultimately small in scale (in relative terms) and isolated away from the 
main colonial establishments, the arrival of the two settler corporations changed the dynamic 
of assignment in Australia.         
 Records from the Australian Agricultural Company’s colonial settlement draw the 
convict dimension of company colonisation out in striking detail. As a “General Abstract of 
the Population” at Port Stephens in northern New South Wales shows, convicts made up the 
bulk of the settlement. Of a total population of 381, 204 were so-called “Prisoners”; 42 were 
“Free Men”; 55 were “Emancipists”; 28 were women, most likely the wives of the free labour 
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force, while a further 52 were children.136 A year later, when the Company’s colonial agents 
enclosed “a List of Prisoners that have been assigned to the Company from the origin of its 
Establishment to the 30th of April last, and a statement of the Offices and other Servants in 
the Colony, in the receipt of Salary and Wages,” the directors were informed that the total 
number of convict workers employed by the Company since its inception was over twice that 
it hired the previous year. “This list,” a marginal comment matter-of-factly noted, “shews 413 
prisoners to have been in the employ of the compy” as of April 1828.137 While the records of 
the Van Diemen’s Land Company are less organised when it comes to the documentation of 
their labour force, Jennifer Duxbury and Geoff Dean have both examined how convict labour 
propelled early corporate development in Tasmania.138    
 Studied at length by the Australian Agricultural Company, the Bigge Report was 
frequently referred to and cited in correspondence with the Colonial Office.139 But just as 
important was the traction it exerted within the confines of the boardroom. In framing 
internal company conversations throughout the period of formation, the Bigge Report 
assumed a significance unmatched by any other source of authority. If the South Australian 
Association and the New Zealand Company looked to colonial North America as their lodestar, 
the Australian Agricultural Company invoked evidence more obviously connected to the 
antipodes. This was a text that validated their colonial ambitions through the 
recommendation of pastoral expansion, and in doing so Bigge’s otherwise sober analysis of 
New South Wales lent credence to the vision of colonial capitalism that began to take shape 
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in meetings over the next weeks and months from the London Tavern, Bishopsgate Street, 
and other such social settings in which the directors gathered.  
It was mentioned at the first meeting of the promoters in April 1824, for example. The 
gathering, which was arranged “with a view of considering the expediency of instituting a 
Company, to obtain a Grant of Land in the Colony of New South Wales, to extend and improve 
the flocks of Merino Sheep, and for other purposes,” was notable for the production of a nine-
page proposal that enumerated guiding principles and objectives. The “Observations and 
Plan” of the Company was shot through with references to Bigge, in particular those passages 
that emphasised the importance of capital investment to agricultural development. As such, 
Bigge’s findings were tactically redeployed to supply the evidentiary basis of the Company’s 
capitalist schemes.140 The promoters likewise cited the Report in arguing for a favourable quit 
rent linked to the employment of convicts, and for this reason the Colonial Office had to 
similarly grapple with its potential bearing on the proposed Company.141  
In a similar vein, the Bigge Report featured prominently in the account delivered to 
the first annual gathering of shareholders. Mindful of fluctuations on the stock market, the 
board tried to allay fears that the Company was in any way connected with what some 
commentators labelled “stock-jobbing,” that is, the buying and selling of shares with the 
primary aim of scoring a quick profit.142 When “every occasion is anxiously watched to give 
fresh impulse and increased vigour to a spirit of speculation,” the proprietors were informed, 
“the Directors conceive that it is more prudent to withhold the statements and calculations 
of individuals, and to present to the proprietors such information only as rests upon public 
and indisputable authority." With that in mind, the directors turned immediately to Bigge, 
whose reports were beyond reproach when it came to the crucial matter of public authority. 
“Adopting, therefore, this course, the first document to which they will refer, is the report of 
the Commissioner of Inquiry, appointed in 1819, to investigate the condition and resources 
of the Colony of New South Wales, and published in the year 1823, by order of the House of 
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Commons.”143 Insofar as Bigge’s series of reports on New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land 
offered comfort to those investors who were wary of the new Company’s first steps in the 
colony, it seems reasonable to ascribe to them a degree of moral authority.  
A passage on page 18 of Bigge’s third report was singled out for its applicability to the 
assembled proprietors, and it would in turn form a recurrent part of Company discourse:  
 
The concluding part of this extract, that "the most favourable opportunities are 
afforded to individuals disposed and capable of entering upon an extensive 
scheme of agricultural speculation," may warrant a belief, that the Commissioner 
of Inquiry, when he wrote, contemplated with satisfaction the prospect of English 
capital being transferred to New South Wales, and employed in advancing a great 
and most important national undertaking.144 
 
Nor was public facing Company literature any less sanguine about acknowledging debts owed 
to Bigge’s commission. On 26 November 1824, the same day that the chairman reported to 
the board that the charter had been completed and placed in the London office, the Company 
issued a prospectus that foregrounded Bigge’s central findings. “The Reports of Mr. Bigge, the 
Commissioner of Inquiry,” it stated, “bear ample testimony to the extraordinary degree in 
which the soil and climate of New South Wales are found to be congenial to the delicate 
constitution of Merino Sheep.”145 Read in the context of the stock market bubble that I 
documented in the first section of this chapter, the “ample testimony” furnished by the Bigge 
Report appears to have served a strategic purpose, namely to counterbalance the suggestion 
that the Company was a speculative undertaking. As I show in the next chapter, the Australian 
Agricultural Company, like the other two settler corporations under study in Part 1, was highly 
sensitive of any utterance that tended in this direction. And it was far from corporate 
paranoia, for the Colonial Office had made it clear in early discussions with the promoters 
that they would be well advised to guard against speculative activity. 
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As a stimulus to private enterprise, the Bigge Report was a great boon to pastoral 
expansion. Slow to develop, the pastoral industry was significantly less important than 
agriculture during the colony’s first forty years, reflecting a latent demand for food. A 
shortage of fresh meat and foodstuffs meant that whatever livestock the Commissariat 
managed to ship in from India or the Cape was almost immediately requisitioned to feed the 
rapidly growing population.146 In this context mutton was of far greater importance than 
wool. However, the burden of keeping convicts and officers “on the store” did not go 
unremarked.147 Since the arrival of Governor Arthur Phillip and the First Fleet in 1788, the 
peculiar nature of the colony’s foundation ensured that Treasury kept a watchful eye over 
how the economy was managed.        
 A particular worry, vividly captured in despatches between the Colonial Office and the 
Colonial Secretary’s Office in Sydney, was the lack of any export industry to relieve Treasury 
of the costs associated with propping up the penal establishment.148 With no commodity to 
sell to overseas markets, how could New South Wales ever pay its way? Added to that was 
the no less pressing want of capital in colonial Australia.149 As the surveyor and former East 
India Company cadet Edward Dumaresq noted in a letter to the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company’s office in Hobart Town, 23 June 1826, echoing many: “I can only add now that if 
you are only reasonable I will give no occasion for the appointment of a Commission for I shall 
be anxious to see the Company on their lands and importing largely the only requisite for the 
most rapid advancement of this most interesting Colony: Capital, Capital, Capital.”150 
 Yet, unlike their New South Wales peer, the Van Diemen’s Land Company did not 
directly reference Bigge. The Company’s validity as a pastoral corporation with the right to 
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hire convict labour was instead assumed, and therefore taken for granted. Indeed, early 
discussions between the Van Diemen’s Land Company and the Colonial Office for the most 
part sidestepped the sort of probing inquiry that usually accompanied the request of a 
company for a large land grant on the other side of the world. The two parties were 
preoccupied with other matters, chief among them the increasingly acrimonious dispute with 
the Australian Agricultural Company over an an alleged breach of the latter’s charter (see 
Chapter 4). An additional cause of anxiety to the directors during this period was the 
seemingly intractable task of finding a suitable location for their land grant, the north-west of 
the island proving a rather more inhospitable locale than initially expected.151 The propriety 
of a sheep company, in other words, had already been accepted and minds were occupied on 
other, more immediate details. 
Lord Bathurst for one saw no reason to linger long over whether a Company similar to 
the Australian Agricultural Company could be set up to operate in Tasmania. As he wrote to 
Edward Curr in April 1825, the grounds for assenting to a pastoral company had been 
thoroughly turned over by the Colonial Office: “It would be superfluous to state in this place 
the reasons which have induced me to consider the Establishment of a Company for the 
cultivation and improvement of waste lands in more than one of His Majesty’s Colonies as an 
undertaking deserving the support of His Majesty’s Government.”152 Rather, what concerned 
Bathurst were the specifics of any company to be formed, for example, the precise capital 
structure of the firm. The larger notion of company colonisation had by now already been 
tacitly endorsed by virtue of the rubber stamp approval granted the Australian Agricultural 
Company.          
 This helps to explain why Bathurst, in reply to Curr’s letter of 22 March, which 
addressed the Colonial Office “on behalf of the merchants and others who have associated 
themselves together as a Company for the cultivation and improvement of waste lands in His 
Majesty’s Island of Van Diemen’s Land,” bypassed entirely the question of whether or not the 
Crown approved of the measure, opting instead to outline the terms and conditions that he 
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considered necessary if the undertaking were to go ahead: “I have thought it right in 
transmitting my answer to your proposals to avail myself of the opportunity of stating to you 
explicitly the terms upon which I am prepared to advise His Majesty to sanction the formation 
of the projected Company.”153 But what exactly were these terms, and how would the 
Company be constituted? 
Bathurst, all too aware of the perilous state of the London money market and the 
associated hostilities that this had begun to engender among commentators, impressed on 
the promoters the importance of sound fiscal management, in particular a more restrained 
approach to the amount of capital required. This was to be a Company settled on a good but 
reasonable fund, sound economics to trump grandiose ideas of a million pound colonial 
leviathan. Before elaborating at length on the precise share structure of any Company so 
formed, Bathurst accordingly took pains to underline just how important he believed the 
careful introduction of capital into the colony was. He consequently urged the Company to 
take precautionary steps in order to ensure that the “nominal Capital of any Company of this 
description will be really raised and expended in carrying the avowed designs of the 
Subscribers into effect.” Four-fifths of the nominal capital would have to be invested in the 
project before a Bill could brought to Parliament, and the security of this capital would have 
to be backed up with an assurance that the promoters were good for their word.154   
But the echo of the Bigge Report is heard most resolutely when we turn to the 
discussion over convict labour. Curr, writing one of his regular despatches to the Court in 
London, was adamant that the Company’s right to procure convict workers was immutable. 
Enshrined in the charter, Curr was quite sure that no defence of the provision was necessary, 
for the simple reason that the Australian Agricultural Company had already established 
precedent by writing it into theirs. “It will be in your recollection,” noted Curr, “that the only 
ground on which the privilege was claimed was that the same had been granted to the 
Australian Company. In fact it was never made matter of argument between the Directors 
and Lord Bathurst, the grounds on which it should be done were never argued, but it was 
granted to the Company without question, simply because it had granted to the Australian 
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Company.”155 Here, then, the imprint of the Bigge Report can be seen to flow through the 
Australian Agricultural Company to its Van Diemonian counterpart, the spirit of Bigge’s 
commission filtered through company practice already operational in the antipodes. 
 
War and Peace in Upper Canada 
 
War was the crucible of the Canada Company, and in two key respects. While the fallout of 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars created the conditions conducive to corporate 
speculation in 1824/25, it was the war of 1812 that first kindled the embers of the Canadian 
enterprise. Alan Taylor describes how the conflict between Britain and the early national 
United States arose out of simmering tensions along the “northern borderland,” that is, the 
liminal zone between Detroit and Montreal that divided British North America and the freshly 
sovereign United States of America.156 Tensions hardened into war, and the collateral of war 
was keenly felt by civilians and participants on both sides. As a means of redress for those 
who had suffered property loss and damages fighting on behalf of the loyalist cause in what 
was then Upper Canada, the British Government appointed a War Claims Commission to 
examine applications for compensation.157 Like the Loyalist Claims Commission in the 
Revolutionary era, the Board of Enquiry established in July 1816 by Wilmot Horton blended 
together strategic as well as patriotic considerations.158 An inherently messy business, the 
ameliorative impulse that undoubtedly lay behind the commission process mixed uneasily 
with the realities of straightened imperial finances after war.  
As is well known, the Scottish novelist and man of letters John Galt (1779–1839) was 
approached by a number of claimants to act as an unlikely agent of redress, to which he 
agreed and applied his vigorous attentions.159 Roger Hall has documented in impeccable 
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detail how Galt toiled on behalf of these claimants.160 As Galt himself was to later write in his 
Autobiography, he was not afraid of being “bird-mouthed in using every argument that could 
at all be employed, even to the contemplation of the colonists becoming rebels.”161 I will 
return to Galt and his colonial vision in the next chapter, but here it will suffice to show how 
his work as an agent ultimately coalesced into plans to form a colonisation company. Colonial 
enterprise was always a contingent phenomenon, and the circuitous and unexpected origins 
of the Canada Company in an uneven novelist’s brief to compensate loyalist victims from the 
War of 1812 bears this out in brilliant detail.  
The idea of a land company was still some way off when Galt was first approached 
about representing a large body of claimants in 1820. Indeed, land sales and compensation 
were only connected in late 1823/early 1824 when Galt began to consider whether the Crown 
Reserves might be sold so as to raise money for his clients. Even then, it seems likely that the 
idea of a colonisation company was first recommended by the Colonial Office (to which I 
return to below). It was only after Galt had experimented with various loan-based options, in 
which claimants were to be reimbursed from a loan raised on the joint-security of the imperial 
and Upper Canadian Assembly, that Galt alighted on his policy of a land fund.162 While the 
land fund was not strictly speaking an endorsement of company colonisation, it did cohere 
with the Canada Company’s later governing principles: Upper Canada had a surfeit of so-
called waste land, and these wastes could be sold to settlers at profit. Robert Gouger would 
subsequently try something similar in South Australia, and that too would ultimately 
transform itself into arguments for corporate colonisation. 
What accounts for the rise of the company model in the case of Upper Canada? Two 
factors appear to be especially salient. First, Galt’s proposals for a loan were hobbled by their 
innate complexity and the lack of inducements they held out to the British Government and 
Upper Canadian Assembly to take the matter further. The loan, as interpreted by the Colonial 
Office, would be raised on the joint security of both Upper Canada and Britain, with Galt 
expected to secure the capital (£100,000 in total, to be split equally between the two parties) 
himself. Yet Galt knew full well that he would struggle to tap the City for money raised on the 
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security of Upper Canada, and this is exactly what happened. As he remarked in his 
Autobiography, it was “ridiculous to attempt, both from the state of stocks and the unknown 
condition of the province.”163 There was little appetite among men with capital to advance a 
loan for a cause that was in essence always a personal concern to Galt, rather than an 
attractive proposition in its own right.  
Second, the company option better spoke to opinion in Upper Canada and Britain 
about the land problem that faced the province. As I note below, the question of what to do 
with the Crown and Clergy Reserves was attracting significant attention in the 1820s as 
discontent with the forced reservation of 2/7ths of all land began to grow. Scholars of the 
Canada Company have pointed out that John Beverley Robinson, a Canadian politician, 
lawyer, and close friend of Wilmot Horton had delivered a paper on land reform in Upper 
Canada while studying for the bar at Lincoln’s Inn. Equally suggestive is the fact that Galt read 
Robinson’s paper during the course of his negotiations with Horton.164 Yet if Robinson’s study 
of the hotchpotch system of land disposal in Upper Canada led him to follow in Horton’s 
footsteps by advocating state-assisted emigration, Galt would ultimately flip this around 
entirely by foregrounding private enterprise. Whatever their relative preference for 
public/private colonisation, the key point here is that the politics of land was hotly contested.  
The Scottish writer and agriculturalist Robert Gourlay (1778–1863) had likewise just 
published a searing inditement of land management in the British settlement, entitled 
Statistical Account of Upper Canada (1822). “On my journeys through the western part of the 
province,” Gourlay noted, “the reserves, the lands of non-occupants, the poverty and 
ignorance of the people, the manner in which many of them had been blocked up in Dundas 
Street, and elsewhere;–all appeared palpable bars to improvement.”165 A text that in no small 
part influenced Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s theorising on new world land, Gourlay’s Account 
argued for a radical rethink of colonial policy in Upper Canada through the adoption of a land 
tax as well as a more general embrace of land sales.166 Galt’s solution to the same problem 
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was to sell the lands and funnel the proceeds back to the claimants, thereby relieving Upper 
Canada off two social ills at the same time.        
It appears likely that the Canada Company was first conceived of with no reference to 
the Australian companies that emerged in early 1824. While Chapter 4 will show how the 
Canada Company was often benchmarked against the Australian Agricultural Company, it is 
important to emphasise that Galt’s conversion to the company form predates the first 
approaches of the Australian speculators.167 Nonetheless, it does seem as though the idea of 
a company was generated within the Colonial Office (though it is not clear why). Evidence 
tending in this direction is supplied by the context in which Galt first raises the possibility of 
the company form. After meeting with Horton on 8 March 1824 to talk through the details of 
his land scheme, which envisaged an individual agent (presumably Galt, although he did not 
specify) selling land, the proceeds of said land sales to be recouped by the war claimants, the 
company option suddenly began to assume a centrality in Galt’s plans for Upper Canada. 
Gone was the earlier agency structure, and in its place was either the company form or the 
constitution of a private association. Galt appears to have lent far more heavily on the idea of 
a colonisation company, however, for he excitedly informed Horton in the hours after their 
meeting that he would prepare the “plan of a company in the course of a few days.”168 
Company colonisation in Upper Canada would unfold from here, in spite of delays, obstacles, 
and changes in approach.169 Nevertheless, the core argument rationalizing the company 
model would remain the same, namely the more efficient use of colonial waste land through 
a regularised system of land sales. And in this sense, it preserved the fundamentals of Galt’s 
proposal for an individual agency.   
Land settlement in Southern Ontario could not have been more different than in the 
penal colony of New South Wales. Quite aside from the obvious distinctions of climate and 
labour between the two imperial outposts, the peculiar trajectory of colonial development in 
British North America since the late eighteenth century meant that land use in Upper Canada 
possessed a local dynamic quite unlike anything contemporaries in the antipodes would have 
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recognised.170 Established in 1791 to provide an enclave for loyalist supporters fleeing the 
new United States of America, Upper Canada had from the beginning seen private syndicates 
and proprietors active in the province. Indeed, once the terms of settlement were outlined 
by Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe in a proclamation in early 1792, there was an 
almost immediate swell of interest in the British colony by entrepreneurial individuals and 
companies.171 This led to a number of requests for large land grants, and these were often 
but not always populated with Scottish and Irish labourers. The settlements planted by 
wealthy individuals such as Thomas Talbot and Thomas Douglas, Earl of Selkirk have 
frequently been the focus of historical study.172  
Just as important to Upper Canadian land settlement was the existence of the so-
called Crown and Clergy Reserves. Both had been created when the province was established 
in 1791, with 1/7th of all land set aside for each.173 Yet constitutional settlement did not 
necessarily beget efficient land settlement, and Galt and the Canada Company understood as 
much when they began lobbying the imperial government for the right to sell large tracts of 
unoccupied waste lands. Indeed, the directors became convinced that the land reserved for 
the Crown and Clergy was the problem holding the province back inasmuch as it stunted 
colonial growth. Galt made exactly this point when he addressed a General Meeting of the 
Company on 30 July 1824. Galt, who had been in regular correspondence with Horton and 
Bathurst at the Colonial Office about the disposal of land in Upper Canada since late 1823, 
was clear that chequered settlement was the primary result of the reserves policy when he 
relayed his views to the promoters. “These reserves, he [Galt] described, as two sevenths of 
all the located Townships of the Canadas, that they consisted generally in Lots of 200 acres, 
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and were interspersed throughout all the peopled Districts in such manner as to be a great 
impediment to the progress and improvement of the Country.”174 It was this perception that 
the Upper Canadian landscape was a wilderness in need of better management that 
motivated the directors, and, ultimately, it was a sentiment that found expression in the 
Company’s charter.         
 While the antipodean companies were also concerned with the application of capital 
and labour to colonial waste lands, the Canada Company’s genesis in a dispute over land 
settlement pushed it in a different direction. Indeed, the Proceedings explicitly tied the 
formation of the Canada Company to the political contest over the reserves. 
 
The inconvenience arising from them had been so strongly represented to 
Government that it was determined to bring them to sale … and therefore he 
[Galt] had been privately authorized by Mr Wilmot Horton to ascertain whether 
in the present state of the Money Market it was likely a Joint Stock Company could 
be formed, which would undertake to purchase the Reserves, and to settle them 
according to the custom and usage in the Canadas.175 
 
Negotiations between the Canadian promoters and the Colonial Office would throw up 
several hurdles, of which the objections raised by Archdeacon John Strachan about the sale 
of the Clergy Reserves would prove the most difficult to navigate, yet the basic business model 
did not substantially deviate from that first proposed by Galt in 1823/24. When the Clergy 
Reserves Corporation refused to sell the 829,430 acres that the Company wished to purchase, 
they were instead offered 1,000,000 acres next to Lake Huron.176 The territory, which had 
recently been bought of the Chippewa, exactly matched that offered to the Australian 
Agricultural Company. While there is no firm evidence to suggest that the New South Wales 
venture informed the Colonial Office’s decision, the role of Horton and James Stephen in the 
formulation of policy in both instances in the very least makes it plausible that there was some 
interchange between the two projects. As Chapter 4 shows, the Canada Company would in 
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fact come to the conclusion that the Colonial Office were unfairly treating them like the 
Australian Agricultural Company.  
The final agreement reached between the Company and the Colonial Office in 1826 
transferred over 2 million acres of land, under the condition that the Company would invest 
at least a third of the purchase price of the so-called Huron Tract in “public works and 
improvements.”177 Payment for the land would, in Anatole Browde’s pithy formulation, follow 
an “escalating payment schedule,” that is, the Company pledged to pay a series of instalments 
that rose to £20,000, before seven transfers of £20,000 to the Upper Canadian assembly 
completed the deal.178 In total, the Company had agreed to pay just under £350,000 over the 
course of 16 years. It would claim the largest amount of territory among the trio of settler 
corporations that emerged in 1824/25.  
The agricultural trading and colonisation companies that were founded during the 
boom may have shared an origin story in the City of London, but local dynamics in Australia 
and Upper Canada also pulled them apart. Convict labour and country land to depasture stock 
were the key requirements for the Australian duo, whereas land alone was enough for the 
Canada Company to commence operations. Yet company colonisation was seldom so clear-
cut. If the business models of the antipodean companies led contemporaries to pair them 
together, the social profiles of the respective boards and their links to the City of London 
suggests that a neat division between the Australian companies and the Canada Company 
may obscure as much as it illuminates. It is to the company crossings between boardrooms 
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Social Histories of the Firm 
 
 
On a midsummer Friday, 1824, a small congregation of merchants and financiers huddled 
together in the committee room of the London Tavern to hold the first formal meeting of the 
Canada Company. After months of correspondence with the Colonial Office, and an equally 
sustained campaign of behind the scenes manoeuvring, the men assembled that July 
afternoon had every reason to be jubilant. But business demanded immediate action. 
Directors and auditors were appointed, bankers and solicitors chosen, the structure of the 
Company clearly spelled out–from voting rights to the mode of capital subscription, and 
everything in between. “A printed Proof of a Prospectus was then read, and being amended 
as hereafter inserted was adopted and ordered to be published as the Prospectus of the 
Company.” Such were the quotidian duties that befell the directors of a new company. Thanks 
were given by the board to Charles Bosanquet, sometime writer and Subgovernor of the 
South Sea Company at the time, “for the dignified and conciliatory manner in which he had 
filled the Chair,” and the proceedings were brought to a close. The next meeting was 
adjourned until August 12, less than two weeks hence, when they would reconvene at Simon 
McGillivray’s house, No. 2 Suffolk Lane Common Street, right in the heart of the City of 
London.179 
Just three months earlier another gathering of company promoters had taken place in 
the chambers of John Macarthur Junior, Lincoln’s Inn, to discuss the merits of forming a 
pastoral company to operate in New South Wales.180 The meeting, held on Saturday 10 April, 
was chaired by the Tory M.P. for Wendover and banker John Smith, father of the future 
director of the New Zealand Company, John Abel Smith. A lengthy recitation of the 
“Observations and Plan” for the proposed Company opened the proceedings, specifying in 
detail both the rationale and operational mechanics of the new enterprise. “The Company to 
be incorporated by Letters Patent, or Act of Parliament,” stated the first point of the plan, 
“and to be called the “Australian Company” with a Capital of £1,000,000 sterling, divided into 
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10,000 shares of £100 each.” It was to seek, and ultimately receive, a 1,000,000 acre grant of 
land from the Crown, the Company’s nominal capital neatly matching the pasture at their 
disposal. A deputation of the great and the good was to wait upon Earl Bathurst at the Colonial 
Office, early subscriptions for shares swiftly noted, and the meeting called to a close.181 
They were of course not the only ones interested in the application of company 
colonisation in the Australian colonies. Indeed, yet another inaugural boardroom meeting was 
summoned on 12 May, this time “to consider the propriety of establishing a Company & 
obtaining a Grant of Land in Van Diemen’s Land.”182 Presided over by John Pearse, an M.P. for 
the constituency of Devizes in Wiltshire and a governor of the Bank of England, the brief 
deliberation focused on taking first steps to secure government support. “After very mature 
deliberation & after consulting Mr. Ingle a Gentleman of great experience who had resided 
15 years in Van Diemens Land,” the Company settled upon a strategy to take their plans 
forward. Those present, among whom were three M.P.’s and a band of West Country 
clothiers, agreed that “the Members of Parliament present together with Mr. Wilkinson 
should apply to Lord Bathurst or Mr. Wilmot Horton for the consent on the part of His 
Majesty’s Government to give the Company a Grant of Land of 250,000 Acres.”183 The meeting 
then adjourned until later that week, Friday 14 May, when the business of company 
colonisation began in earnest. But who were the men who composed these extraordinary 
meetings, and how did their social profile shape the development of company colonisation as 
it unfolded in the context of the 1824/25 stock market bubble?   
This chapter analyses the social history of the 1824/25 settler trio, and in so doing it 
draws out the most salient cultural dynamics that drove their development as business 
entities. It shows how the Australian Agricultural Company and the Canada Company were 
networked into a social world with strong ties to the City’s merchant houses and the 
boardrooms of other colonisation companies, thus enveloping the two corporations in a 
shared social universe centred on the institutional pillars of colonial capitalism. The Van 
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Diemen’s Land Company, on the other hand, was relatively disconnected from the social 
currents that propelled its competitors, lacking both strong ties to the City and the colonial 
world more generally. A parochial imitation of its antipodean peer, the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company consequently had a much lower profile than either the Australian Agricultural 
Company or the Canada Company–both in London and in Tasmania.  
I conclude the chapter by examining the role played by pivotal individuals: John 
Macarthur Junior in the case of the Australian Agricultural Company, and John Galt on behalf 
of the Canadian enterprise. These individuals were the key nodes in the social examination of 
company colonisation that I sketch out below, the generative force behind much of their 
respective corporations’ early history. Again, I draw a contrast with the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company, which lacked an equivalent figure, and I show in the next chapter how this dulled 




If the Australian Agricultural Company and the Canada Company diverged in their underlying 
business model, to say nothing of the geographical focus of their operations, they were 
nonetheless united in drawing their ranks from London’s merchant community. Stacked with 
directors steeped in the intricacies of international trade and the mores of the City’s most 
estimable merchant houses, the boardrooms of these two up-start settler corporations were 
nothing if not well equipped to navigate the challenges of turning a profit in far-flung markets. 
Men of money and enterprise, the directors of these companies were well at home in a 
commercial world that was becoming globalised like never before. From Baltic spars to 
calicoes and silks sourced from the East Indies, the merchant houses that thronged the Square 
Mile were by some margin the place to be when it came to international commerce.184 What 
is more, the men who made the move from merchant house to company boardroom were 
invariably descended from families long familiar with the ways and means of mercantilism. 
As I show, this was not a trait shared by the Van Diemen’s Land Company, whose social body 
was always more precariously positioned vis-à-vis London’s commercial class and the 
institutions they inhabited.  
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Margot Finn’s investigation into the East India Company shows us how the company 
boardroom was never hermetically sealed, and in so doing she opens up new ways of writing 
about the social history of company colonisation.185 Returning to the 1824/25 settler trio, it 
is evident that company crossings were an integral facet of corporate life for those involved 
in both the Australian Agricultural Company and the Canada Company. The directors of these 
companies often moved from their City offices to the headquarters of the more established 
chartered companies, the East India Company most especially. The Van Diemen’s Land 
Company largely bucked that trend. There is an important qualification to this boardroom 
movement that needs to be stated upfront, however. While the directors of the Australian 
Agricultural Company and the Canada Company were integrated into social networks that 
brought them into close contact with the larger world of company colonisation, there was 
correspondingly little traffic between the boardrooms of the settler companies themselves.
 As I demonstrate in the next chapter, there was a pointed sense of rivalry between 
the two antipodean companies, while the Canada Company’s obvious focus on British North 
America attracted the attention of a different social orbit. Few were those who had a stake 
in Upper Canada and Australia, Edward Ellice the notable exception. A further parallel 
between the two case studies can be found in the election of Martin Tucker Smith (1803–
1880) to the board of the North American venture. Smith, who was a partner in the family 
bank Smith, Payne and Smiths, the banking establishment of the Australian Agricultural 
Company and a number of the bodies established to colonise Australia and New Zealand in 
the era of systematic colonisation, was the son of the Australian Agricultural Company’s 
governor, John Smith. A family representative of the bank that served one of its main rivals in 
the stock market, Tucker Smith further solidified connections between the two enterprises 
through marriage in 1831 to Louisa Ridley, daughter of Sir Matthew White Ridley, 3rd 
Baronet.186 Ridley, a close friend of John Smith’s, was much in favour with the Australian 
Agricultural Company, so much so that, when John Macarthur proposed carving out a special 
dispensation of shares in 1824, the board decided to offer twenty a piece to Commissioner 
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Bigge, three Whig parliamentarians–Henry Peter Brougham, Stephen Lushington, and Ridley 
Colborne MP–as well as White Ridley himself.187 
Yet Ellice and White Ridley were anomalies in an otherwise antagonistic relationship 
between the trio. And it is the atomised nature of these settler firms that most clearly marks 
them out from the colonisation companies that constituted themselves in order to implement 
the ideas of Edward Gibbon Wakefield in the 1830s and 1840s (the focus of Part 2). In stark 
contrast to the companies that would colonise parts of South Australia, Western Australia, 
and New Zealand in the 1830s, the settler corporations that emerged in 1824 were largely 
resistant to the cross-fertilisation of directors. Not that their boardrooms were entirely sealed 
off from each other. As I also explain in the next chapter, the three companies were engaged 
in active correspondence, sometimes constructive but frequently bitter, while company 
discourse and business strategy were often framed in terms that explicitly referenced their 
perceived rivals in the marketplace. Indeed, it is this ingrained sense of rivalry that best 
explains why someone like Edward Ellice, who was a director of the Canada Company, the 
Van Diemen’s Land Company, and the ill-fated 1825 New Zealand Company was an exception 
to the general rule of closed doors between the three settler corporations, rather than an 
embodiment of a culture that regarded peripatetic directors as the norm.   
 It was a different situation with respect to company links beyond the settler bubble. 
Among the original directors of the Australian Agricultural Company, for example, Penelope 
Pemberton has calculated that four were directors of the East India Company, with another 
in the process of election to that board.188 Furthermore, there is good reason to suspect that 
a not insignificant proportion of investors in one or more of the settler companies also held 
stock in the East India Company. While a rigorous comparative analysis of the shareholders 
of these settler corporations is much needed, it is nonetheless clear from a cursory glance at 
the share registers that investors in the East India Company were heavily represented among 
those staking a claim in the new wave of colonisation companies.189 As I explore below, 
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perhaps the most pronounced characteristic of the Australian Agricultural Company and the 
Canada Company was the merchant interest, and in the case of the former this was for the 
most part coloured by the presence of merchants connected with one of the many East India 
trading houses that had begun to proliferate from the late eighteenth century onwards. Taken 
together, the balance of evidence strongly points towards the East India Company as a critical 
factor in the social makeup of the British colonisation companies that were formed from 1824 
onwards, an insight only reinforced when we turn to the colonial reformers in chapters 4 
through 6. 
The Canada Company’s inheritance of personnel from the boardrooms of other 
colonisation companies was more wide-ranging than its New South Wales contemporary. In 
addition to Charles Bosanquet of the South Sea Company and a number of men with ties to 
the East India Company–John Masterman and Martin Tucker Smith–the boardroom at No. 13, 
St Helen’s Place, Bishopsgate Street was filled with merchants deeply active in the fur trade. 
Like the roving Edward Ellice, Simon McGillivray (1785–1840), who was central to the early 
negotiations with Wilmot Horton of the Colonial Office, was intricately involved in North 
American company colonisation.190 And like so many of the protagonists in the story that this 
dissertation tells McGillivray’s connections to company colonisation began at home, where 
family ties to the fur trade cultivated an early interest in imperial commerce. McGillivray’s 
uncle, Simon McTavish, a founder of the North West Company, which Ellice and McGillivray 
would later subsume the XY Company into, not only paid for Simon and his brothers to attend 
school. He also supplied them with their first jobs, Simon not following his brothers to Canada, 
on account of a childhood disability, but rather taking up employment as a clerk for McTavish, 
Fraser and Company in London, which aimed to bolster the North West Company’s balance 
sheet by supplying them with goods for trade.191  
Merchant capital was what ultimately sustained the Australian Agricultural Company 
and the Canada Company, however. First among equals, the New South Wales entity 
brandished the strongest links to the City’s preeminent merchant houses. Like the Macarthur 
family network that did so much to drive the early direction of the Company, which I will 
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return to below, the merchants on the board of this new pastoral company had considerable 
influence and experience in the burgeoning world of colonial trade. Perhaps unsurprising 
given the strong presence of East India Company directors on its board, the merchant interest 
nonetheless throws into stark relief the extent to which the Australian Agricultural Company 
was networked into the institutional pillars of colonial capitalism.  
Emblematic of the criss-crossing career of such company men was Stewart 
Marjoribanks (1774–1863), a future director of the New Zealand Company who we 
reencounter in Chapter Seven. Marjoribanks, who was the third cousin of John Loch, a fellow 
director of the Australian Agricultural Company and a chairman of the East India Company, 
had strong family ties to East India business. His father John Stewart was involved with the 
East India Company and his older brother Campbell Marjoribanks had been a director of that 
Company since 1807, serving as chairman on three separate occasions.192 But Stewart 
Marjoribanks was no less personally invested in the family line of business–even if he had to 
balance his time as a Member of Parliament, itself no disqualification in a world where 
Westminster and the company boardroom often intersected. Possibly starting his merchant 
career in the East India agency Paxton, Cockerell & Trail, Marjoribanks soon established his 
own merchant house at 6 Great Winchester Street. By the time that the Australian 
Agricultural Company was floated, Marjoribanks was operating from King’s Arm Yard, 
Coleman Street, where he was one of the largest East Indian shipowners.193 
The wonderfully named George Gerard Hochepied Larpent (1786–1855) was another 
with a stake in colonial trade. The chairman of the Oriental and China Association and the 
deputy chairman of the St Katherine’s Dock Company, Penelope Pemberton has noted that 
Larpent was also involved with the India house of Paxton, Cockerell & Trail, where he may 
well have first met Marjoribanks.194 In an antipodean twist on the East India connection, 
Larpent was moreover the chairman of the East India Trade Committee that had been set up 
to promote settlement on the northern coast of New Holland, all of which  speaks powerfully 
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to his active engagement in colonial affairs.195 But just as important were his textual 
utterances on empire. Supplementing his behind the scenes efforts in the numerous 
committee and company boardrooms that he found himself in was an equally strong 
commitment to voicing his opinions in print, and to that end Larpent was a key discussant in 
debates concerning the political economy of colonisation. The author of a pamphlet that 
argued in favour of protecting the West Indian sugar interest in 1823, Larpent intervened 
more directly in the matter of company colonisation when he penned another on the by then 
thorny politics of the East India Company, entitled “Some Remarks on the late Negotiations 
between the Board of Control and the East India Company.”196 Like so many before and since, 
Larpent blended intellectual activity on empire with actual work in the company boardroom. 
What is the significance of all this? The social profile of these firms matters as the 
London world of company colonisation has often been glossed over in accounts of settler 
colonialism after 1815. Scholars have long studied the intricacies of the Colonial Office, 
exploring in depth the personalities that formulated imperial policy. While we now know a 
great deal about who worked there and how they worked, the company men who were on 
the other side of the table in negotiations with the likes of Wilmot Horton and James Stephen 
are not well known.197 The links to merchant capital moreover connect the history of settler 
capitalism to developments in the City of London. The City and its relationship to empire has 
not been sufficiently analysed in relation to colonial reform, and so there is an empirical need 
to factor these agents back into the historical picture. At the same time, the relative clout of 
the respective boards had a bearing on their ability to attract investors and also to persuade 
the Colonial Office to grant favourable terms. As I show in the next chapter, the Van Diemen’s 
Land Company was to find out in concrete terms just how important a strong presence in 
London could be. 
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Just as the Australian Agricultural Company drew strength from prominent City 
capitalists, so the Canada Company populated its boardroom with merchants. Most notable 
in this respect was Edward Ellice, commonly referred to by contemporaries as the “Bear” on 
account of the large fortune he derived from the North American fur trade. Born into a family 
long comfortable with making a living from colonial trade, his father operating a successful 
Atlantic merchant house from Mark Lane, Ellice found his niche in Canada, where he 
orchestrated the merger of the XY Company and the North West Company in 1804, before 
later presiding over the subsequent merger between the strengthened North West Company 
and the Hudson’s Bay Company.198 A deputy governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company and a 
large investor in East India Company stock Ellice was a key player in driving settler capitalism 
between 1820–1840. 
John Easthope (1784–1865) similarly staked out an impressive career in the City. After 
a spell as a banking clerk for Thomas and Timothy Cobb, in Banbury, Oxfordshire, Easthope 
established himself as a stockbroker in London, his firm Easthope and Son turning a tidy profit 
from its premises on Threadneedle Street. A chairman of the London and South Western 
Railway Company later in life, as well as an MP for St Albans and other constituencies from 
1826 onwards, Easthope reputedly navigated the stock market turbulence of 1824/25 with 
admirable dexterity: he was said to be worth £150,000 by 1841, no small sum in the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century. Like Ellice, Easthope was an active investor in a range of 
companies that emerged during the boom, for example, the Mexican Mining Company.199  
But it was in fact the banking interest that was the strongest lobby on the board of the 
Canada Company. Full of men with a background in colonial commerce and currency, the 
directors had a toehold in the world of merchant banking and international finance, and they 
used this expertise to great effect in managing the Company’s finances during the difficult 
period of establishing their operations in Upper Canada.200 While lacking the lustre of Bank of 
England connections like their New South Wales counterpart, the Canadian enterprise 
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nonetheless boasted strong credentials among many of the most prestigious banks in the City 
of London. However, unlike their peers sitting on the board of the Australian Agricultural 
Company, the directors of the Canada Company who possessed a background in banking 
notably did not balance their professional interests in the City with an ancillary career in 
Westminster.   
On the contrary, many of the board members who did become MP’s only did so well 
after their initial involvement with the Canada Company. One such figure was John 
Masterman (1781–1862), a partner in the private bank Masterman, Peters, Mildred, 
Masterman & Co. of 35 Nicholas Lane in the City, who served as an MP for the City of London 
alongside the East India Company chairman and New Zealand Company director George Lyall 
and others from 1841 onwards.201 Indeed, of the three MP’s among the inaugural board of 
directors, none of them were bankers: Robert Dowie, William Williams, and Edward Ellice all 
pursued careers in trade and international commerce. By contrast, the Company’s less 
successful competitor, the British North American Land Company, itself inspired by the 
Canada Company, saw greater traffic between the twin poles of the cash nexus. As Anatole 
Browde has noted, the British American Land Company’s chairman George Robinson “was not 
only an MP but also a director of the Bank of England and of Lloyd’s,” underlining the point 
that an estimable pedigree did not necessarily guarantee success. In the uncertain world of 
company colonisation, social credentials were but a valuable starting point.202  
This brings us to an additional merit in the social history approach to company 
colonisation, namely that it helps isolate distinctions between the companies that otherwise 
get obscured when the focus is on business operations. There is just as much value in reading 
into the names listed on prospectuses as there is in interpreting annual reports. That the 
Canada Company had a slighter parliamentary presence than the Australian Agricultural 
Company tells us something interesting about the two ventures, for example. Whereas the 
antipodean company lobbied government for approval in what was after all a new 
geographical setting for company colonisation, the Canada Company did not face the same 
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hurdles. The Hudson’s Bay Company, from which many of the protagonists involved in the 
1824 projection were associated, had long been active in British North America, while land 
companies in the United States likewise furnished another local example of corporate 
colonisation. Placed in this context, the parliamentary representation of the Australian 
Agricultural Company makes considerably more sense. Colonisation in the Australian colonies 
had hitherto always been a state-based project, so the new emphasis on private enterprise 
marked a radical departure from contemporary imperial practice. The good name of an MP 
could go a long way in such unchartered territory.  
What is more, the social credentials of the company men mattered to contemporaries. 
It should therefore matter to us as well. This is perhaps most clearly on display in the 
negotiations between the Australian Agricultural Company and the Colonial Office. 
Accompanying the list of names associated with the new proposal was a note indicating 
whether the directors were associated with one of the grand companies: the Bank of England, 
the East India Company, or one of London’s merchant houses.203 As I show in Chapter Four, 
moreover, character talk was central to corporate discourse–both in London and the settler 
colonies. It is important then to work towards an appreciation of these companies as social 
collectives as much as capitalist enterprises, for the moral economy that they strived to 
impose over their workforce and settlements is only explicable when we have a sense of who 
these men were in the first place. However, it was not just the companies themselves that 
were concerned with commercial probity. The Colonial Office also displayed an interest in the 
matter, with the careful vetting of prospective directors a core part of the application process 
for government support. Indeed, the Downing Street department quite understandably linked 
the standing of the board to an ability to actually raise capital, thereby forging a functional 
link between the social status of the directors and the ability to execute upon their promises.
 Yet if merchants were central to both the Australian Agricultural Company and the 
Canada Company, the picture presented by the Van Diemen’s Land Company complicates our 
understanding of the link between merchant capital and company colonisation. Whereas a 
cosmopolitan outlook defined the commercial interests of the New South Wales and 
Canadian enterprises, the Van Diemen’s Land Company was distinctly more parochial, with 
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the wool trade at the core of their operations. Indeed, one of the most notable features of 
the Tasmanian board of directors was the relatively narrow domain expertise of its foundation 
members. Drawing in the main on men with ties to the West Country and also Blackwell Hall, 
the centre of the English cloth and wool trade since the thirteenth century, the directors of 
the Van Diemen’s Land Company cut a very different figure to that of their competitors in the 
marketplace.204 A prominent component of earlier phases of mercantile and industrial 
capitalism in Britain, by the second quarter of the nineteenth century the Blackwell Hall 
factors were a marginal presence in what was after all an economic landscape fundamentally 
altered by the first throes of industrialisation.205 When placed alongside the well-connected 
directors of the Australian Agricultural Company and the Canada Company, many of whom 
cultivated strong commercial links to the Baltic, East Indies, and North America, the 
boardroom of the Van Diemen’s Land Company appears notably removed from the social 
networks that powered imperial commerce.  
There is a major caveat to declare, and this has never been noticed in connection with 
the Van Diemen’s Land Company. A considerable portion of its board had either made wealth 
directly from the slave trade or inherited it from family. The pioneering scholarship of 
Nicholas Draper and the UCL Legacies of British Slavery project has reinvigorated the study of 
capitalism and slavery in the British Empire, while a new cluster of studies is beginning to 
probe the connections between the settler revolution and plantation slavery.206 While these 
histories and historiographies have typically been studied apart, there is now compelling 
evidence to suggest that this classic distinction is in important respects misleading. The case 
of the Van Diemen’s Land Company lends further support to the idea that metropolitan 
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capital derived from the slave trade was redeployed in Britain’s settler colonies.  
 John and Brice Pearse of the Van Diemen’s Land Company both derived wealth from 
slavery, for example. John was associated with three claims that also involved Charles 
Bosanquet of the Canada Company, while Brice was associated with four. Others involved 
with the Van Diemen’s Land Company who are documented in the UCL database include 
Raikes Currie, Edward and Russell Ellice, James Inglis, and John Horsely Palmer.207 There 
would appear to be significant merit in closely tracking the engagement between the 1824/25 
colonisation companies and the capital networks identified with the slave trade, just as there 
would with the later Wakefield-inspired enterprises. While it is enough for the purposes of 
this dissertation to reveal these links for the first time, there is a pressing need to further 
interrogate how the slave trade shaped private colonial enterprise in the age of colonial 
reform.  
Most important to the Tasmanian company in its early years were a pair of 
parliamentarians with family ties to the cloth and wool trade: John Pearse (?1760–1836) and 
Joseph Cripps (1765–1847). The engineers behind the venture, Pearse and Cripps 
nevertheless had a much lower profile in the public eye than either John Macarthur Junior or 
John Galt. Not that they were without their credentials–far from it. Pearse, whose father had 
been a successful Blackwell Hall factor, inducted his son into the family firm, naming John a 
partner in Pearse and Bowden when he was just twenty.208 Cripps meanwhile had come into 
a cloth mill at Cirencester, Gloucestershire, which had been owned by this father, and it was 
here that he served as an MP and diversified his business interests to encompass brewing and 
banking.209 
That both men represented constituencies in the West Country captures the centrality 
of the wool trade to the business at large. For while Pearse was a director of the Bank of 
England and continued to forge a successful career from his office in Lothbury in the City of 
London, it was wool (and slavery) that paid for a country house in Berkshire designed by the 
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celebrated architect Sir John Soane.210 The West Country, alongside East Anglia, had for many 
years been the regional heart of the English wool industry and the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company remained wedded to the idea that wool, and wool alone, would be the source of 
the Company’s profits. While the Australian Agricultural Company also concentrated its 
pastoral pursuits on the production of fine merino wool, it was always more flexible in its 
approach to opening up new branches of the business. Nic Haygarth observes that it was only 
in the 1850s that the Van Diemen’s Land Company began to pivot towards gold prospecting 
and mining, while it was Sorel who first intimated that it might be prudent for the Company 
to expand its ambit beyond wool. The Australian Agricultural Company on the other hand 
took an early interest in coal deposits and the cultivation of vines.211 
Pearse was undoubtedly the driving force behind the Company’s early operations, and 
he was recognised as such when he was appointed President on 12 May 1824. Cripps was 
elected Vice-President at the same meeting, with the two frequently sitting on committees 
together.212 Both sat on the shipping committee, for example, and also the committee of 
management.213 Yet it was Pearse who conducted the early negotiations with the Colonial 
Office during the lull in meetings between July and December 1824, and it was Pearse again 
who privately corresponded with Horton.214  
It is worth pausing to reflect on the language used to describe their respective 
positions atop the Company hierarchy. Unlike John Smith, who was from the first styled the 
governor of the Australian Agricultural Company, Pearse and Cripps opted instead for a more 
restrained vocabulary. These were not governors in the sense that the South Sea Company 
and the East India Company had instituted, but rather presidents of a commercial enterprise. 
It seems likely that the Australian Agricultural Company’s much closer ties to the East India 
Company explain why the model of that Company’s governance structure was immediately 
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implemented, whereas in the case of the Van Diemen’s Land Company the shift only came 
later.215  
Yet it also probably owes something to the smaller scale of the Tasmanian business. 
After all, the promoters originally requested a grant of 250,000 acres of land with a nominal 
capital of £500,000 pounds, whereas the Australian Agricultural Company applied for, and 
received, a grant of one million acres with a capital to land ratio of one pound per acre. The 
Van Diemen’s Land Company’s proposal was subsequently watered down by Bathurst, and 
they forewent issuing a public prospectus (after initially discussing it during early Company 
meetings).216 Indeed, there is an air of hesitancy about the Van Diemen’s Land Company’s 
initial approach. Blissful confidence of the sort espoused by John Junior was nowhere to be 
seen, and even the idea of the company form was not settled when they discussed a draft 
petition to send to the Commons in the event that they failed to gain momentum. They were 
“desirous of forming themselves into a Society or Partnership with an adequate Capital for 
the purpose of encouraging the cultivation of such Waste Lands & for other beneficial 
purposes relative to that Colony,” the petition stated, yet only upon such rules and 
regulations that would “appear proper” to the House.217 Caution trumped confidence in the 
Company office at 53 Broad Street, and just as well, for they would be forced to deposit their 
cash in the Bank of England after their bankers Peter Poll and Co. collapsed. A deed signed by 
the Company gave them back five shillings in the pound.218  
The Van Diemen’s Land Company was frequently derided in the colonial press for 
representing the interests of absent capitalists, and there was much truth in this.219 It was not 
in the least bit unusual for the board of a colonisation company to have no personal 
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experience in the colonial world, but the lack of firm family and business connections to 
Tasmania did mark the Van Diemen’s Land Company out from its peers. As we will see when 
we turn to John Macarthur Junior, the Australian Agricultural Company had strong ties to New 
South Wales, and its Colonial Committee gave the Company a solid platform in the colony 
(even if it was often subject to criticism). The Canada Company meanwhile had backing from 
the North American merchant interest, and a number of its directors had spent time there. 
Edward Ellice captures this distinction nicely. A director of both companies, Ellice was 
nonetheless synonymous with the fur trade and his antipodean interests appear peripheral 
rather than central to his professional career. 
 There could be costs to appearing out of touch. As A. L. Meston showed in detail some 
time ago, the primary reason why the Company had to wait so long to commence operations 
centred on the difficulty in securing the land grant (we will see in Chapter Seven that the 
Western Australian Company was also hobbled by much the same problem).220 Indeed, the 
topic that occupied the bulk of Pearse’s attention in interviews with Horton and Bathurst 
during the autumn of 1824 concerned the Company’s mistaken belief that a sufficient 
availability of land existed in the north-west corner of the island. Sorell had informed the 
Colonial Office that “2/3rd of the Island was nothing but barren rock,” and with the settled 
districts largely occupied, the implication was clear.221 There was no room for a colonisation 
company that intended to clear and cultivate waste land, for there was nothing left to clear 
and cultivate. 
As a result of weak links to the colony, the directors came to rely on the advice of a 
small group of individuals, of whom Edward Curr and William Sorell proved central to the 
Company’s early history. While Sorell’s initial query about unappropriated land in the north-
west of the island had posed a serious obstacle to the Company’s formation, he changed tack 
after discussion with the directors. After learning of Sorell’s opposition, the Company decided 
that it was “necessary to satisfy Lord Bathurst that Col. Sorell was mistaken” in his view, and 
they quickly set about writing letters to people familiar with the island, among them the 
convict-turned landscape painter Jospeh Lycett, Curr and Sorrell himself. Correspondence 
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followed, though we do not possess documentary accounts of what exactly transpired.222 
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the approach to Sorell and their other Tasmanian 
contacts paid off as Bathurst quickly dropped his opposition. Bathurst, the minute books 
record, “appears to have set aside his principal objections to the proposed Grant.”223 It was 
nimble diplomacy, and the sort of backchannel persuasion that they ultimately lacked in their 
dispute with the Australian Agricultural Company (see Chapter 4). 
Edward Curr was more important still, not least because he was chief agent of the 
Company when the Cape Grim Massacre took place. Scholars of colonial Tasmania have 
frequently drawn attention to Curr’s evasive approach to reporting the conflict to the board 
in London, and rightly so. Ian Mcfarlane has gone further and argued that Curr in fact pursued 
a policy of native extermination.224 While there is disagreement about the precise role that 
Curr played in instigating conflict between Company workers and the indigenous peoples of 
north-west Tasmania, there can be no doubt that he presided over a business that was 
implicated in violence that formed part of the broader Black War.225  
At the same time, it is well known that Curr’s book on Tasmania was used by the 
promoters to support their corporate proposition.226 An Account of the Colony of Van 
Diemen’s Land, Principally Designed for the Use of Emigrants (1824), which was based on 
Curr’s travels to the island between 1820 and 1823, stated that the colony was “blessed … 
with a salubrity of climate which no country can surpass, and which is found to be peculiarly 
favourable to the rearing of sheep.”227 Curr’s paean to this most southerly of British 
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settlements unsurprisingly attracted the attention of the would-be Van Diemenonian 
entrepreneurs, and he was soon invited to take a position as secretary.228 Yet, it is arguably 
what happens after Curr is brought within the corporate fold that best illustrates the power 
he wielded among the directors. Appointed chairman and senior member of council in the 
colony, Curr would effectively extinguish the local council and centralise power in his own 
hands. As such, Curr almost single-handedly governed the Company in the colony, the 
directors in London deferential to his key decisions about the location of the headquarters at 
Circular Head and the expenditure of capital in setting up the firm.229  
As a member of the Legislative Council in the colony, moreover, Curr was an important 
broker between the Company and the colonial authorities, although this would ultimately 
cause considerable friction from the late 1830s.230 In any case, the reliance on Curr was 
perhaps the most significant feature of the Van Diemen’s Land Company’s colonizing strategy 
during the first decade of its activity in Tasmania, and the authority he wielded seems possible 
only because the board in London lacked an effective network of contacts in the colony. It 
was a pointed illustration of how corporate activity could be shaped by influential individuals 
as much as powerful social clusters in London.  
 
The Colonial Corporation: Aggregate or Sole? 
 
There are limits to the type of social histories of the firm that I have just recounted. In 
prioritising the collective over the individual, it is easy to lose sight of just how far these settler 
corporations called upon the resources of personal charisma. And yet the Australian 
Agricultural Company and the Canada Company were nothing if not the products of individual 
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ambition. As I show, both companies were driven by forceful personalities who bound their 
respective ventures together in the joint pursuit of profit and prestige. In notable contrast the 
Van Diemen’s Land Company lacked an equivalent figure at the summit of its corporate 
hierarchy, or for that matter further down the chain of command, even if the board of 
directors was controlled by John Pearse and Joseph Cripps to a degree unmatched by either 
of its rivals. Understanding the central role played by key individuals–John Macarthur Junior 
and John Galt in the case of the Australian Agricultural Company and the Canada Company, 
respectively, need not detract from the importance of the company as a social collective, but 
it does call for an explanation of how and why these companies were guided through the early 
stages of formation by corporate leaders who marked them with the not inconsiderable 
imprint of individual ambition.        
 The leading light of the Australian wool industry and founder of Camden Park Estate, 
John Macarthur (1767–1834) was confident that New South Wales would yield fine merino 
wool, and at profit too: “The tracts of Land adapted for pasture,” Macarthur wrote in a 
memorial to the Board of Trade, “are so boundless that no assignable limitation can be set to 
the number of fine wooled sheep which may be raised in that Country with but little other 
expence than the hire and food of the shepherds.”231 Ever keen to turn his hand to a promising 
venture Macarthur set about arranging the establishment of a new Company to monopolise 
the Australian wool trade. Thus, in 1803, some twenty years before his son John Macarthur 
Junior (hereafter John Junior) invited a small coterie of merchants and parliamentarians to his 
chambers at Stone Court to discuss the formation of what became the Australian Agricultural 
Company, Macarthur Senior penned a proposal for a joint stock sheep company. Macarthur’s 
Proposal for Establishing a Company to encourage the increase of fine woolled sheep in New 
South Wales was in many respects a harbinger of what was to come: 
 
He therefore proposes that as many persons as may be most approved do form a 
Company, & that they subscribe a sufficient sum to purchase all his Sheep, at the 
price they were selling, to be slaughtered, When the last Returns were sent from 
New South Wales, which was about five pounds per Head. That as the present 
 
231 John Macarthur to the Board of Trade, 4 May 1804, in Papers re Wool, 1803–1880, Macarthur Papers, ML 
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number cannot be correctly ascertained, they be calculated, as Four Thousand & 
that all which may be delivered over that number be Received at half price.232 
 
Despite coming to nothing, family memory was to preserve the legacy of the 1803 plan, and 
in that sense, we can see the origins of the 1824 Company running through two generations 
of the Macarthur family. That, certainly, was how John Junior saw it. “If the undertaking be 
prosperous,” an excited John Junior wrote in a brief moment of respite from his many 
professional and social duties, “how quickly will the export of fine wool from New South 
Wales become an object of national importance, and how much greater will be the merit of 
the person who first pointed the path for useful exertion. My fathers’ name will be handed 
down as the founder of a trade beneficial to this Kingdom & to the Colony.”233 
Even dissent from Macarthur Senior’s corporate template merited explanation. In a 
letter from Lincoln’s Inn, November 14 1824, John Junior told his brother James of his plans 
to diverge from their father’s original intention of importing fine merino wool into the colony 
from the Northern Hemisphere. “The plan of sending out large flocks of sheep according to 
Mr Macarthur’s plan is abandoned by every one. The Company will purchase all good flocks 
that are for sale in the Colony, and will improve them, from time to time, by the finest that 
can be selected in Saxony or Spain.” As was characteristic of the tightknit Macarthur family, 
John concluded his letter to James by underscoring his desire to hear from their father: “I shall 
look with anxiety for my father’s opinions.”234 Family was always important to the 
Macarthurs, and John Junior remained eager to consult with his father throughout the 
Australian Agricultural Company’s gestation and initial development as a joint stock 
enterprise.  
Yet it was ultimately John Junior who oversaw the Australian Agricultural Company’s 
formation. A source of advice and inspiration, yes, but by the 1820s, John Macarthur Senior 
had other preoccupations to keep him busy in New South Wales. It was to a new generation 
of the Macarthur family, then, that the task of company colonisation fell. Ambitious and 
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bright, John Junior (1794–1831) proved a slick operator behind the scenes. After attending 
the universities of Glasgow and Cambridge, John pursued a career in the law, where he was 
called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn in 1818.235 John’s early professional life was marked by 
uncertainty, however, and he was forever scoping out opportunities that might secure him a 
more settled future.236 He possessed at least one quality well-suited to a man with a strong 
personal drive, namely a tremendous work-ethic. It was a trait that he would put to great 
effect during the early years of the Australian Agricultural Company. As he confided to his 
mother in late May 1824, the duties of his legal practice and work on behalf of the Company 
left little time for frivolity. “I have been very busy, & did not go out any where during the 
week–dining on Monday & every other day at the A.A.C. & returning in the Evening to 
chambers.”237  
But more relevant for our purposes are the social circles that John Junior moved in. 
Ever the conscientious son, he wrote frequently and at length to his mother in New South 
Wales. Their correspondence, which is remarkable for the richness of its day-to-day detail, 
shows John to be a young man on the make, eager to do the Macarthur name proud. A 
cossetted life in chambers would therefore not do, and the numerous letters that he sent to 
Sydney capture the ease with which he fraternised with the great and the good. “May 24th. I 
accepted an Invitation on Saturday, to pass a day at the house of Mr Marjoribanks M.P., near 
Watford … went there in company with Mr Loch, an E. Indian & Australian Director.”238 Social 
invitations of this kind were hardly scarce for John Junior, his letters peppered with the goings 
on in Society.  
There was more to John Junior’s packed social life than a natural amiability, though he 
undoubtedly possessed a good dose of that. As he bluntly informed his mother in a letter that 
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recounted the proceedings of the newly formed Australian Agricultural Company, the 
cultivation of close ties with prominent officials in the Colonial Office and Westminster served 
a clear business purpose. A dinner had been arranged in Lord Bathurst’s honour, he informed 
her, but the pretence was clear. “The only use of such entertainments is to promote good will 
& friendly feelings amongst the parties, and to increase the attention paid to the affairs of the 
Colony. I will hereafter transmit an account of the entertainment.–Lord Bathurst, Mr 
Huskisson, Mr Pryme, Mr Horton, Mr Lushington, the Atty & Solc. Genl. have engaged to be 
present & others are expected.”239 Seen in this light, John Junior’s social networking appears 
as shrewd as it was sincere, the public pleasantries of the club neatly aligned with his 
professional interests.  
Pivotal to the fortunes of the Australian Agricultural Company was John Junior’s 
longstanding friendship with Wilmot Horton, the influential Under-Secretary of State for War 
and the Colonies. While Horton is best known for his advocacy of state-based emigration, he 
proved amenable to private colonial enterprise during his time at the Colonial Office. Indeed, 
it was Horton who brokered agreements with all three of the settler corporations under 
discussion. An intermediary between the Macarthurs and John Thomas Bigge, whose report 
laid the groundwork for company colonisation in the Australian colonies, Horton’s ear was a 
valuable coup for John Junior and he was not shy about taking advantage of the connection 
if it meant he could further the family interest.240 Nevertheless, theirs was an intimate, easy 
relationship and they were often to be found dining and discussing ideas together–foremost 
among them the political economy of colonisation.241  
After a meal and an evening that stretched into the small hours of the morning, where 
they discoursed on the work of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, among other texts and 
topics, Horton and Macarthur reconvened the next morning to attend the first of a series of 
lectures delivered by John Ramsay McCulloch. “This morning at 11 Mr Wilmot Horton met 
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me, by appointment, at Willis’s Rooms, & I introduced him to Mr MacCulloch [sic], as an 
auditor of his Lecture on the Colonies, which was the subject of the day. I mentioned before 
that I am attending a course of Lectures by Mr M, on Political Economy.” Evidently, the 
previous night’s conversation had dovetailed into the lecture’s subject matter: “The 
arguments were chiefly upon the impolicy of the Monopoly or Mercantile System, as noticed 
by Adam Smith, and the advantage of allowing the Colonists to carry their products where 
they can sell to the greatest profit, & buy what they want, on the lowest terms. This is the 
system that has so many advocates now, & has been so fully acted upon by Government.”242 
Whether they discussed Adam Smith’s famous remarks on company colonisation is unclear, 
but the important point to take away from the attendance at the lecture with Horton is that 
John Junior effectively balanced his social engagements with Company business.  
John Galt similarly shepherded the Canada Company through its formation and early 
history. Although he would prove temperamentally unsuited to the post, Galt was appointed 
the Company’s first colonial commissioner in 1826. He would serve the corporation in Upper 
Canada until 1829, when he was dismissed for poor management.243 Yet his advocacy on 
behalf of the Company in London was arguably as important as subsequent work on the 
ground in Canada. The extent to which this is true is well-captured in the lengthy 
correspondence that Galt maintained with Horton, yet again the touchpoint in this story. His 
private letters show how dexterously Galt manoeuvred behind the scenes, and here it is 
perhaps worth drawing a parallel with Edward Gibbon Wakefield, another talented writer 
who ably advanced the plans of a number of settler companies.244  
Not that Galt lacked conviction in the idea of company colonisation. For example, in a 
letter to Lord Howick about the British American Land Company in July 1832, which Galt 
trained his attentions on after parting ways with the Canada Company, Galt reaffirmed his 
commitment that this new venture would channel a profit similar to what that land company 
had realized in the Upper province. He likewise spoke up the benefits of emigration: "what I 
propose is the establishment of a colony that should not cost the mother country any expence 
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and yet at the same time contribute ... to her relief from that superabundance of the labouring 
population which is at this time a great evil."245 As Galt remarked in his Autobiography, a 
“mere literary man–an author by profession–stands but low in my opinion,” or at least that 
was how Galt was keen to be interpreted by posterity.246 Of this he was clear, even if it strains 
at the strings of believability given his prolific fictional output.    
 Galt’s correspondence with Horton ranged from letters sent into the Colonial Office 
to a voluminous backchannel discussion about matters colonial. What immediately strikes the 
historian working through the two men’s textual exchange is just how forceful and 
perseverant Galt was in making his case for the Canada Company. This often shaded into 
impetuosity, as in his premature declaration that the Colonial Office had given the Company 
its authorization to settle large tracts of Crown land, but his eternal enthusiasm could also be 
put to more productive ends.247 As we have already seen, Galt was a nimble schemer unafraid 
to change tack when he believed it would help his cause. An unyielding faith in the propriety 
of one’s endeavour was a valuable trait in negotiations with a Colonial Office ever weary of 
new commitments, especially those premised on private enterprise. As George Fife Angas 
would likewise show in the South Australian case, a zealous commitment to the cause was all 
but essential to ensuring that company projections were implemented in practice.  
It is important to note that Galt had taken an interest in British North America well 
before his involvement with the Canada Company. He wrote an 1807 essay entitled “A 
Statistical Account of Upper Canada” for The Philosophical Magazine, for example, in which 
he canvassed the climate, customs and so-called “curiosities” of the province.248 Roger Hall 
has cautioned against reading too much into these early musings. “It was true that almost 
twenty years previously, he had published an article extolling the province’s virtues as a place 
for settlement, but this had been a casual work and the product of a cheerful discussion with 
a Canadian relative.”249 The point is well taken, but we should be careful not to dismiss this 
textual engagement with Upper Canada entirely. After all, Galt had gone to the trouble to see 
the article into print–a fairly formal way of conducting a discussion with a relative. 
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 Yet it is another dimension of Galt’s thinking that interests us here, namely his deep 
belief in private colonial enterprise. Two years prior to his article on Upper Canada Galt had 
written a piece for the same publication entitled “An Essay on Commercial Policy.” For the 
most part overlooked by historians of the Canada Company, the 1805 article linked together 
Galt’s views on imperial trade with reflections on company colonisation. Galt was especially 
critical of state intervention in the economy, and his intervention reads as a passionate 
defence of free trade: 
 
If one might imagine the world in such a Utopian condition as would allow 
commerce to diffuse itself without being affected by political events; if the world 
were raised to a state which would require no part of human industry to be 
appropriated to the purposes of governments, nor of its population to be 
employed in war; mankind, at liberty to cultivate in safety the varieties of trade, 
would divide themselves into companies, by which an approximation would be 
induced towards a communion of goods, and society would assume a form of 
which a faint epitome may sometimes be traced in the communities of factories 
and colonies.250 
 
The company set up to plant a colony in Darien was Galt’s case study in how government 
objectives often clashed with the principles of unfettered commerce. In Galt’s telling the 
Scottish company was fatally undermined by William III’s imposition of the Navigation Acts, 
which the English and Dutch East India companies had pushed for. “The judgement with which 
that expedition [Darien] was planned, and the spirit with which it was executed, reflects as 
much honour upon the Scottish nation as the policy by which it was undermined disgraces 
the disposition and reign of William III.”251  
Angela Esterhammer writes that Galt “expressed great admiration” for William 
Paterson, founder of the failed Scottish colony at Darien.252 An influential banker who had 
helped set up the Bank of England, Paterson was pivotal in the creation of a joint stock trading 
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company with designs on the Isthmus of Panama. The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa 
and the Indies attracted considerable attention when reports of its disastrous expeditions 
were relayed back to Scotland and England, and there are good grounds for thinking that it 
contributed to the 1707 Acts of Union between the English and Scottish parliaments.253 While 
in some respects a strange model of imperial adventuring, Galt found the daring of his fellow 
Scot so captivating that he embarked on a laudatory biography of Paterson (and subsequently 
incorporated the Darien scheme into his fictional writing).254 As George Fife Angas was to later 
do with William Penn, Galt saw in Paterson an idealised agent of colonial expansion. 
Galt’s views on imperial commerce are important because they help explain why he 
did not flinch when the option of a colonisation company was first raised in discussions with 
Horton in 1824, while they also supply added context to his much more commonly studied 
activities in Upper Canada. We know that Galt was instrumental in ironing out Company 
strategy in the colony, for example. His trip to the Holland Land Company’s office in Genesee 
County is frequently referred to in analyses of the Canada Company, and I discuss this in the 
next chapter, while his role in overseeing business operations in British North America 
illustrate how he was able to move from advocacy in London and Scotland to practical 
implementation on the ground. More than anyone else during the period of company 
colonisation studied in this dissertation, Galt was able to move between corporate activity in 
the metropole and the colonial frontier.      
 There was no equivalent figure in the case of the Van Diemen’s Land Company. As I 
show in the next chapter, the Tasmanian enterprise was bedevilled by its lack of political clout 
when a dispute arose with the Australian Agricultural Company over a perceived breach of its 
charter rights. What is more, the lack of an individual leader who combined ambition and 
charisma with the ability to carry with them a team of dedicated company men meant that 
the business lacked an obvious centre of authority. This was all the more pronounced given 
the Company’s preference to confine corporate decision making in the hands of its founding 
directors, John Pearse and Joseph Cripps. Here it is worth drawing a parallel with the Canada 
Company, who effectively managed a committee system in London, similar to the New 
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Zealand Company in design, and who likewise called on the resources of any number of 
prominent directors such as Simon McGillivray. The same was true of how the Van Diemen’s 
Land Company operated in the colony, the management there far less democratic and 
deliberative than that pursued by the Colonial Committee of the Australian Agricultural 
Company in New South Wales. 
Corporations may indeed be legal persons, but we need to ensure that we do not 
overlook the natural persons who compose them. Influenced by the habits of men (and they 
were all men) in a particular place and time, the colonial corporations that emerged during 
the boom of 1824/25 were as much hives of social activity as vehicles of imperial commerce. 
While all three had headquarters in the City of London, only the Australian Agricultural 
Company and the Canada Company were networked into the City’s community of merchants. 
This social dynamic is important as it helps to explain why the Van Diemen’s Land Company 
had comparatively less clout with the Colonial Office, which I explore in the next chapter. At 
the same time, the social standing of the firm was also a concern that occupied the attention 
of contemporaries, and so it should therefore concern us. Yet there are limits to social 
histories of the company that prioritise the collective over the individual, and the chapter has 
accordingly documented how individual ambition could just as often act as a spur to corporate 
innovation as the will of the corporators. The view from inside these corporations brings out 























The Inner Lives of Corporations 
 
 
It is frequently assumed that companies only concern themselves with profit and loss, 
revenue streams and cash flow. However, as historical analyses of the business corporation 
demonstrate, the tendency to view companies in such restricted terms can blind us to the 
larger objectives that often accompany business enterprise.255 This is especially so when we 
consider corporate colonisation, which by its very nature is tied-up with the creation, or, more 
precisely, recreation, of European society in the non-Western world. This chapter takes a 
different approach to the corporation, whereby the social aims of company colonisation are 
accorded as much prominence as the overtly economic. To do so, the chapter treats the 
corporation as an example of what the French sociologist Émile Durkheim called a moral 
community, that is, a social order governed by a shared set of customs and values, principles 
and protocol.256 As Alan Atkinson has remarked in relation to the records of the Australian 
Agricultural Company, the Company’s “ambivalent character is frequently obvious–
moneymaking is often overlaid in these documents with a sense of some larger purpose, or 
at least some larger dignity. In that way the official records of the Company not only say 
something about the early possibilities of government in Australia but also about the early 
possibilities of capitalism.”257         
 The chapter explores the ambivalent character of the three settler companies that 
were formed in the 1824/25 bubble, thereby extending the analysis of company colonisation 
in social context. It investigates the intimate history of these companies, and in so doing it 
recovers the cultural construction of corporate life from the perspective of the men who sat 
at the boardroom table. This involves the recovery of corporate speech acts, in particular the 
discursive strategies employed by the directors to make sense of what they were doing. I 
begin with an examination of how character talk infused life inside the boardroom: probity, 
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public virtue, and manners informed not only how these company men interacted with the 
Colonial Office. It also shaped how they saw themselves, how they conducted business, and 
who they chose to employ in London and the colonies.258 The chapter argues that the 
company men also conceived of themselves as public men, the legal status of these 
corporations a mirror to their tactics of self-description. 
While there are good grounds for disputing the authenticity of their claims to be acting 
in the public interest, my concern here resides in the repertoire of techniques that they used 
to frame their performances. An appreciation of these discursive manoeuvres allows us to 
better appreciate how company colonisation straddled both the public and private spheres. 
It also enables us to grasp why these company men assigned so much attention to the moral 
standing of the court of directors, with character and the display of gentlemanly credentials 
rendered an essential component of corporate life. Indeed, the chapter shows how the trio 
of companies had an abiding concern with respectability and probity, both for the individuals 
who composed the board and the corporation as a social collective. To that end, I explore 
how the language of speculation influenced company discourse, with all three firms adopting 
strategies of disavowal as a means of shoring up their credentials as corporations of good 
standing. 
 The analysis then shifts to the company conversations that united the boardrooms of 
these settler firms in a shared discursive universe. It examines how the Canada Company and 
the Van Diemen’s Land Company positioned themselves in relation to the Australian 
Agricultural Company, progenitor of this new breed of colonisation company. Company 
crossings, however, were not just conducted on a discursive plane, as their tactics of 
corporate espionage and commercial rivalry attest. Accordingly, I show how benchmarking 
informed business practice, and in so doing I draw out the practical implications that 
competition had for company colonisation. The mixture of dialogue and rivalry that these 
intra-company exchanges signify points to a fundamental tension at the heart of business 
enterprise, and I frame my comments around that tension. Understanding the contradictory 
nature of these conversations, in any case, enables us to better grasp the competitive 
dynamic that drove company colonisation. In scrutinising the company books of the 
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Australian Agricultural Company, the Van Diemen’s Land Company, and the Canada Company 
the chapter argues that an understanding of culture is necessary if we are to retrieve the inner 
workings of the business corporation from the historical record. It shows how the aims and 
motivations of these company men had a bearing on the revival of company colonisation in 
the years after Waterloo, and how the cultural history of the firm in turn had an impact on 
Britain’s settler empire. 
Character and the Court 
One of the most salient features of company discourse is just how self-absorbed it was. The 
character of the men who composed the court was much discussed, serving both to validate 
the high standing of the company in the eyes of the public while also holding up a mirror to 
the perceived merit of individual directors. Because respectability radiated from the top down 
in the hierarchical world of the corporate boardroom, the election of directors was no run of 
the mill event. At stake was the very essence of corporate identity, the social composition of 
the leadership group. Thus, when a Special General Court of Proprietors for the Australian 
Agricultural Company met to discuss the replacement of a director and auditor in June 1826, 
governor John Smith in the chair, the conversation was pregnant with self-reflection about 
the role of the board and the importance of character:  
Matthew Wood, esq. Alderman and M.P. observed that he thought it of the 
highest importance to the interests of a Public Company, that the Office of 
Director should be filled by persons of commercial experience and respected by 
the Citizens of London, as well as by the inhabitants of the Metropolis at large–
With these feelings he would propose to be elected to the present vacancy in the 
Direction of this Company, a Gentleman who has recently filled a very important 
situation in this City and whose high Character must be well known to every 
individual now present.259  
That man of commercial eminence and high character was Cornelius Buller, governor of the 
Bank of England during the stock market bubble, and previously the company’s auditor. After 
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returning his thanks and reassuring the proprietors present that he would devote “his best 
energies and the time which he could conveniently spare from other avocations” to the 
company’s purposes, Buller joined the rest of the company’s representatives in the selection 
of a replacement auditor.        
 Again, the key criteria for the successful candidate rested on a dual blend of 
commercial experience and respectability, social capital the all-important ingredient for those 
seeking the nomination. Accordingly, John Abel Smith, a founding partner in Jardine, 
Matheson and Co., and a figure who reappears when we turn to the New Zealand Company 
in Chapter 6, was appointed unanimously to that office. A man “whose high respectability and 
talents were too well known to need any further remark upon this occasion,” Abel Smith 
certainly fit the brief.260         
 Buller and Abel Smith typified the type of man that filled the ranks of these 
colonisation companies, their social credentials and standing in the City of London as 
important as any technical expertise they might bring to the boardroom table. By virtue of 
class and wealth, they were predisposed to view commercial life as but one facet of a 
rounded, public career.261 Company work in this sense formed part of a larger set of designs, 
activity as a corporate director a compliment to toil as a parliamentarian or City merchant. A 
classic expression of what Cain and Hopkins many years ago termed “gentlemanly capitalists,” 
their twin status as men of commerce and public affairs was highly valued.262 But why were 
these characteristics prioritised, and what does it tell us about company colonisation? 
 The directors of these companies shared a fervent commitment to public life, that is, 
to civic society construed in the most general sense.263 More recent divisions between the 
public and private spheres are inadequate when the historical context is early nineteenth 
century London, their conception of corporate purpose a blend of commercial prerogative 
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and public duty.264 Seen in this frame, the modern notion of shareholder value fails to capture 
the attitudes and beliefs that drove these company men.265 Indeed, to a striking degree, the 
company men were at one and the same time public men, or at least they claimed to be.
 Moreover, as the directors of public companies, that is, companies that offered shares 
for sale on the stock market, they had a direct interest in ensuring that the reputation of their 
respective firms was unblemished.266 Private enterprise in this way rubbed up against a range 
of causes larger than the corporations that they lead, and the peculiar interplay between the 
two is key to unravelling the layered identities of the men who orchestrated it all. As the 
report to the First Annual General Meeting of the Australian Agricultural Company made 
clear, “There are, therefore, the most important public, as well as private advantages to be 
derived from the development and success of the plan upon which this Company is founded, 
and these have uniformly secured for it the encouragement and protection of His Majesty’s 
Government.”267 Public and private were in this sense brought together, with the directors’ 
objectives suspended in a middle ground between the two.   
 Public opinion consequently mattered to these company men, and not only for 
reasons of esteem, for it also had a bearing on firm performance. If a company was highly 
regarded in the City, then that would translate into profitability on the stock market, thus 
initiating a virtuous cycle. As the directors of the Australian Agricultural Company remarked 
in a despatch to the colonial committee in Sydney, the Company was “one of the few concerns 
that has continued to maintain the high character it obtained at its commencement.–And it 
is no less essential to the interest of the Shareholder, than to the Character of the Directors, 
and the Colonial Committee, that it should continue, not only to preserve, but to increase the 
good opinion of the Public.”268        
 The self-identification of the Australian Agricultural Company with important public 
business, while clearly self-serving, made it logical that they would seek to align themselves 
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with men drawn from the highest ranks of public life. To that end, the restructuring of the 
original subscription list, in late May 1824, seems expressly designed to make room for a 
number of prominent investors who could bolster the Company’s status: “That various public 
men having signified their approbation of this Company as being calculated to advance the 
national interests, and having expressed a strong desire to promote its views, it is expedient 
to admit such persons as subscribers.”269      
 Likewise, the hosting of public events served to endear the Company to those in 
positions of power, while further cementing the establishment credentials of the enterprise 
in the eyes of the public. “The Directors & Auditors of the Australian Company are to give Lord 
Bathurst a grand dinner on Saturday the 18th of June,” John Macarthur Junior hastily remarked 
in private correspondence. Several members of cabinet were also expected. Critically, the 
dinner was designed to strengthen support among the political class for the Company, of 
whose ranks they were well represented.270 Such occasions were not just opportunities for 
frivolity, rather they were part and parcel of securing support in high places, and the Company 
accordingly took them seriously. The dinner at the Albion Tavern in Aldersgate Street, which 
was paid for at the directors’ own expense, merited a follow up mention several weeks later. 
Non-attendance by some of the great and the good was expressly noted.271  
 Understanding that these companies believed they were contributing to the public 
good is essential to grasping how they perceived their business operations. One method they 
deployed to convey their commitment to the public sphere was through the language of 
patriotism. An effective way to neutralise the claim that they were purely interested in 
commercial objectives, the patriotic tenor of many of their public utterances reveals the 
degree to which they felt it was necessary to demonstrate the virtues of chartered enterprise. 
For example, in a meeting between a delegation of the proposed Canada Company and 
Wilmot Horton at the Colonial Office on the 1st of June 1824, the provisional board of directors 
took umbrage at Horton’s suggestion that the Company should be treated like any other 
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private settler emigrating to Upper Canada, principally because they, unlike individual 
settlers, had ambitions to reform colonial society. “Independent of all views of private 
advantage,” the Company argued, “the persons undertaking to form the Company, claim for 
themselves some allowance of patriotic principle insomuch as they propose to remove a great 
public impediment to the improvement of Canada,” namely the cultivation and improvement 
of the then idle Crown and Clergy reserves, “and to substitute in its place a great source of 
public good.”272 In thus disavowing private motivation as the mainspring of their commercial 
endeavours, the provisional board of the Canada Company worked hard to foreground the 
public benefits that the Company would deliver to the British Empire.   
Manners and the Making of Company Men 
Manners and comportment were an important part of the boardroom as moral community, 
with the directors expected to adhere to appropriate standards of conduct. This was 
especially so when company business migrated beyond the office, as John Junior’s reflections 
on the Australian Agricultural Company’s dinner for Lord Bathurst captures in vivid detail. 
“Our object in this dinner is to impress the new Governor, & also the public, with our strength, 
& the growing importance of the Colony,” he noted in a letter to his father. “All the Directors 
will be present except Mr Grey Bennet, who has left London for the continent with his only 
remaining child, who is … dyeing like the others of consumption. He is wretched, & has quite 
neglected public business.”273 It was a singularly harsh verdict, and evidently for John Junior 
even family tragedy was no let off for ill manners and shyness from public duties. However, 
what is important for us to take note of is that he felt compelled to describe the Company’s 
activities in terms of public rather than private business, because it underscores just how 
firmly affixed the notion was to corporate self-understanding. Directors were expected to act 
in a manner befitting public life precisely because company colonisation was regarded as a 
domain that fell under its purview.       
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 Likewise, in his assessment of the Australian Agricultural Company’s first colonial 
agent, Robert Dawson, John Junior spoke candidly of the new recruits’ temperament, in a 
mixed appraisal that he would soon have good reason to rethink in light of Dawson’s 
subsequent dismissal from the Company’s service. “I think, my dear mother, that you will be 
pleased with Mr Dawson. His manners are occasionally somewhat blunt, but he is in truth 
unassuming & good tempered.”274 Of course, the damage wrought by bad behaviour also had 
to be thought about, with reputational damage to the firm managed as efficiently (and 
promptly) as possible. The by-laws of the Van Diemen’s Land Company, adopted and made at 
a Special General Meeting on April 10 1827, for example, included a specific provision to guard 
against any possible fallout from a director losing his seat due to bankruptcy: “And, if any 
Director shall in any respect so conduct himself, as in the opinion of at least Six of the Directors 
to bring discredit upon himself, and such opinion shall be expressed by a Resolution of a Court 
of Directors, to be carried by Ballot, at which there shall be Six or more Black Balls, then the 
office of every such Director shall immediately become vacant, as if he had resigned the 
same.”275 As we will see below, in the analysis of the Australian Agricultural Company’s 
settlement at Port Stephens, abstract statements about character could quickly take on very 
real dimensions, with company conduct often interpreted through the lens of morality. 
 It was not just London that figured prominently in discussions about standards. What 
might be called the moral economy of the company settlements also pressed on the directors’ 
minds, the propriety of the corporation abroad a reflection of the intrinsic virtue of the 
company at home. We see this clearly expressed in the language used to describe the colonial 
workforce, for example, where character and morality were never far from the surface, as 
well as broader reflections about the role the company should play in settler society. As the 
directors of the Van Company instructed their colonial agents, “The Court think it their duty 
to impress upon their Commissioners & upon all their Officers & Servants whose Station and 
Character can give them any influence in the Society that they shall set the example in their 
Persons and Families, & encourage in those below them an attendance on Public Worship.”276 
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Conspicuous here is the attention that both the Australian Agricultural Company and the Van 
Diemen’s Land Company devoted to their convict workforce, who were portrayed in 
classically paternalistic terms (discussed below).      
 The Tasmanian promoters were explicit that their objectives were not simply 
economic in nature, and we see this at work in the instructions they gave to their agents sent 
out to Australia.277 Assuring the colonial authorities of their benevolent intentions, especially 
as it concerned the conduct of their men on the spot, the court sought to reassure Governor 
Arthur of its commitment to the social implications of company colonisation. “It may however 
be satisfactory to your Honor to be assured that in the Instructions given to these Gentlemen 
the Court of Directors have not confined themselves solely to points of an Interested 
commercial Policy,” a clear statement of the Company’s intention to act in the public good. 
“They have contemplated the possibility of their Establishment becoming at no distant period 
under the fostering care of the Colonial Government an Institution of some magnitude; & 
they are convinced that its prosperity & dignity, together with the individual happiness of its 
Members, will be essentially promoted by an attention in its managers & superior officers to 
the great interests of Order Morality & Religion.”278 Yet, as revealing as all this is for how the 
board of the Van Diemen’s Land Company envisaged the role of their so-called superior 
officers, it is the description of their convict workforce that most illuminates the larger aims 
of the Company. After all, this was a far more taxing challenge when viewed through the lens 
of early nineteenth century notions of order, morality and religion, then ensuring the 
adherence of the Company’s superior officers to codes of conduct and probity.279 
 Correspondence between the directors in London and their principal agent in the 
colony, Edward Curr, shows how deeply the court thought about convict management. “The 
Court feel desirous to offer a few observations upon the general treatment of Convicts which 
they do with deference to the experience Mr Curr has acquired by his residence in the Island 
of the character & habits of that description of Persons. In the first place you will make 
yourselves intimately acquainted with all the orders & regulations in their behalf made by the 
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Colonial Government & cause all the Servants of the Company in their respective 
Departments carefully to observe them.”280 In particular, the court of directors wished Curr 
to adopt a light touch with respect to the convict labourers, as they thought this would 
ultimately produce better results: 
You are aware … how much His Majesty’s Government feel interested in 
improving the moral condition of these Offenders & in furtherance of which they 
are hired out to the company. The Court therefore recommend you to keep those 
ends constantly in view & to endeavour to lay down for yourselves & your 
Subordinate Agents & Servants such a system of discipline & controul as while it 
affords to the Convicts every comfort compatible with their Situation, shall inure 
them to habits of discipline, industry & sobriety.281 
 
Moralising about convict reform was also accompanied by a system of incentives, for 
example, the payment to prisoners of tea and sugar for work in their own time on the 
Company farm.282        
 Bookkeeping came into the picture when the directors wished to make known their 
interest in receiving reports on their convict workforce. For the Van Diemen’s Land Company, 
as for their New South Wales peer, the close observation of the convict workforce would 
improve both Company and colony, with the two linked in a symbiotic relationship. “The 
effect of such a System the Court confidently anticipate, must be; not only, to promote the 
public advantage, but, to make their labour more effectual & profitable: Upon this Subject 
they will expect to have frequent & ample reports from you.”283 To that end, the court 
encouraged their representatives to file returns that encompassed detailed reports on convict 
behaviour, including commentary on their work habits and living conditions, all of which could 
be used to monitor their labour force with an unrivalled degree of precision: “The Court are 
glad to see your return of Convicts both those now in the service of the Company and those 
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who have left this return tends to make the Directors acquainted with the details and 
minutiae of the Concern and they would wish that similar returns should be annually made 
not only of the Convicts but of the free labourers with your observations on Character.”284 
The Company concluded their observations on instituting this paper panopticon by 
elaborating on why it would be good practice to incorporate such returns into the normal 
stream of colonial reports.  
Just as these companies laboured at home to project an image of public virtue, so the 
colonial establishments were designed with an eye on optics. The Australian Agricultural 
Company’s colonial committee saw no reason why the headquarters in Sydney should be any 
less grand than those back in London. “A commodious & conveniently situated house in 
Macquarie Place Sydney (formerly the Bank of N.S. Wales) has been rented for the term of 
three yrs. from the 1st Jany. as an office for the transaction of the Company’s Affairs, as well 
as a place of residence for the Secretary, and of temporary Accommodation for the Servants 
of the Company, on their arrival from England, or at such time as business may call them to 
Sydney.” At £250 per annum the house in Macquarie Place was an expensive choice, “but the 
necessity of having a house & the impossibility of obtaining a suitable one at a cheaper rate” 
clinched the decision. What is more, the house was thought to be a social setting conducive 
to the smooth functioning of orderly business, as well as being well-situated to keeping the 
Company’s servants out of harm’s reach:  
 
We feel assured however that this expence will be repaid by the greater facility 
which will thus be afforded for the regular & methodical transaction of the 
Company’s Affairs; and by the Advantage of having a place of reception for the 
servants of the Company, instead of their being constrained to take lodgings at an 
exorbitant price, where they would be in constant danger of contamination by 
improper associations.285 
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Individuals were always more important than the buildings that housed them, however, and 
the calibre of personnel in the colony was frequently a topic of conversation. An especially 
rich documentary record of how character shaped the administration of company 
colonisation is preserved in the Canada Company’s application book for employment in Upper 
Canada.286 Industriousness is a trait that crops up with regularity when one parses the 
application list, what the company tended to call “personal activity.” But so too was a wider 
measure of suitability for a posting in the Company’s office, with commercial experience and 
refinement to the fore. Thus, the notes on Charles Goodwin read as follows: “applying for the 
office of Secretary in Canada–Can speak and write the French language has been 22 years in 
a Banking House in the City.”287 In spite of his broad-ranging qualifications, Goodwin was not 
hired.            
 The Australian Agricultural Company similarly probed the background of potential 
staff, alert to respectability and character as much as concrete measures of competence. In a 
letter to the governor and deputy governor, for example, the committee of management 
emphasised pedigree and station. “Having found it necessary to obtain the assistance, as 
Clerk, of a Gentleman in whom we could place implicit confidence, we have made a 
conditional agreement with Mr Thomas Cudbert Harrington, to act in that capacity.” 
Harrington, who later served the New Zealand Company, was considered a perfect fit for the 
New South Wales enterprise. “Mr. Harrington has received an excellent education, is 
accustomed to publick business; and from a residence of some years in the Colony, has 
acquired considerable information in the mode of conducting agricultural affairs.”288 Like 
Harrington, the colonial clerk of the Van Diemen’s Land Company would be entrusted with 
the all-important task of managing the Company’s books, an essential element in the 
maintenance of corporate order. Thus, when they turned to discuss hiring someone to fill the 
post, they emphasised the fact that the job entailed the close documentation of all facets of 
business, stretching from work for the chief agent to minute taker at meetings of the local 
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council.289           
 In a mirror of attempts to ingratiate themselves at home, the antipodean companies 
moreover instituted a special policy of dispensing colonial shares. Principally designed to 
curry favour with local dignitaries, while also securing the Company a close channel to political 
authority, the Tasmanian directors made a point of reminding Curr of the purpose of colonial 
shareholding:  
As it appears very desirable to interest some of the most respectable & influential 
Colonists in the Concerns of the Company the Court have placed at your disposal 
(beyond the appropriation made to several individuals connected with the 
Government) Two hundred shares in their joint Stock which they leave to the 
discretion of the Council to distribute in such manner as may appear best 
calculated to conciliate the good wishes of the Community in Van Diemen’s Land 
… 290 
 
Critically, the shares were to be apportioned to those best placed to further the interests of 
the Company in the colony: “They further desire that you will apportion these Shares, with 
reference to the Situation, Character and means of the Individual.”291 Indeed, the Company’s 
rationalisation of local shareholding placed emphasis on the social dimension of the policy, 
not any economic consideration, and this was a line of reasoning also taken by the Australian 
Agricultural Company, the colonial committee having “always considered the ultimate 
retention, by the Colonial proprietors, of only a limited number of their Shares, as one of the 
strongest arguments of the advantageous prospect, which the undertaking holds out to 
English Capitalists.”292 What really mattered was that the dispensation of colonial shares 
worked to bolster social status. In a similar vein the Australian Agricultural Company’s colonial 
establishment relayed with obvious relish the news that a number of respected men in the 
colony had purchased shares. “It will be satisfactory to you, and to the proprietors in general 
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to learn, that the opinion of the state of the Company’s affairs in the Colony is very 
favourable.–Several persons of respectability here are desirous to obtain Shares.”293  
 
The Charge of Speculation  
 
If probity and gentlemanly credentials mattered to individual directors seeking election, or to 
aspiring clerks hoping to make their way in the City, the same was true of how these 
companies as a whole wished to be seen by the broader public. Unease inside the boardroom 
about the moral fibre of its representatives was thus matched by company literature that 
aimed to quell any suggestion that they were engaged in speculation for speculation’s sake. 
Moreover, it was a strain of company discourse that found expression among the colonial 
agents. The Van Diemen’s Land Company’s principal agent, Edward Curr, typified this 
corporate concern with local opinion, when he wrote of the colonial publics’ scepticism 
towards the Company. “The public here are also well aware that a large proportion of joint 
stock and chartered company’s [sic] of recent formation have abandoned their undertakings,” 
he noted in a letter to London, “and they have no certainty that the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company will not dissolve in their turn.”294       
 While geographically removed from the epicentre of company speculation in the City 
of London, the Van Demonian settlers were highly attuned to the fact that companies had 
come and gone in great numbers over the course of 1824/25, and they were naturally anxious 
that the large up-start enterprise in their community might follow suit. Moreover, the close 
ties that many in the colony perceived between the Company and the colonial government, 
principally on account of the favourable terms the Company had managed to wrangle from 
the Colonial Office, aroused suspicion. “Again,” Curr wrote, “it is to be observed that one 
common feeling of jealousy is entertained by every individual in the Colony. The magnitude 
of the grant is less thought of than that the whole is to be chosen land and the refuse to be 
made no account of. This makes the body unpopular and individuals are afraid of connecting 
themselves with an unpopular body.” What is more, the Company was deemed to be in the 
pocket of government, which itself was highly unpopular in the fractured civic sphere of 
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colonial Van Diemen’s Land: “To all these reasons I must add that the formation of the 
Company is considered a Government measure, and as the Government is unpopular the 
Company must be so too.”295        
 Underlying Curr’s sentiments was a broader worry about being associated with the 
negative implications of the 1824/25 stock market bubble. The stability and good name of the 
Company depended on a reputation for prudence and sensible management, not commercial 
flights of fancy. Curr’s discussion of how the local board might draw bills on London captures 
the pointedness that such disquiet could engender:  
Whenever the time arrives when it shall be necessary to draw Bills on the 
Directors, if the premium realized should not be equal to that of Treasury Bills, it 
certainly will not be owing to any doubt which the public might be supposed to 
entertain of the Company’s credit … and at this time when the news of the 
dreadful reverses which have been felt in England and the total extinction of nine 
tenths of joint stock companies of recent origin is still fresh in the minds of the 
people it is satisfactory to be able to say so much.296 
Such fears percolated through Company discourse, and a variety of tactics were deployed to 
counter the charge that they were playing recklessly with cheap credit. Often, this simply 
meant deflecting what they believed to be an inherent hostility to joint stock investment. 
“There will, nevertheless, remain numbers who cannot well divest themselves of the idea, 
that all Companies, and all Joint Stock Companies, must ever assume the form, and be 
pregnant with the mischief attending on monopoly,” noted an in-house history of the Van 
Diemen’s Land Company.297 A representative take on how these settler corporations 
understood the views of their detractors, this particular Tasmanian history was forthright in 
its challenge to the accusation that they were acting without propriety.  
 Self-positioning against the stock market bubble could also help draw out comparisons 
among the settler trio. The private letter book of the secretary to the Australian Agricultural 
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Company contains reflections on that Company’s standing in relation to the Canada Company 
and the Van Diemen’s Land Company, for example. In a despatch of 16 July 1826 to New South 
Wales, John Strettell Brickwood remarked with some glee that their Company was virtually 
unique in the prosperity attendant upon the concern. “Our Company at this moment stands 
almost alone in the long list of Schemes with which the Mercantile World were mad when 
you left England–the list continues, altho’ most of the Associations are dissolved & nearly 
forgotten.–We almost alone, are favoured with success.” Brickwood continued with a clear 
statement of how he saw the Australian Agricultural Company’s prospects in light of the two 
other settler corporations to have emerged at the same time:  
The Van Diemen’s Land Co. are now much talked of as unlikely to proceed, but 
until the return of their Commissioners, or of a report from them after arrival out, 
no certain opinion is promulgated from their office.–The Canada Company 
appears to be laid upon the shelf–and the precious Metal Mining Companies are 
all, with scarcely an exception at a low discount.298 
Such self-congratulatory talk was of course little more than corporate naval gazing. In 
constructing a favourable comparison between the Australian Agricultural Company, on the 
one hand, and the Canada Company and the Van Diemen’s Land Company, on the other, 
Brickwood was not in fact aiming at an objective assessment of each companies’ merits. 
Rather, what interested him was the creation of a narrative sequence that demonstrated how 
the Australian Agricultural Company alone was based on sound principles, and furthermore 
that it was composed of men with upstanding values who were unmoved by the animal spirits 
of the market. At the same time, the insertion of selective data points bolstered Brickwood’s 
overall narrative about the Australian Agricultural Company’s superior performance, his 
observations about the Company’s stocks a ploy to supply reassurance about the economic 
fundamentals of the business: “Our Shares, amidst the general disappointment & strong 
prejudice existing against every Establishment of the kind have sunk far below the high 
premium at one time paid for them, but they have never gone down to par–Some have been 
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transferred as £5 prem but not under.”299       
 Not that the Van Diemen’s Land Company would have accepted Brickwood’s 
broadside. They, too, positioned themselves in relation to the economic boom of 1824/25, 
although their interpretation quite naturally put a far more positive spin on the Company’s 
guiding principles and early history. A particular emphasis was placed on honesty and time-
honoured commercial wisdom:  
In the midst of this rage for speculation, and the scramble for shares in joint stock 
concerns, one Company started, the Directors of which were too sensible to look 
for profit from other sources than those which the universal suffrage of mankind 
had for ages continued to consider as the true mines of wealth, viz. agricultural 
and commerce, and too honest to hold forth any prospects of gold mines, &c. 
which never existed, but in the brains of the projectors: This was the “Van 
Diemen’s Land Company,” which owed its origins to no trumped up story on the 
part of a set of designing men.300 
At the same time, protestations against the taint of speculation could also feed into actual 
shifts in company policy. Indeed, it was precisely the desire to appear above the fray of stock 
market gyrations that persuaded the directors of the Van Diemen’s Land Company to forego 
issuing a prospectus. Understood to be standard practice among new companies, the decision 
to refrain from publicly advertising shares in the venture signalled a break from conventional 
commercial policy. “In an early stage of the application to Government for a legal sanction of 
the Company, a pledge was extracted, that the shares should not be issued to the public, so 
as to become a marketable property, until the Charter should be obtained,” recounted the 
board. Company honour was underscored in a promise to act in good faith, unlike other 
companies who they believed rushed to the stock market to acquire capital: 
This pledge has been redeemed: but the Directors have felt that they would not 
be honourably fulfilling the intentions of Government, unless they acted in all 
other respects in conformity with the prohibition. It is for this reason that they 
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have, contrary to the example of other Companies, foregone to issue a 
Prospectus, and to invite a General application for their Shares.301 
Yet, more often than not, a speculative impulse was disowned for strategic reasons, the talk 
of prudence a discursive tactic to reassure a sceptical Colonial Office. Soothing words and 
overtures to probity were infrequently matched by actual company practice, and there is even 
good reason to doubt the sincerity of the Van Diemen’s Land Company’s declaration of 
restraint. Arguably a more plausible explanation for the Company’s reluctance to issue a 
prospectus and open itself up to the wider public lies in its low profile in the City of London. 
Without the backing of prominent individuals, drawn from the upper echelons of parliament, 
the East India Company, and London’s merchant houses the Van Diemen’s Land Company 
lacked the sort of clout possessed by the Australian Agricultural Company. Seen in this frame, 
the decision not to circulate a prospectus and seek subscriptions from across the City reflects 
the more prosaic facts of life for this Tasmanian twist on the Australian Agricultural Company. 
It did not have an equivalent public profile and would therefore have to begin operations in 
the manner of a more localised private company.  
Company Conversations 
 
The verbal utterances of these company men may elude the historian, but the paper trail of 
their business records nevertheless speaks to the tenor of the times. While company 
discourse was for the most part inward looking, almost reflexively self-referential, this does 
not mean that it was hermetically sealed off from the outside world. Indeed, to an extent not 
previously registered in existing accounts of company colonisation and the stock market 
bubble of 1824/25, the trio of settler corporations were united together in a shared discursive 
universe, where talk and conversation flowed from one boardroom to another. “Speech,” as 
Alan Atkinson has noted, “creates an island of understanding, high and dry, and the habits of 
speech lead to a sense of place and of particularity. There is power in utterance, in filling a 
silence, and listeners are easily made into subjects, at least for the moment.”302 Place and 
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particularity, subjectivity and self-understanding–these were all facets of company 
colonisation that were cultivated through conversation.  
Corporate precedent has been a staple feature of company rhetoric from the 
inception of the genre at the beginning of the seventeenth century. As I show elsewhere in 
the dissertation, the example established by earlier waves of company colonisation was 
routinely drawn on to normalise private colonial enterprise. But among the companies of 
1824/25 it was the Australian Agricultural Company that set the benchmark for what this new 
breed of colonial corporation stood for. Seen in this frame, the template of John Junior’s 
Australian Agricultural Company was a spectre that influenced how the other settler 
companies came to define themselves 
Edward Curr, the headstrong manager of the Van Diemen’s Land Company, who was 
infamously branded the “Potentate of the North” by the Hobart Town Courier, was acutely 
aware of the long shadow cast by their New South Wales forerunner.303 In discussions with 
Lord Bathurst and Wilmot Horton, Curr, then the acting secretary of the provisional board, 
was indeed much relieved at the Colonial Office’s willingness to engage with the Company, 
“the only objection at any time urged to the undertaking or to a Grant and Charter on similar 
terms and conditions with those to the Australian Company, originated in the doubt 
entertained of finding a sufficient quantity of land in the Island unlocated and eligible for 
agricultural purposes."304 As a template for what the Tasmanian capitalists could reasonably 
expect from the Colonial Office, the charter bestowed on the Australian Agricultural Company 
was a concrete reminder of what awaited them once negotiations with the Colonial Office 
were brought to a close. Unquestionably a fillip for corporate confidence, the precedent of 
the New South Wales venture also made clear that the concept of an antipodean pastoral 
company was unlikely to attract much criticism from within the Colonial Office, even if they 
were to soon find themselves fending off attacks from less friendly quarters in both London 
and Van Diemen’s Land.         
 The board of the Van Diemen’s Land Company was quite certain that once the initial 
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difficulty of the land grant had been surmounted there would be little problem in securing a 
charter, principally because the underlying business model in many respects replicated what 
the Australian Agricultural Company had already succeeded in putting into practice. Thus, 
when evidence supplied by William Sorell, the former lieutenant-governor of Tasmania, 
attested to the availability of unoccupied land in the north-west of the island, the Company 
was satisfied that a charter of incorporation would soon be forthcoming.305 “The Directors 
have proceeded, therefore, in the arrangements, in the full confidence that your Lordship 
would feel no objection to advise the Crown to Grant a Charter, and recommend a Bill in 
Parliament in aid of such Charter, both containing provisions similar to those passed in favor 
of the Australian Company.”306 Foremost among these provisions was a quit-rent affixed to 
the land grant, perhaps the most advantageous concession that the Australian Agricultural 
Company had secured from the Colonial Office. 
Again, the Australian Agricultural Company was explicitly cited as the benchmark for 
what they expected, or at least hoped for: “They [the directors of the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company] pray that the Grant may be made subject to a Quit Rent, and the redemption of it 
on the same principles as that to the Australian Company,” provided only that the differential 
in future land prices between the two colonies was kept in mind. The capital structure of the 
corporation, Curr thought, should also mirror that of the Australian Agricultural Company, the 
rights and duties of these companies a perfect match.307     
The Canada Company was likewise drawn into the Australian Agricultural Company’s 
orbit, though in this case the comparison with the antipodean company was resisted as well 
as tacitly endorsed. Mimicry of the Australian Agricultural Company’s charter was not initially 
deemed problematic among the Canadian speculators, even if they would later tire of what 
they considered to be a sloppy application of the Australian model in the context of an 
altogether different commercial proposition. A useful shorthand for what they could likely 
expect from the Colonial Office, the example established by the Australian Agricultural 
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Company served to provide the board with an immediate reference point. It did not hurt that 
their interlocutor at the Colonial Office, Wilmot Horton, had personally presided over the 
earlier set of company negotiations. 
 At an impromptu meeting at the London Tavern on 13 May 1824, which followed 
private discussion among individuals interested in forming a joint stock business to colonise 
parts of Upper Canada, a number of foundational principles were agreed that constituted the 
Company’s initial pitch to the Colonial Office. The Proposals of the Company thus stated, Peter 
Robinson was summoned to discuss matters concerned with the disposal of land in Upper 
Canada. The expedition lead for Horton’s trial emigration schemes in Upper Canada, 1823 and 
1825, Robinson was nevertheless confident that private colonial enterprise would yield 
positive results, and the Company’s key takeaway from this meeting reflected the 
assuredness of his views: “That with respect to the Charter and Act of Parliament, there could 
not be the slightest difficulty in stating that Government would grant to a Canadian Company, 
the like principles as were promised to the Australian Company, now forming for the 
settlement of Lands in New South Wales.”308 Two days later, 15 May 1824, at a private 
meeting at Messrs Hullett Brothers and Company’s Counting House, the Company reassured 
themselves of the validity of the comparison, in particular by pointing out the absence, as 
they saw it, of any clear reason why the Colonial Office would not treat the two entities on an 
equal footing: “There would be no objection to the principle of extending the same privileges 
to this Body as had been granted to the Australian Company.”309    
 If the Company sought special privileges or rights however, they were quickly 
disabused of the notion, and it was in relation to corporate rights that the directors broke 
from the Australian Agricultural Company analogue. “Under these circumstances it would be 
open to the Company to settle Emigrants on the same terms, provided always that no expence 
whatever were to attach to the Government in transporting them thither. But the Company, 
in this instance, will not be in a different condition from any Individual.”310 It was here that 
the Canada Company began to dissent from the model advocated by the Colonial Office. That 
the corporation was to be rendered equivalent to an “individual Settler,” as was the case with 
 
308 Meeting of the Court of Directors, 13 May 1824, MS564, r. 3, 4, Minutes of the Court of Directors, Canada 
Company Papers, Archives of Ontario, Toronto.  
309 Meeting of the Court of Directors, 15 May 1824, ibid. 
310 Meeting of the Court of Directors, 21 May 1824, ibid. 
 107 
the Australian Agricultural Company, was interpreted as an affront to the plans and prospects 
of the Company. They complained bitterly.     
The subject of much “desultory and unsatisfactory discussion” with Horton, the 
Company now rejected the comparison drawn between themselves and the Australian 
Agricultural Company. Horton, the minute books record, “spoke of the principle which had 
been adopted with respect to the Australian Company as that on which Government would 
act towards the Canadian.”311 However, the directors could not have been less convinced that 
this was a fruitful basis upon which to reach an agreement. Adamant that the framework 
adopted by the Colonial Office was ill-conceived, unsuitable when applied to company 
colonisation in Upper Canada, the board asserted that Horton’s portrayal of the Company was 
in fundamental respects misguided.       
 From the Company’s point of view, Horton “did not appear to be aware of all the 
objects of the proposed Establishment, and he seemed to think that it was intended to be 
much more of a mercantile character than has been contemplated.”312 The social worlds that 
these corporations occupied may have in important respects overlapped, but their respective 
business models were still distinct. There was a similar sense of dissatisfaction that October, 
when the Company alleged that the Colonial Office had used the Act of Parliament granted 
to the Australian Agricultural Company as the basis upon which to deal with them: 
 
And they are rather surprized to observe that after having submitted the Draft of 
a Charter drawn up with great care and embracing all the powers and privileges 
which the Company may probably require, no notice whatever has been taken of 
that Document, but that a transcript has been made of the Australian Company’s 
published Act, which although not at all applicable to the objects and 
circumstances of the Canada Company, has yet been so closely followed that in 
several instances the words of the Act are preserved, and the term “this Act” used, 
instead of employing the language of a Charter…313 
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For the board of the Canada Company, the local context of land settlement in Upper Canada 
necessitated a different approach than that followed by the Colonial Office in its negotiations 
with the Australian Agricultural Company. It was in this vein that they drew a stark comparison 
between the two firms: “It is a matter of general notoriety and therefore may be stated here, 
that the Australian Company have received or is to receive a Grant of a certain Tract of waste 
Lands in a Country which is without any local legislature–whereas the Canada Company is 
purchasing in a Settled Country, Lands scattered among the properties of many thousand 
different individuals each of whom require the Company as often as any question may arise 
to prove the terms of its Charter.“314 The directors of these companies well understood the 
distinctions that existed between them, and therefore so should we. Understanding that the 
corporate form could take many shapes challenges us to think beyond static conceptions of 
capitalism that posit a stable institutional framework.    
 Whereas the Australian Agricultural Company presented itself as a pastoral concern, 
which specialised in the production and sale of fine merino wool, the Canada Company made 
much of its credentials as a land company in the model of contemporary North American 
firms such as the Ohio Company and the Holland Land Company. John Galt’s report on his 
travels through America, in which he visited the Holland Land Company’s office in Batavia, is 
indeed full of effusive praise for the success attendant upon these speculations. Describing 
the township of Geneva in New York State, which was part of the famous Phelps and Gorham 
Purchase of 1788, in which a private syndicate bought 6,000,000 acres of land from the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Galt rhapsodised about what they had been able to 
achieve. It was, he wrote, “one of the most beautiful Towns for its extent in America–Few in 
England can compare with it. The Churches are Elegant and the private Houses adorned with 
a degree of Architectural Taste rarely seen elsewhere–Among the several good Inns it 
contains is the Great Hotel built by the Manager of the Pulteney Property.”315 Similarly, the 
Holland Land Company’s settlements in Genesee Country, also Western New York, were given 
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positive reviews. “Batavia, in which the central office is held for the sale of the Holland 
Company’s Lands, owes its origin to that undertaking and is also a respectable Town 
containing in 1820 above 2500 Inhabitants, but now many more.”316  
 Aesthetics aside, the Company’s interest in the “great American Purchases” also had 
a bearing on how they proposed to run their business.317 Foreshadowing Wakefield’s Letter 
from Sydney, the Canada Company underlined their conviction in the superiority of the 
American system of land sales, hitherto not adopted in Britain’s settler colonies. “Before the 
Institution of the Canada Company the British Government had scarcely ever really sold any 
of its Lands but made gratuitous Grants of them upon payment of office fees.”318 It is a 
sentiment that would later find legislative succour in the Australian colonies with the 
introduction of the Ripon Regulations of 1831, which sought to transform colonial land policy 
on just these lines.319 In the meantime the directors of the Canada Company sought to pre-
empt official opinion on land settlement, in particular by opening up their lands to 
“settlement according to the American system.” In so doing, they argued, “it is probable the 
Company will ultimately derive the greatest profit and best verify those expectations of 
advantage to the Province by which Government was induced to enter into the Contract” with 
the Company.320         
 While Clarence Karr some time ago recognised that the Canada Company styled itself 
in the image of contemporary American land companies, less studied is how the deeper 
American past informed firm identity and self-understanding.321 North American company 
colonisation, both present and past, was a guiding force for the Canadian speculators–an early 
forerunner of a discursive connection that the promoters of systematic colonisation in South 
Australia and New Zealand cultivated in the 1830s, and which I analyse in Part 2. A defence of 
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seventeenth-century chartered colonial enterprise in particular coloured John Galt’s thinking 
about the Company. Galt was acutely sensitive about perceptions that that the Canada 
Company was prosecuting a new, and thus untested, colonial agenda. The invocation of the 
colonial past served to allay such fears, naturalising the corporate model of the Canada 
Company by locating it in a genealogy with roots deep in British imperial history. As Galt 
relayed in a lengthy report to the court of directors:  
The time and circumstances in which the Company was formed have led many to 
regard it as the first of its kind and consequently experimental, but it is not so, for 
the record of Royal Charters affords numerous precedents of similar 
undertakings; none of the old associations indeed proposed so strict an 
adherence to commercial principles, but they gave rise to the latter speculations 
to which I particularly allude. Their origin and history I shall now proceed to state 
somewhat fully, referring the Court to the appendix for a Chronological Account 
of those chartered associations, by which the foundations of the United States 
were originally laid.322 
 
Company conversations often traipsed across the centuries in a dialogue between 
contemporary promoters and those who founded the tradition they sought to revive. Yet 
there were ultimately limits to what could be gleaned from a Chronological Account of 
chartered associations past. More pressing were corporate rivals in the here and now, and so 
it is to this set of more competitive company conversations that we now turn.  
Commercial Rivalry and Corporate Espionage 
Rivalry was never far from the thoughts of these company directors, ever mindful as they 
were of the advantages that came with monopoly and the threats associated with 
competition. No more pronounced was this sense of corporate hostility than in the 
relationship between the Australian Agricultural Company and the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company, which from the beginning was coloured by competition over market share. At the 
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core of the Australian Agricultural Company’s argument against the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company was point seven in the agreement reached with the Colonial Office: “That no Rival 
Incorporated, or Joint Stock Company with similar objects shall be established in New South 
Wales … it being however expressly understood that no other exclusive privileges, and no 
peculiar jurisdiction in the Colony, are desired.”323 For the directors of the Australian 
Agricultural Company the up-start Tasmanian company was in flagrant violation of this 
principle, the island of Van Diemen’s Land then under the jurisdiction of New South Wales. 
Convinced that their firm was in fact the market, insulated from insurgents, with a free 
reign in the trade of fine wool between Australia and Britain, the sudden reappearance of the 
Van Diemen’s Land Company challenged the directors’ sense of security.324 Accordingly, the 
Australian Agricultural Company sought to stave off the formation of this new rival, going 
directly to the Colonial Office to plead their case as soon as they were notified by Earl Bathurst 
of the reinvigorated efforts to form a Van Diemonian company.325 Making full use of the 
weight of their board, and their close connections to Westminster, the Company argued 
forcefully about the negative consequences of greenlighting another antipodean trading 
company.326 New entrants were to be discouraged, of that much they were clear.   
In any case, the Van Diemen’s Land promoters would struggle to develop their ideas 
over the course of 1824–there was much difficulty in persuading the Colonial Office of the 
availability of land in the island. The Australian Agricultural Company, for the time being, had 
the field to themselves. However, tensions between the two bodies resurfaced when the 
Tasmanian capitalists renewed their operations at the beginning of 1825. As he had done the 
previous year, Bathurst informed the Australian Agricultural Company of the Van Diemen’s 
Land projection, and they were accordingly invited to meet with him on 12 February at 2pm, 
while the Tasmanian promoters were invited to an interview two days hence, 14 February at 
3pm.327 Bathurst then arranged a joint consultation with both boards at the Colonial Office 
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on 17 February, before a deputation from the Van Diemen’s Land Company visited the offices 
of their counterpart on 22 February to take stock of proceedings.328 
There was plenty of work to be done, however, before an agreement could be 
brokered, and with the two parties seemingly at cross-purposes, the unenviable task of 
bridging the gap fell to Bathurst and Wilmot Horton at the Colonial Office. After thinking 
through the implications of Bathurst’s letter and deciding upon the composition of the 
deputation, the directors of the Australian Agricultural Company drafted up a letter in the 
name of its governor, John Smith, that reiterated the protection talk they had adopted in May 
1824. “The Principle of Protection from the interference of any Rival Company having been 
admitted by Your Lordship, I have strongly to express the hopes of the Australian Company 
that it will be so far carried into effect as to secure to that Company sufficient and adequate 
means to put into execution their original plans for the growth of Fine Wool in New South 
Wales.”329 It was a missive that would have left Bathurst in little doubt about where they 
stood on the Van Diemen’s Land Company. 
Two propositions informed the Australian Agricultural Company’s response to their 
competitor. The first was that the Tasmanian capitalists would “pledge themselves not to buy 
Sheep in New South Wales, or any Sheep imported from thence into Van Diemen’s Land, 
either openly or collusively, directly or indirectly for Twelve Years,” while the second provision 
extended the logic of the first to the European sheep market: “The Van Diemen’s Land 
Company engage not to purchase either openly or collusively, directly or indirectly, any Sheep 
in the Markets of Europe for Three Years, namely, the Seasons 1825, 1826 and 1827.”330 The 
two provisions confirmed by the board, the Company drafted a letter in the name of the 
 
Canberra; Meeting of the Court of Directors, 16 February 1825, VDL 201/1, Van Diemen’s Land Company 
Papers, Tasmanian Archives and Heritage Office, Hobart. See also John Pearse’s undated note, ff. 12-13, ibid.  
328 Meeting of the Court of Directors, 24 February 1825, ANU NBAC 160-89, Minutes of the Court of Directors, 
Australian Agricultural Company Papers, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Canberra. 
329 John Smith to Earl Bathurst, 16 February 1825, CO 280/2, Colonial Office Correspondence Tasmania, TNA, 
Kew; Meeting of the Court of Directors, 16 February 1825, ANU NBAC 160-89, Minutes of the Court of 
Directors, Australian Agricultural Company Papers, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Canberra. On colonial 
corporations and protection, see Phil Stern, “Limited Liabilities: The Corporation and the Political Economy of 
Protection in the British Empire,” in Lauren Benton, Adam Clulow and Bain Attwood eds. Protection and 
Empire: A Global History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 93–113. 
330 Meeting of the Special Court of Directors, 24 February 1825, ANU NBAC 160-89, Minutes of the Court of 
Directors, Australian Agricultural Company Papers, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Canberra. 
 113 
governor to the proposed directors of the Van Diemen’s Land Company, thereby initiating 
direct negotiations between the two parties.331  
Unsurprisingly the Van Diemen’s Land Company disagreed with the characterisation 
given by Smith and the Australian Agricultural Company. Aside from the misrepresentation of 
the impact that two companies would have on a market that could bear considerably more 
competition, John Pearse, the leading architect of the Van Diemen’s Land Company, voiced 
concerns that the Australian Agricultural Company’s position went against all that was worthy 
about imperial commerce, that is, that it encouraged free and unfettered trade. For Pearse, 
therefore, the Macarthur venture represented nothing less than a threat to the “liberal” spirit 
of the British Empire generally, and a monopolistic barrier to the Van Diemen’s Land Company 
more specifically.332 What is more, the cloak of protection sought by the “Australians,” as he 
dubbed them, was entirely unnecessary, for a compromise was in easy reach. Why could the 
European sheep market not be split along a North/South axis, with one company claiming the 
right to purchase sheep in Germany and the other restricting itself to Spain, “in the same 
manner that Abraham and Lot managed their concerns under very similar circumstances”?333 
As it turns out, Pearse’s argument would win out, forming the basis of a negotiated 
settlement.  
And yet a rapprochement between the two parties was not reached until April, when 
a “restrictive agreement” was struck. This entailed two provisions, the first of which was 
reached without much agitation (if not excitement on behalf of the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company).334 “After a full consideration of the Subject it was moved, seconded and 
unanimously resolved,” the relevant minutes of the Australian Agricultural Company’s court 
of directors record, “… That the Van Diemen’s Land Company pledge themselves not to buy 
Sheep in New South Wales, or any Sheep imported from thence into Van Diemen’s Land, 
either openly or collusively, directly or indirectly, for Twelve Years.”335   
 More difficult was the second proposition, which had originally barred the Van 
Diemen’s Land Company from also purchasing sheep in Europe, an obvious non-starter for a 
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pastoral company predicated on the rearing of merino sheep. Invoking the “common 
principles of Fairness & Equity,” the directors of the Tasmanian company complained that the 
stipulation secured the Australian Agricultural Company a monopoly off the back of illusory 
reasoning: “The broad meaning is this, that, the Australian Company shall have the Monopoly 
of the Market for sheep during the period of three years in the whole of Europe because the 
Australian Company imagine that the price of Sheep might by the competition of another 
Buyer be raised in the European Markt.”336 
A resolution to the dispute was finally settled in April, but only after the intervention 
of the Colonial Office. In a sign of just how contested the intra-company dynamic had become, 
it was Horton and Bathurst who mediated between the two parties and devised a solution. 
At a meeting between Joseph Cripps and the Bischoff brothers of the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company and Horton in late March, Horton advised that a “conciliatory proposal should be 
made through Lord Bathurst calculated to give the Australian Company a preference in the 
Market & to prevent competition.”337 This they did, with Curr’s suggestion of a tweak to the 
second proposition winning the day: the Van Diemen’s Land Company would be entitled to 
purchase 5,000 sheep in addition to any other flocks from Spain and Portugal, provided they 
refrain from purchasing sheep outside of the Iberian peninsula between 1825 and 1827.338 
Although relations between the two companies did not degenerate further, there was 
nothing edifying about their first serious engagement with one another. When James Inglis, 
then Managing Director of the Van Diemen’s Land Company, requested a one-off exemption 
in 1827 to purchase a small cargo of merino sheep from Germany, a cool cordiality was the 
order of the day.339    
The discursive network that these companies knitted themselves into could be the 
source of business innovation, however. Although rivals in the marketplace, they also acted 
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as models for one another, with the collective sum of their commercial activity constituting 
an archive of capitalist practice that could be consulted when necessary. This cross-company 
filtration of ideas is vividly captured by the Van Diemen’s Land Company’s scoping inquiries 
into rival commercial policy. Conscious of their low price in the London stock market, the 
Tasmanian capitalists in particular made a point of examining the Canada Company’s business 
operations, and to that end they leafed through company literature with the aim of 
establishing whether there were any lessons that could be learned from their more popular 
competitor.          
 With this in mind, the Company’s directors instructed its agent in Tasmania to study 
the Canada Company’s tenant farming policies. “In several of the Despatches which we have 
sent to you lately and particularly in No 21,” the London office noted in a letter to Edward 
Curr at Circular Head, dated 5 November 1831, “we have dwelt upon the advantages accrued 
to the Canada Company by selling and letting their land.”340 Whereas shares in the Canada 
Company had by this point risen to £22 a piece, Van Diemen’s Land Company stock was selling 
for a mere £4–a considerable discount on the £12 initial offer. “Judging from the price of 
Shares in that Company,” the directors rather enviously remarked, the “Concern ought to be 
in a very flourishing state.”341 If the Van Diemen’s Land Company were to implement a similar 
commercial strategy, might its prospects on the stock market not likewise flourish? 
 Not that the board of the Van Diemen’s Land Company went so far as to suggest that 
these were corporate twins. As cognisant of what distinguished the two companies as what 
could possibly unite them, the directors instead focused on the particulars of Company 
practice when foregrounding areas of potential overlap with their Canadian peer. When it 
came to more general comparisons between the companies, however, there was an explicit 
recognition that the respective business models were in key respects quite different, even if 
such reflections betrayed a certain element of self-deception. “We admit that betwixt the Van 
Diemen’s Land Company and the Canada Company there are vast differences and we can 
believe that the property invested in our Company may eventually be, and probably will be, 
more valuable than that of the other Company.”342 This was comparison unrestrained by self-
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effacement: the Canada Company’s superior performance on the stock market was portrayed 
as only a temporary phenomenon. Ultimately, the directors of the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company smugly believed, the Tasmanian concern would dwindle that of their North 
American competitor.        
 Significantly, the London office of the Van Diemen’s Land Company well appreciated 
how their status as an agricultural trading company marked them out from the Canadian 
enterprise, which was a land company in the tradition of the Holland Land Company (which 
they explicitly cited) and the Ohio Company. A distinction that is often passed over by scholars 
of colonial land settlement in the British Empire, insofar as the corporate model is taken to 
be a homogenous unit, if queried at all, the Van Diemen’s Land Company nevertheless 
recognised that the “very formation of the two Companies were upon different principles.” 
Indeed, for the Van Diemen’s Land Company, “the chief difference” between the Canada 
Company and their own colonial venture was “that views of the Canada Company were 
directed to the sale of their Lands, whilst the Van Diemen’s Land Company looked to the 
clearing, cultivating and occupation of the Lands.”343 In other words, the directors of the Van 
Diemen’s Land Company were acutely aware of the fundamental distinction between a 
pastoral enterprise like their own and a corporation, such as the Canada Company, which 
profited from colonial real-estate. The former was dedicated to running stock across the land, 
while the latter saw all economic value residing in the land itself.   
 Even so, the court recognised potential opportunity in the commercial policy pursued 
by the Canada Company, and they underscored the point by reflecting on their intention to 
reward the shareholders. “[W]e wish,” the directors noted in the same dispatch to Curr, “if 
possible to bring our resources forward more rapidly, and whilst the Projectors of our 
Company are living that they should see the advantage likely to result from their labours.” 
The fact that the Canada Company’s stock price so manifestly exceeded that of the Van 
Diemen’s Land Company was thus taken as a spur to experimentation, whereby the former 
provided a set of policy prescriptions for the latter to implement if it so desired. Accordingly, 
they instructed Curr to look into the Canada Company’s practices in Upper Canada, in the 
hope that he might find their nascent emigration scheme worthy of replication in the 
 
343 Ibid.  
 117 
antipodes.344 “In order however that you may know what the Canada Company have done, 
and intend to do,” the directors in London wrote, “we send you a Book, entitled “Advantages 
of Emigration to Canada by William Cattermole”, from which you will derive much 
information, and comparing their expenses with ours, if those statements and calculations 
are correct, they possess great advantages,” most especially as it concerned the appropriation 
of colonial waste land.         
“But the whole of this Work merits great attention,” the despatch continued, before 
going on to outline how and why the Company history might furnish useful advice: “and with 
regard to private Settlers we only want to know what Lands we have to offer, and to have a 
Map laid down in the manner that the Map of the Canada Company is laid down, and with 
such encouragement, and the advantages which you can hold out, we shall have little 
difficulty in inducing Emigrants to make application for Land to you.”345 In navigating the 
uncertain terrain of company colonisation in one of Britain’s most remote settlements, the 
directors of the Van Diemen’s Land Company found a guide at hand in the practice mapped 
out by the Canada Company.        
 This was not simply a literary gift then, a textual distraction for an unruly and 
headstrong colonial agent. Far from it, Cattermole’s history also served a profoundly practical 
purpose. Intended as a prompt to innovation, a discursive toolkit to help Curr run the 
Company on a day-to-day basis, the book supplied the Van Diemen’s Land Company’s resident 
agent with a catalogue of new business ideas and management techniques. Seen in this light, 
the discursive connections within and between these companies generated practical insights 
into what constituted best practice on the colonial ground. As such, the iterative process that 
underlay such instances of corporate borrowing casts into sharp relief the connection 
between the rhetoric of company colonisation and actual capitalist practice.  
 In a similar vein the directors of the Australian Agricultural Company alerted their 
colonial committee to the Canada Company’s tenant farming scheme, again with the 




345 Ibid. William Cattermole, Advantages of Emigration to Canada: Being the Substance of Two Lectures 
Delivered at the Town-Hall, Colchester, and the Mechanics’ Institution Ipswich (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 
1831). 
 118 
You will observe that the Inclosure (No. 7) is a Prospectus of the Canada Company 
recently established under the Sanction of Government, & we request the favor 
of your opinion, whether any part of the Plans therein described, are such, as it 
may be desirable to adopt in our Establishment, & particularly whether you think 
the Inclosure & preparation of small Farms for the purpose of leasing them to 
Emigrants would be, either now, or hereafter productive of benefit to the 
Company.346 
Like their Tasmanian counterpart, the board of the Australian Agricultural Company was 
clearly interested in the possibility of incorporating the farming policies of the Canada 
Company into their corporate wheelhouse, though why both companies should alight on this 
particular policy remains unclear. What is more, the apparent deference to the views of their 
colonial agent, Robert Dawson, reveals the degree to which the court in London was open to 
policy changes off the back of information gleaned from New South Wales. Indeed, the board 
does not appear to have raised the topic lightly, with no intention of clarifying how the matter 
was viewed from New South Wales, for they also conveyed news of the Canada Company to 
Dawson. He was instructed to solicit the views of the colonial committee. As a long letter from 
the court to Robert Dawson noted, “At a future period it will be desirable that you should 
confer with the Committee and communicate with us upon the expediency of preparing small 
Farms, for the purpose of leasing them to Emigrants, on the Plan suggested by the Canada 
Company.”347          
 Dialogue between boardrooms was often a contradictory affair. While benchmarking 
and corporate borrowing suggest that company conversations could validate ideas and spark 
business innovation, the relationship between this trio was always marked by a competitive 
spirit. Commercial rivalry and corporate espionage show how company crossings could shade 
from benign self-positioning to more bitter contestation. In this antagonistic environment, 
the inner life of company colonisation could be a paranoid and lonely place indeed. 
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Visions of Colonial Reform 
 
“Is there any mode of Emigration,” Robert Gouger pointedly asked Robert Wilmot Horton in 
a letter towards the close of 1829, that pivotal year of colonial reform, “offering so good a 
security for repayment of its cost, as that private capitalists should readily embark in it? In 
other words, may colonization be conducted … so as to offer large and early profits to 
individual capitalists?”348 Horton, who had only the year before stepped down as under-
secretary of state for war and the colonies after a lengthy stint in the post, had long puzzled 
over the economics of emigration.349 But whereas Gouger, a London merchant and 
philanthropist, wondered about the possibilities of private colonial enterprise, Horton held 
steadfast to the belief that it was the prerogative of the state.350 “It will only require judicious 
measures on the part of the Government, for the general arrangement of the transfer and 
location of the emigrants,” Horton confidently asserted in his Outline of a Plan of Emigration 
to Upper Canada (1823).351 The costs, or so he argued, would be borne by the public purse 
through an elaborate scheme of mortgage-backed securities on future poor law payments, 
though this was hotly contested.352 
An inveterate hoarder of all things colonial, Horton had conducted a number of trial 
experiments in Upper Canada during the 1820s which involved the resettlement of destitute 
Irish labourers, the better to promote his personal views on emigration.353 More significant 
still were the series of parliamentary select committees on the subject that he chaired 
between 1826 and 1827: a roll-call of eminent political economists, from James Mill to 
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Thomas Robert Malthus, was summoned to supply evidence.354 Perhaps more than anyone 
else during the period of his tenure at the Colonial Office, Horton shaped the agenda for 
thinking about emigration. 
And yet Horton’s silence in response to Gouger’s question is telling. Since the 
publication of Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s Letter from Sydney in 1829, the tide of public 
opinion had begun to shift away from Horton and towards schemes that prioritised the 
private sector. The tenor of debate on colonisation was now dominated by the voices of a 
new generation, Gouger and Wakefield chief among them. This fresh crop of thinkers, note 
Alison Bashford and Joyce Chaplin, “doffed their hats to their elders, in discursive moves that 
at once acknowledged and dismissed them.”355 This chapter explores the curious afterlife of 
Gouger’s question, in particular tracking the unlikely resurrection of private colonial 
enterprise that announced itself with stunning force in the clamour to establish a new British 
colony in South Australia. 
I begin with a reconstruction of Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s theory of systematic 
colonisation. Wakefield was the intellectual architect behind the so-called colonial reform 
movement, a loose group of parliamentarians, political economists and land speculators who 
banded together to promote several new British settlements in the 1830s and 1840s. He was 
also an adept strategic operator who enjoyed an unrivalled degree of influence over the 
colonial reformers, and the remaining chapters in this dissertation document how Wakefield’s 
behind-the-scenes work as an informal advocate for company colonization shaped the 
content of his ideas. Here, I link Wakefield’s writings on colonisation to imperial capital 
formation, and in so doing I build on Onur Ulas Ince’s recent appraisal of systematic 
colonisation.356 America figured prominently in Wakefield’s published writings, though the 
use he made of it was idiosyncratic. While he drew sustenance and symbolic heft from the 
exemplar of North American chartered enterprise, he also warned against the destructive 
impact of dispersion.         
 Although scholars have long studied the content of Wakefield’s ideas, there is a no 
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less important social history dimension to colonial reform.357 I track the development of 
systematic colonisation as an idea in the hands of theorists to one sculpted by capitalists and 
land speculators in London as the 1830s plans to colonise South Australia gathered 
momentum. In treating colonial reform as an actors’ category, that is, as a movement shaped 
by the social lives of contemporaries, I demonstrate how a political economy discussion 
originally dominated by parliamentarians and political economists evolved into one shaped 
by bankers and merchants in the City of London, which I examine in detail when I turn to 
address the South Australian Company in the next chapter.  
However, I also seek to advance a more ambitious claim. Not taking the social context 
of company colonisation seriously, I suggest, distorts the very intellectual history of colonial 
reform that scholars have long been preoccupied with. The company boardroom, and the 
social connections centring on the City of London that sustained it, was considerably more 
influential in the development of systematic colonisation than any close study of Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations or Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population, however generative 
these texts may have been for Wakefield when he first conceived of his theory in the confines 
of Newgate Gaol.358 I argue that the company model did more than anything else to transform 
systematic colonisation from a theoretical template that preached the reform of colonial land 
policy into actual antipodean settlement plans. 
 
Systematic Colonisation and Imperial Capitalism 
 
A resurgent wave of scholarship has examined the writings of Edward Gibbon Wakefield 
(1796–1862), the English political economist and author of the famous A Letter from Sydney. 
Long recognised as a foundational text in the political economy of empire, Wakefield’s Letter 
profoundly influenced settler colonial discourse throughout the 1830s and 1840s, particularly 
in relation to South Australia and New Zealand.359 First circulated as a pamphlet in 1829, and 
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thereafter published in a series of articles in London’s Morning Chronicle, it purportedly 
described what life was like as a farmer in Britain’s farthest colonial outpost, New South 
Wales. Yet far from an authentic account of New South Wales, in the tradition of David Collins 
or Watkin Tench, Wakefield’s Letter was actually composed in Newgate Prison, where he was 
serving a three-year sentence for abducting a wealthy young heiress, Ellen Turner.360 
Wakefield’s core argument was that colonial land should be sold, not granted as had 
been the case in New South Wales, and to that end he worked hard to show how wealth in 
the colonial world was dependent on concentrated settlement. A fixation, almost an 
obsession, with dense settlement tied the otherwise disparate threads of the text together 
and supplied its analytical thrust, while a strong anti-transportation argument grounded in 
moral economy underlay a forceful critique of colonial policy in New South Wales and Van 
Diemen’s Land.361 If land was simply given away, Wakefield argued, settlers would tend to 
disperse across the frontier, and his historical sweep of European colonisation portrayed in 
no uncertain terms the damage this wrought: the new world, at least in Wakefield’s imperial 
imaginary, was a desolate place shorn of civilisation and the habits of polite society. 
Concentration, for Wakefield, was synonymous with civilisation–while dispersion was 
associated with its antonym in the stadial model of development, barbarism. This was not a 
new argument, of course, as population density had long preoccupied writers in the tradition 
of classical political economy–from at least Adam Smith onwards–but no other writer, with 
the possible exception of Robert Gourlay, the Scottish-Canadian agriculturalist and farmer, 
had foregrounded it in quite the same way.362 “Concentration,” as Alison Bashford and Joyce 
Chaplin have recently reminded us, was A Letter from Sydney’s “signature argument,” the 
conceptual category that organised Wakefield’s analysis of the new world.363 But why was 
this so, and what did Wakefield claim was at stake?      
 If the empire could decline and fall by virtue of overindulgence in the metropolis, 
Wakefield’s Letter suggested, it could also unravel at the farthest periphery. In this 
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antipodean twist on the trope of imperial decline, a tradition invigorated, if not invented, by 
Edward Gibbon in his monumental Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776), Wakefield 
interrogated imperial policy from the colonial ground, an unconventional if shrewd rhetorical 
strategy. Yet if his narrative glanced back at Britain from the antipodes, inverting the imperial 
gaze, his intellectual project also took him back in time, to the world of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment and the universal histories that it bequeathed. The pitfalls and possibilities of 
colonisation in the first half of the nineteenth century may have demanded novel solutions–
and novel theories–but Wakefield’s break from the world of Adam Smith was not as complete 
as he sought to make out. This was no blind disciple to Smith, certainly not on colonies.364 
The Enlightenment tradition of stadial theory, which divided humankind into a four-
stage model of development, persisted well into the nineteenth century, influencing both 
philosophical reflections on supposedly “savage” peoples in new world lands, while at the 
same time shaping imperial policy vis-à-vis indigenous proprietary rights and Britain’s 
concomitant claims to sovereignty in the extra-European world.365 But while scholars have 
remarked on the connection between stadial theory and settler colonialism often enough, 
Wakefield’s precise deployment of the tradition is often misunderstood.366 Far from seeking 
to write a conjectural history of humankind in the mould of William Robertson’s History of 
America (1777) or Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), Wakefield preoccupied himself 
exclusively with the economics of settlement, at least, that is, until he was forced to modify 
his theory to accommodate the acknowledged presence of the Māori in the islands of New 
Zealand.367 His stadial analysis of the Pacific new world thus wrote out Aboriginal Australians 
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entirely, a textual silence that was at odds with daily reality in the fledgling colony.368 
Wakefield’s vision of colonial reform may indeed have been expansive, but it’s obvious blind 
spot was the total neglect of ancient Australia. 
What prompted this curious rendition of the four-stage model? The conceptual 
language of decline and fall inherent in stadial theory made it possible for Wakefield to link 
free land grants for settlers with a slide towards barbarism, dispersion with degeneration. It 
was thus a tradition that could be harnessed by Wakefield to attack modern colonial land 
policy, one that readers steeped in classical political economy would have readily 
recognised.369 His diagnosis of the social decay of colonies, what Wakefield called his “ruling 
idea,” also connected analysis of the colonial past and present with a vision of the colonial 
future, a future underwritten by the principles of systematic colonisation. “Does not our 
inquiry into the causes of the evil,” Wakefield rhetorically asked, “point out a remedy?”370 
Significantly, Wakefield’s theory assumed that individual capitalists, not government, 
would fund colonisation. This did not mean that Wakefield wished government to play no 
part in colonising Australia. “It was impossible,” he wrote, “to use waste land without the 
active assistance of government,” as government alone could secure property rights.371 But 
beyond the right of government to lay claim to the antipodes and specify the much remarked 
upon “sufficient price” on land, government did not figure particularly prominently in 
Wakefield’s plans.372          
 At the heart of Wakefield’s argument here was a model of “colonial capitalism,” a 
vision of colonial expansion underpinned by the productive use of capital.373 Wakefield’s 
capitalist credentials have been insightfully analysed in a recent article by Gabriel Piterberg 
and Lorenzo Veracini.374 Focusing on Marx’s reading of Wakefield, most especially as it 
concerns the latter’s depiction of the Swan River Colony in Western Australia, Piterberg and 
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Veracini claim that Wakefield’s theory of colonisation heralded the genesis of a previously 
unplumbed political tradition. Central to this tradition was the assertion that the “empty 
lands” of Britain’s settler colonies supplied an escape hatch for global capitalism. Insofar as 
the settler world could be called upon to ward off revolution at home, Piterberg and Veracini 
argue, the seemingly boundless pastures that they represented acted as a bulwark against 
social reform. 
But it is perhaps worth restating that Wakefield was responding to a live debate in 
Britain at the time that concerned the relative merits of colonisation, not the future prospects 
of capitalism. Concerned as he was with social decay in Britain and her colonies, Wakefield 
saw no “impending revolution” in the capitalist world system.375 More immediate matters 
pressed on his mind, chief among them the reform of colonial land policy. A recognition of 
this blunt fact need not cut us off from analysing Wakefield’s writings within the framework 
of global capital, but it does require us to analyse his work in light of the concepts that were 
open to him as a thinker in the 1820s and 1830s. Thus, whereas Robert Wilmot Horton, the 
Tory MP and Under-Secretary of State for War and the Colonies between 1821 and 1828, had 
argued assiduously in favour of the public purse funding mass emigration throughout the 
1820s, Wakefield reframed the emigration and colonisation debate so as to foreground the 
role of private capitalists. As he noted towards the end of the appendix, “London capitalists 
would require no other encouragement to assist in giving effect to the proposed system of 
colonial policy,” for the simple reason that the scheme itself was designed with them in 
mind.376 
America supplied the answer for Wakefield, and he turned in particular to American 
land companies, such as the Ohio Company, for inspiration. The “mode of selling waste land 
in North America would furnish a useful model” for the reform of colonial land policy in the 
antipodes, Wakefield noted in the opening point of the appendix that outlined the key 
principles of systematic colonisation, a nod to the Atlantic world that would become common 
practice by the time that practical proposals for colonising South Australia began to find their 
way to the Colonial Office in the early 1830s.377 Wakefield was adamant that if his principles 
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were followed, and if the example of contemporary American land companies was emulated, 
“Emigration would be carried on by private speculation, not to the loss but to the advantage 
of those who should defray its expense.”378 What the Ohio Company or the North American 
Company had achieved in the eighteenth century, Wakefield argued, British land companies 
could replicate in the nineteenth.  
The deployment of America was hardly novel in the tradition of classical political 
economy. From Adam Smith onwards, America had been regarded as the standard reference 
point when discussing whether empire was really worth it. Unlike Smith, however, who 
ploughed the American past for lessons about the wealth of nations and so-called primitive 
peoples, Wakefield’s America operated on two temporal planes, past and present. As both 
historic object lesson and contemporary case study, America in Wakefield’s work was 
decidedly Janus-faced, a characteristic that Wakefield exploited to defend both the 
theoretical principles of systematic colonisation and the actual company colonisation of South 
Australia. 
There was a further tension underlying Wakefield’s depiction of America, however. An 
amorphous category, America represented both the pinnacle and pitfalls of colonisation. In 
describing the American frontier, for instance, Wakefield railed against unrestrained 
settlement. “But at present, and until they [Americans] can no longer spread,” Wakefield 
pointedly remarked, “they are, and must remain–like children acquiring the means of 
knowledge by learning to read–an infant people, acquiring only the means of future wealth 
and greatness.”379 At the same time, he also admired the land companies then operating in 
the Midwestern United States. The more distant American past, on the other hand, the classic 
period of English colonisation, was couched in lofty, even elevated language. After all, it was 
in the example set by William Penn and Lord Baltimore that Wakefield located the 
foundations of his own colonial projections.      
 Such contradictions speak to a sort of creative uncertainty embodied by the image of 
America. What mattered most to Wakefield and his followers was the strategic use that it 
served, the practical work that it did in furthering calls for colonial reform. It is this feature of 
colonial discourse that explains how America was able to simultaneously operate as the 
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subject of scorn and adulation. Highly stylised, the impressions of America that flowed from 
Wakefield’s pen took shape with one eye firmly fixed on colonial strategy. It was a conceptual 
and historical device that was constantly moulded and remoulded to fit the imperatives of 
systematic colonisation. This was a polyphonic America, an America to be used as one saw fit. 
England and America (1833) was exemplary in looking to America as both model and 
deterrent. Published at the very moment the colonial reformers were lobbying the Colonial 
Office, Wakefield’s magnum opus wove support for the South Australian Land Company into 
more conventional analysis of North American political economy.380 Drawing in particular on 
James Stuart’s two-volume Three Years in North America (1833), Wakefield described a 
continent that was bereft of any signs of refinement: prone to religious zealotry, blighted by 
bigotry, hostile to learning and self-improvement. Civilisation this was not, and Wakefield 
attributed this to the superabundance of land that encouraged settlers to take up their own 
homesteads, rather than work as hired labour, a point he also made in relation to Spanish 
America and one that marked his writings out from Adam Smith.381 As Wakefield had noted 
earlier in A Letter from Sydney, his citation of Smith’s Wealth of Nations was akin to taking 
the “bull by its very horns,” for Smith “argues in favour of excess territory” whereas he of 
course argued forcefully in favour of concentrated settlement.382 
And yet America also supplied hope, or at least a model that could be revived in South 
Australia. While contemporary American land companies were cited as exemplars of prudent 
capitalist enterprise, it was the American past that most moved Wakefield. “The old English 
colonies in America, now the eastern States of the Union,” Wakefield asserted, “were not 
founded by any government. They were founded by individuals, not even aided by any 
government, save as the compact, into which each of those bodies of individuals entered, was 
bound by a charter from the crown of England.”383 From Virginia to Maryland, Baltimore to 
North Carolina, this was an English past that spoke powerfully in favour of chartered colonial 
enterprise. 
Just as George Fife Angas would later model himself on William Penn, the notable 
Quaker founder of Pennsylvania, so Edward Gibbon Wakefield saw himself as upholding a 
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peculiarly English tradition of private colonial enterprise.384 In an unpublished manuscript 
held at Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Kāwanatanga, which was most likely 
written in 1846, after attempts to systematically colonise South Australia, Wakefield reflected 
at length on the colonisation of North America, arguing that England’s chartered colonies of 
the seventeenth century embodied the highest principles in the art of colonisation, certainly 
far superior to those practiced by the French or Spanish. “The old proprietary authorities,” 
Wakefield claimed in a crossed out passage, “whether individuals or corporations, almost 
invariably exhibited the greatest earnestness and attained a great success as respects the first 
stage of colonization, and none more than the joint stock company for founding Carolina, the 
directors of which were chiefly Cabinet Ministers.”385 
Wakefield stopped short, however, of openly championing the company model in A 
Letter from Sydney, only fleshing out his arguments about chartered colonial enterprise in 
later writings. His influential theory, in its first iteration, advocated private colonial enterprise 
but refrained from endorsing company colonisation explicitly. This was a vision of empire that 
imagined the redundant poor tilling antipodean pastures for the benefit of metropolitan 
capitalists, a fact that no less an authority than Karl Marx noted, even if it had relatively little 
to say about companies.386 “The whole object of the proposed measure,” wrote Wakefield, 
“is to diminish the evils of pauperism in Britain, and to promote colonisation, by rendering 
the purchase of waste land a very profitable employment of capital.”387 Only then, Wakefield 
argued, could the new world benefit both colony and metropole. Thus, at the theoretical level 
of political economy, companies and colonial reform were not yet conjoined: that fusion 
unfolded in the practical act of colonising South Australia. 
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The Social History of Ideas: Colonial Reform in Cultural Context 
 
 
Reflecting on a long career engaged in advancing the interests of Britain’s settler colonies, a 
journey that would soon see him set sail for New Zealand, Edward Gibbon Wakefield 
underscored the importance of sociability to the business of empire. Even for this most 
voluble of commentators on colonies and colonisation, “mere writing on behalf of colonies, 
without organized association for action, is like beating the wind.”388 The architect of the 
blueprint for colonial reform well understood the world of difference that separated 
speculative thinking about colonisation from its implementation in the real world, even if he 
consistently tried to fuse these two poles of the art of colonisation together. 
Tony Ballantyne has recently made a compelling case for a reading of systematic 
colonisation that is more attuned to what the cultural historian Peter Mandler has called the 
“relative throw” of ideas.389 This interpretation of the colonial reformers both builds on and 
revises Ballantyne’s account, in the sense that it more rigorously restores the social context 
of company colonisation to the forefront of historical analysis. To the extent that systematic 
colonisation circulated as a theory in the 1830s, it was discussed in fora shaped by the norms 
and customs of the boardroom and the dictates of private enterprise. 
Systematic colonisation was first translated into practical proposals through the 
auspices of the National Colonisation Society, a lobby group formed in London. Established in 
1830 and gathering in rooms rented at the British Coffee House, Cockspur Street, the society 
brought together a diverse cross-section of men interested in emigration and colonisation.390 
“They were an unknown and feeble body,” Wakefield later wrote, “composed chiefly of very 
young men, some of whose names, however, have long ceased to be obscure, whilst others 
are amongst the most celebrated of our day.”391 
Among the more celebrated members were figures such as John Stuart Mill, John 
Hobhouse, 1st Baron Broughton, and Francis Burdett.392 However, on the whole, Wakefield’s 
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judgement of the group’s social standing is uncharacteristically balanced. Largely 
unremarkable, these were predominantly upper-middle class men, well-educated and 
possessed of social and political capital, with ambitions for either public office or a career in 
one of the respected professions.393 Significantly, a large proportion of the Society were self-
declared radicals, arguing for parliamentary reform at home while at the same time 
advocating for a sea-change in British emigration policy.394    
 Robert Gouger (1802–1846), the first Colonial Secretary of South Australia, was to 
prove an able spearhead. Attracted to radical politics by way of a formative early friendship 
with the socialist Robert Owen, Gouger came from a wealthy merchant family and this family 
wealth appears to have enabled him to enjoy a somewhat dilettantish lifestyle in his early 
twenties.395 However, industrious and with a strong predilection towards philanthropy, 
Gouger took quickly to the reforming vision of Wakefield’s systematic colonisation, after a 
meeting at Newgate.396 A firm grasp of detail ensured that Gouger was an effective 
administrator behind the scenes, efficiently orchestrating the early tactics and running of the 
National Colonisation Society. Having taken upon himself the unenviable task of financing the 
publication of Wakefield’s Letter from Sydney, Gouger was soon bankrupt, and so sent to 
King’s Bench prison. But like Wakefield before him, who had used his stint in Newgate to 
concoct the theory of colonisation that was now beginning to attract attention in London and 
farther afield, Gouger found his stay in the Southwark gaol profitable. He shared a cell with 
the cavalry officer Anthony Bacon, and they soon jointly pitched a company plan to colonise 
South Australia along Wakefieldian lines.397 
Gouger’s correspondence with Wilmot Horton sheds valuable light on the otherwise 
elusive National Colonisation Society, and here it is worth drawing attention to the fact that 
the discursive context in which this correspondence took place predated the embrace of 
company colonisation. Convinced that Horton would find the themes raised by the “new” 
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theory of colonisation interesting, although unsure of just how far he was up to speed with 
the developments of 1829, Gouger provided Horton with a potted history of its publication:  
 
Shortly after the distribution of that pamphlet, its author wrote some letters to 
the Morning Chronicle newspaper, with a view to illustrate in a familiar manner 
the principle of colonization laid down in the pamphlet. Those letters having been 
printed in several country papers, and having made a considerable impression on 
reflecting men in London, it was thought advisable to republish them in the shape 
of the book called, “A Letter from Sydney.,” of which a copy was forwarded to you 
some weeks ago. 
 
This little book has been circulated principally amongst persons connected, either 
by property or trade, with the settlements of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s 
Land; and I am happy to know from personal communication with many of them, 
that it has caused, in not a few, a total revolution of opinion as to the best means 
of raising the wretched Colonies to comparative wealth and importance.398 
Much of the emphasis in Gouger’s letter was placed on the textual medium in which 
Wakefield’s ideas were circulated, from pamphlet to newspaper article to book. And closely 
aligned to the circulation of these texts was the readership, initially comprised of so-called 
“reflecting men in London,” and latterly by those with commercial interests in the Australian 
colonies. In truth, it was the first group of men, Gouger and Horton among them, that 
predominated during the brief history of the National Colonisation Society, for 
overwhelmingly this was a society that had in mind a “revolution of opinion as to the best 
means” of conducting colonisation, not the prosecution of an ambitious commercial project 
on the other side of the world. As Wakefield later styled it, the “object they had in view was, 
in general terms, to substitute systematic colonization for mere emigration, and on a scale 
sufficient to produce important effects on the mother-country.”399 Crucially, it was a 
substitution that took as its benchmark of success a shift in sentiment as much as any 
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immediate practical result, and consequently the discussions of the society seldom ventured 
into the terrain of capital speculation.       
  In this frame, the most immediately apparent aspect of the National Colonisation 
Society’s social profile is the relatively slim representation of the City of London and the 
dearth of members with a background in company colonisation.400 If we read the history of 
colonial reform back from the mid-to-late 1830s, when the South Australian Company was 
commencing its operations, and when the Australind and New Zealand ventures were gearing 
up, then this is thrown into stark relief. What we immediately begin to see is a clear contrast 
between the milieu that clustered together in the committee room of the British Coffee 
House, on the one hand, and the men who began to gather in company offices and 
boardrooms once plans to implement the theoretical principles of systematic colonisation 
began to gather momentum from 1831 onwards. This is not to suggest that the Society was 
entirely devoid of connections to company colonisation. Robert Torrens, for one, had been a 
member of the 1825 New Zealand Company and, along with George Lyall, would later float a 
plan for a joint stock company to colonise the islands of New Zealand, the New Zealand 
Society for Christian Civilisation.401 Likewise, the Hutt brothers, William and John, who play a 
leading role in the comparative chapter on Western Australia and New Zealand, were involved 
in the Society as were the Buckle brothers and the bankers Smith, Payne, and Smiths.402 
 But I do wish to argue that the National Colonisation Society reflected the more 
overtly theoretical tenor of public debate about emigration that characterised metropolitan 
discussion in the 1820s. That is to say, the Society conceived of itself in terms that drew it 
back to the 1820s debates, even as they sought to transcend them by prioritizing the private 
sector over that of the state. The important, and symbolic, intermediary figure here is Wilmot 
Horton, conduit between the two projects.403 Douglas Pike went as far as to state say that 
there “was no abrupt changeover from the humanitarian principles of Wilmot Horton, with 
their emphasis on pauper migration, to the utilitarian theories of Gibbon Wakefield, with their 
emphasis on the migration of capital and enterprise.”404 It is certainly true that the Society 
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initially acted as a bridge between the “two systems,” as Pike put it, but it is equally the case 
that the connection quickly ruptured. In truth it was anything but a harmonious changeover 
from Horton to Wakefield, and the colonial reformers would attack Horton’s scheme with 
almost as much venom as they heaped on the Swan River Colony, both cited as exemplars of 
how not to colonise.405 Significantly, it was on the plane of ideas, if not personality, that the 
two camps fell-out, pointing to an ultimately irreconcilable difference between Horton and 
Wakefield’s views on colonial emigration.       
 The overriding ambition of the National Colonisation Society, then, was to make the 
case for systematic colonisation. This, in other words, was a body that aimed to defend an 
idea, to promote a theory of how to colonise most effectively. Accordingly, the Society 
operated in ways that Horton and his interlocutors of the 1820s would have readily 
recognised, even if the specifics of the arguments now placed much greater emphasis on 
private capital. This theoretical inclination is well captured by the Society’s pamphlet, A 
Statement of the Principles and Objects of a Proposed National Society, for the Cure and 
Prevention of Pauperism, by Means of Systematic Colonization (1830). “We beg the reader to 
observe,” it noted, “that these conclusions are stated hypothetically. The accuracy of the 
conclusions depends on the truth of the principles which it is our wish rather to submit for 
examination, than to assert with confidence; but if those conclusions should turn out to be 
founded on reason and truth, it will be acknowledged, that objects more important were 
never sought by more simple means.”406 Rather than the boardroom, one instead gets the 
sense that the pamphlet could have been assigned reading for a meeting of the Political 
Economy Club, of which a number of the Society’s members were drawn.  
 Again, Wakefield’s reflections on the National Colonisation Society are instructive. In 
the Art of Colonisation (1849), Wakefield’s last and ultimately unwieldy meditation on the 
subject, he placed special emphasis on the theoretical import of the society (though, of 
course, one can see the self-serving purpose that such a depiction served): “That subject 
[colonisation] presented before 1830 one very remarkable feature; namely, an immense 
amount of practice without theory. The practice of colonisation has in a great measure 
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peopled the earth … Yet so lately as twenty years ago, no theory of colonization had set forth 
what should be the objects of the process, still less what are the best means of accomplishing 
them.”407 If we return to the 1830 Statement we can see the broad contours of Wakefield’s 
claim validated insofar as it dwelt at length on the theoretical underpinnings of systematic 
colonisation. The political economy of colonisation quite clearly predominated over an outline 
of its precise mechanics.        
 Bain Attwood is right to suggest that the Society “emphasised orderly colonisation” 
along the lines of Wakefield’s theory. But he is arguably incorrect to state that their views 
“centred upon a colonisation company controlling land sales in the colony and determining 
the level of emigration to it,” for the company form was only settled upon later.408 Moreover, 
as it was initially styled, the Society did not restrict itself to “creating a prosperous and 
improved Britain in the Antipodes,” rather preferring to offer itself up to Britain’s settler 
colonies writ large. “That his Majesty’s Government be requested to aid the objects of the 
Society,” their second proposition stated, “by requiring a payment in money for all future 
grants of land in the three great colonies, Canada, South Africa, and Australasia; and by paying 
to the Society, out of the proceeds of sales, a fixed sum for every young couple which the 
Society shall convey to a colony free of cost.”409 In 1830, despite the obvious antipodean focus 
of Wakefield’s Letter from Sydney, the attention of the colonial reformers was, ostensibly at 
least, more expansive than it would soon become.      
 It seems highly likely that the decision to cover the “three great” settler colonies of 
the time was a tactical ploy to assuage Wilmot Horton. Horton, who had a particular 
fascination with Canada, had suggested as much in a letter to Robert Gouger that same July. 
“I have referred to the scale of Prices in all territorial colonies because a National Colonisation 
Society cannot by possibility propose to restrict itself to a consideration of the Australian 
Colonies alone … If such a restricted Society be desirable it ought, at least, to take another 
name and avow in limine, the concentration of its objects.”410 In this light, the overtures to 
Horton, who was pulled into the Society by the active exertions of Gouger, appear calculated 
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to recruit his support so as to lend it the imprimatur of authority. Horton, as already discussed, 
was generally considered to be the leading colonial thinker of the previous decade. He was 
certainly the most committed to the cause, as his voluminous correspondence and 
organisational work on behalf of the parliamentary select committees on emigration attest.
 The National Colonisation Society was shrewd, therefore, in publicly acknowledging 
their debts to Horton, if for no other reason than his was a name that could be used to further 
their own objectives. “From the moment when, in consequence of the zealous exertions of 
Mr. Wilmot Horton, emigration was seriously contemplated with a view to the cure and 
prevention of pauperism in Britain, philosophers and statesmen have acknowledged the 
importance of the question.”411 While the subsequent attacks on Horton seem inconsistent 
with this early praise, the strategic context in which it was uttered shows the extent to which 
the legitimacy furnished by Horton’s name was sought after. Public support, and the veneer 
of authority and respectability, were as important to the colonial reformers as ideological 
purity or sincerity.          
 Quite how far the endorsement of philosophers and statesmen spurred on colonial 
reform is a moot question. But the significance of sociability to the project at large should not 
be underestimated, a point we are perhaps apt to forget when we speak broadly of strategic 
manoeuvring in colonial contexts. After all, it was the spoke of sociability that connected the 
colonial theorists to a dense network of parliamentarians and capitalists, ideas about colonial 
reform to political patronage and metropolitan capital. Wakefield well saw the significance of 
a spirit of sociability at play in the Society’s operations. “When Englishmen or Americans have 
a public object, they meet, appoint a chairman and secretary, pass resolutions, and subscribe 
money: in other words, they set to work for themselves, instead of waiting to see what their 
government may do for them. This self-relying course was adopted by a few people in London 
in 1830, who formed an association which they called the Colonization Society.”412 Simply 
putting pen to paper would therefore not do.      
 It was this inclination to gather, to associate and form a company in the classic sense 
of the term, that underlay the shift from discursive argument to tangible proposal. “But they 
were rather a party than a mere school,” Wakefield later characterised the Society, “for it 
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happened that those who had chiefly framed the new theory, were constitutionally disposed 
rather to action than to preaching and teaching. Accordingly, when they found that they could 
make no impression on the public by argument, they set about endeavouring to get their 
theory submitted to the test of experiment.”413 The next section of this chapter shows how 
experimentation went hand-in-hand with company colonisation, and it does so through a 
close analysis of the social dynamics that lay behind the shift towards the company model in 
1831 and 1832. 
 
From Society to Company 
 
 
The transition from the National Colonisation Society to the South Australian Land Company 
entailed a narrowing down of options to the principle of joint stock colonisation. From an 
earlier conversation that was ambiguous about the precise mechanics of systematic 
colonisation, the promoters of a British settlement in South Australia were now resolutely 
committed to the principles of company colonisation. This shift in strategy was reflected in 
the increased importance attached to support from the City of London, and one of the more 
marked characteristics of the conversation about South Australia between 1830 and 1832 is 
just how quickly a concern with garnering the endorsement and capital of eminent men in 
the Square Mile rose up the agenda.        
 An effective side-lining of the prior concern with theoretical argumentation was 
evident in the 1831 company plan, for example, which advanced a mode of colonisation 
centring upon a commercial company. Entitled a Plan of a Company to be Established for the 
Purpose of Founding a Colony in South Australia, Purchasing Land Therein, and Preparing the 
Land so Purchased for the Reception of Immigrants, the proposal was clear that the proper 
vehicle of colonisation lay with business enterprise. “The Company being altogether of a 
commercial nature, will abstain from all interference with the religious sentiments of the 
colonists, or with any arrangements which they may think proper to establish for instruction 
according to their respective opinions.”414 It was the sort of spare, unflinching statement of 
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commercial prerogative that would later be recycled by George Fife Angas’s South Australian 
Company in 1835.          
 Not that the Company entirely disavowed the broader suite of promises held out by 
emigration, which had so energetically infused discussion on the subject over the previous 
decade. There was a strong moral calculus at play, too, and the Company was eager to 
highlight the self-improvement attendant upon their plans. “To these might be added some 
knowledge of the general principles which determine the success or failure of different 
branches of trade and commerce, and such a foundation of moral, political, and general 
rights, when the period shall arrive for the establishment of the Permanent Government. To 
assist in promoting this object it is proposed, that the Company should furnish the colony with 
a Circulating Library selected with these views.”415 It was an altogether more serious, even 
sombre, reading list than the one encouraged by the founders of the Pickwick Club in New 
Zealand, among whom were two directors of the New Zealand Company.416
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that this stress on the cultivation of moral and 
political rights, as the plan put it, now fell within the purview of company colonisation. The 
movement from Society to Company in this sense entailed a fundamental shift in how 
contemporaries thought about South Australian colonisation. Indeed, it was only in 1831, and 
not before, that company colonisation assumed the sort of prominence that it would enjoy 
throughout the lifecycle of colonial reform, whether that was in South Australia, Western 
Australia, New Zealand, or even Vancouver Island.417 
Speculation talk was particularly rife during this period, and Anthony Bacon’s pitch to 
the Colonial Office well captures the movement away from a political economy discussion to 
one grounded more squarely in the specifics of colonial capitalism. To be sure, the proposals 
put forward by Bacon and others were never entirely divorced from political economy 
considerations, and in important respects company colonisation was a matter for the political 
economists to mull over. However, for the men who were beginning to draft and submit 
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concrete proposals to the Colonial Office, the world of Wilmot Horton and his emigration 
committees was beginning to recede into the background, as the demands of private colonial 
enterprise began to usurp the priorities of an earlier generation of emigration proposals.  
Bacon’s scheme for a private colony in South Australia, which prefigured the South 
Australian Land Company’s proposal, was based on a subscription model with the Crown 
earmarked as the colony’s “Patron.”418 In key respects, however, the February plan marked a 
halfway house between the Society’s earlier proposals and the company charters soon to be 
drafted, never entirely breaching the divide between Hortonian emigration and company 
colonisation. It represented a break from the 1830 discussion among members of the National 
Colonisation Society inasmuch as it now focused on private capital, yet it was not premised 
on the principle of joint stock. Moreover, Bacon put the whole question of the propriety of 
emigration to one side, rather wishing to focus on the specifics of his projection. “Whether 
the adoption of a system of emigration upon an extensive scale may be attended by beneficial 
results, is a question which has been much canvassed, but which remains for His Majesty’s 
Ministers to decide.”419 Bacon instead wished to emphasise the likelihood of success that 
would follow from the injection of private capital into South Australia, success defined as the 
returns on capital investment. But in other crucial respects this was still a prospectus that had 
much in common with what the Society had originally offered, for example, in the 
commentary upon navigable rivers in the region and the geographical benefits of the 
imagined colony. Nonetheless, the theoretical tenor of the 1830s statements on colonisation 
were beginning to be replaced with proposals filtered through a commercial lens. 
 It was not until 1831 then, that the first fully formed company pitch found its way to 
the Colonial Office. Emblematic of the break from theoretical speculation, the Plan of a 
Company invoked the recent example of North American land companies, and most especially 
the Canada Company. “The confidence entertained of the practicability and profitableness of 
the scheme does not wholly rest on à priori consideration,” stressed the lengthy proposal.420 
Rather the dataset that now supported their assumptions in part rested on the recent capital 
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returns of company colonisation, the Canada Company a northern template for their 
antipodean experiment in the genre. 
Attention now started to drift with ever greater urgency towards the matter of money, 
and in particular the likelihood of a secure capital base. Writing to the Colonial Office on 
August 25 1831, in a letter that spelled out the purposes and design of the 1831 Company, 
George J. Gairdner, Robert Torrens, Anthony Bacon and Robert Gouger were sure that 
funding would not be a problem: this was to be a Company settled on an ample fund. Pointing 
to the future, the projectors had the “most satisfactory assurance that the whole subscription 
for the capital will be furnished whenever they shall be in a condition to commence 
proceedings.”421 But it was a point that the Company felt necessary to return to the following 
month, this time in a letter to William Tooke, their touch point to the City of London.  
 Of particular concern to the Company was whether they could secure the support of 
government before capital had been subscribed, synchronisation between tapping the money 
markets and official endorsement a persistent problem for new commercial ventures reliant 
on the Crown for authorisation. “The question therefore arises–whether it be possible to 
obtain a sufficient number of subscriptions without a conditional approval from the Govt?” 
Bacon implored Tooke to soothe the anxieties of the Company with a quiet word to their 
potential City backers, for they were eager to press ahead with drawing up the subscription 
list (irrespective of guaranteed support from government). If not, Bacon worried, “we shall 
be placed in this dilemma–that both the Govt, & our monied friends refuse to take the first 
step tho’ only a conditional one. I therefore mention it to you hoping that you will be so good 
as to consider our City friends, and let me know the results as soon as possible.”422 
 Tooke was considerably less confident of the Company’s chances in the City, and he 
relayed these doubts back to Bacon in what would have been an unwelcome moderation of 
expectations. Having anticipated Bacon’s line of questioning Tooke had taken it upon himself 
to canvas the views of “some eminent capitalists in the City on the subject, with the view to 
obtaining their immediate concurrence in the measure.” Their response, filtered through 
Tooke, was that the inverse course of action should be pursued, sanction to precede 
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subscription. Tooke was clear that in order to raise the necessary capital, official recognition 
therefore needed to come first:  
 
Such an information would afford sufficient grounds whereupon to apply for 
subscriptions, whereas adopting the contrary course of applying for the 
subscriptions first, it might suggest that the conclusions on which they should be 
sought, might not be exactly such as government would approve.423 
 
Foremost on Tooke’s mind was whether the Company could reassure potential investors that 
their capital was to be channelled towards the aims and objectives that first attracted them. 
Simply put, they needed to know the terms of their investment, and nothing less would do. 
“It does appear to me,” Tooke told Bacon, “that the simplest, safest, & surest mode of 
proceeding, is for government to propound its own terms however guarded, but upon which 
we shall be enabled to submit them to our City friends, & solicit their aid as offering an 
advantageous investment of capital, if we fail in preserving such subscriptions we shall be the 
only sufferers.”424         
 Adopting the posture of an informal broker of knowledge, Tooke’s commercial council 
thus emphasised the risk of alienating the City with an ill-considered, premature gesture to 
potential investors. “In the present very feverish & capricious state of the money market, it 
would not be prudent to incur the risk of submitting, by way of experiment any scheme of an 
indefinite nature on which would require much further discussion, revision, & the only chance 
of effecting a sound subscription by individuals of name & credit, will be to lay before them a 
well matured plan, & official approval.”425 It was advice, however, that proved unpalatable to 
Bacon: Tooke accordingly pulled out, dismayed by Bacon’s refusal to listen to his concerns 
about the paralysing effect of approaching “capitalists and prudent individuals” before the 
Colonial Office had approved the plan. Tooke believed that the miscalculation was 
symptomatic of a project that was looking ever more futile.426  
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Many of these men of influence in the City congregated around the 1832 South 
Australian Land Company, significantly bolstering its prospects among the London elite of the 
time. Especially conspicuous here is George Fife Angas, whose role in the colonisation of 
South Australia is studied at length in the next chapter, while some of the illustrious old family 
names in English banking were represented by Samuel Hoare (1783–1847) and Henry 
Drummond (1786–1860). Hoare’s father, for example, had been a prominent abolitionist and 
had in fact involved himself in company colonisation directly, taking part in the early 
deliberations of what became the Sierra Leone Company. Yet it was banking that was most 
readily associated with the family name, even if Samuel could not trace his family genealogy 
to the more famous private bank, C. Hoare & Co.427    
Nonetheless the banking connections of the Hoare family went back to Barnetts, 
Hoares, Hanbury & Lloyd, established in the late-1720s, little more than thirty years after the 
English financial revolution made its mark on the City of London and the country beyond.428 
Drummond, meanwhile, who had endowed, in 1825, the chair of political economy at Oxford 
from which Herman Merivale would declaim his critique of systematic colonisation, took his 
name and profession from Messrs Drummond, likewise a staple of banking since the early 
eighteenth century.429 The world of capital and credit was thus not altogether unfamiliar for 
the likes of Hoare and Drummond, their subsequent omission in accounts of colonial reform 
concealing an institutional ecology based in large part on familial inheritance. Banking and 
commerce were in this way threads deeply woven into the fabric of systematic colonisation, 
visible only once the connecting strand of company colonisation is unpicked.  
 The more commercial orientation of the 1832 company men was reflected in the 
proposal that they sent to the Colonial Office in April. Like the land companies that they 
referenced, the South Australian Land Company was to employ its capital in the name of 
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boosting the value of colonial waste land. With a capital of £500,000 in shares of £50 a piece, 
the men who had assembled together “proposed to form a Company to assist in that 
enterprize, with a view, likewise, to the profitable employment of capital.”430 Here, then, was 
a colonial association that explicitly aimed to prioritise capital above all else, taking for 
granted the expediency of doing so. 
Again, the Company looked to the Canada Company as the corporate template on 
which to base their projections. “With its power of Capital, the Company will do what 
otherwise must have been left undone, have been partially done, or effected with great 
difficulty. The Canada Company, by expending £4000. In the formation of roads through their 
Huron property, laid open for settlement 100,000 acres of land,” noted the prospectus. It was 
a shift in emphasis that the Company was fully cognizant of:  
 
The above statement is confined to the advantages which may be expected to be 
derived by the Shareholders and the Colonists by the formation of the proposed 
Company. It must not however be forgotten that the advantages to the public, 
and in particular to parishes in the country over-burthened with poor, by affording 
an advantageous outlet for the surplus population, will likewise be great; and the 
Directors will therefore be invested with the power of treating with Parish Officers 
for the conveyance of poor labourers.431 
 
Primacy was thus given to shareholders of the Company, if not exactly over and above the 
ancillary concern with the colonists themselves. Where Horton’s scheme had stressed the 
redemptive features of emigration for those down and out in Britain and Ireland, and where 
the National Colonisation Society had waxed lyrical about Wakefield’s theory of colonisation, 
the South Australian Land Company instead prioritised the effective management of capital. 
Profits to be paid to shareholders were accordingly amplified. “By purchasing, from time to 
time, blocks of land, making roads, and laying out towns, re-selling the country lots, and either 
selling the town lots, or holding them at a ground rent, the capital of the Company may be 
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expected to yield large profits to the Shareholders, affording concurrent and great advantages 
to the Settlers.”432  
The Company’s bankers, Messrs. Barnetts, Hoares and Co. of Lombard Street, and 
Messrs. Drummonds and Co. of Charing Cross, were thus advertised alongside their lawyers 
and directors, the mechanics of company colonisation now assuming ever greater 
importance. It was a trend ramified by the attention given over to the finer points of company 
meetings and the nuances of calls, clarification of which the interested investor could solicit 
from calling on the Office of the South Australian Land Company at 8 Regent Street. As much 
attention was now lavished on the finer points of by-laws and book-keeping as the ins and 
outs of the Wakefield system.433  
Another distinction between the land company and the body that preceeded it was 
the radical political agenda espoused by many of its promoters. Historians of colonial reform 
have always appreciated the radical pedigree of the systematic colonisers, but less well 
understood is how and why company colonisation proved such an attractive platform on 
which to test their ideas.434 As already noted, the seeds of radical politics had been planted 
from the very beginning of colonial reform, in the writings of the “early” Wakefield and the 
administrative work of his erstwhile editor and publicist, the fellow radical Robert Gouger. 
Yet while it would be inaccurate to suggest that the National Colonisation Society shirked 
parliamentary reform, the extent to which radical ideas inflected the plans of the Society was 
marginal: the political economy of colonisation always predominated. 
The Company’s prospectus was certainly not shy about the powers it desired, nor was 
it modest in how it presented itself. “The South Australian Land Company will possess 
advantages, under a Charter from the Crown, greater than any Land Company hitherto 
established has enjoyed,” exclaimed the 1832 document.435 This, evidently, was to be a far 
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more significant body than the Australian Agricultural Company or the Canada Company.436 
However, it was in the detail of the plan, rather than in its often lofty rhetoric, that we most 
clearly see the radical politics of the land company at work. More especially, it was the desire 
for political power on the colonial ground that most obviously set the South Australian Land 
Company apart from the agricultural trading and land companies analysed elsewhere in this 
dissertation. Whereas the companies of 1825 situated themselves into pre-existing 
economies and structures of political authority, the South Australian Land Company wished 
to create a new colony in its own image.        
 In addition to buying and selling land, then, as the Canada Company did, or erecting 
infrastructure and cultivating a moral economy on Company territory as the Australian 
Agricultural Company and the Van Diemen’s Land Company attempted to do, the South 
Australian Land Company also set out to establish in South Australia the apparatus of 
government. The locus of political authority in this novel antipodean settlement, in other 
words, would rest with them, if only for a period of transition.437 It was a profound difference 
that would come to colour discussions between the South Australian lobby and the Colonial 
Office for the next two years, and it would ultimately come to shape the unique dual-mandate 
structure of authority in the colony, which split power between the South Australian 
Colonisation Commission and the Colonial Office. 
Of the two copies of the South Australian Land Company’s 1832 prospectus in the 
Colonial Office records, only one section is bracketed to mark a point of dissatisfaction (as 
was practice at the time). “In return for these important advantages,” the Company’s 
prospectus stated in relation to the benefits that their endeavour would inevitably bestow on 
the new settlement, “it will be required by the Charter, that the Company should undertake 
the government of the Colony, for a time.”438 Two particular facets of this passage invite 
immediate reaction. The first, which was a feature throughout the period under discussion, 
was the unstinting confidence of the promoters’ colonial vision. A charter was simply 
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presumed, seemingly a parchment in waiting for the Company to affix their corporate seal 
when ready to commence operations. The Colonial Office was simply expected to fulfil its 
obligations for a bargain that was drawn up by the other party, all before any serious 
consultation and negotiation had begun.  
More fundamental was the political power that the charter would confer on the 
Company. Citing the 1775 instructions sent by the Governor of Jamaica to the newly 
appointed superintendent of British Honduras, the prospectus claimed far-reaching authority 
in the new colony, rendering this a Company settlement in the most expansive sense of the 
term.439 A number of proposals are quite remarkable for the sheer daring of their import, 
particularly given the highly centralised system of colonial governance then operational in the 
penal colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land. Among some of the more 
ambitious demands were the right to appoint all “official, judicial and other appointments,” 
the ability to raise a militia for the protection of the colony, and the responsibility of issuing 
the Governor with instructions subject to approval by the Crown. Clause 12 of the prospectus 
meanwhile asserted the right of the Company to preside over daily life in the colony, the 
wording deliberately vague so as to leave wide scope for interpretation. “The company to 
have power to make such rules and regulations, from time to time, as may be necessary for 
the management of the Colony.”440 
In point of fact the earlier Plan of a Company had gone ever further, most notably in 
its desire to vest in the Company the power to nominate the governor. Despite early and 
continuous pushback from the Colonial Office on this specific provision, the Company still 
clung to the idea that it might be realised. “The Company’s success and that of the colony 
depends so much on the course pursued by the governor and it is intended to make further 
representation of the government on this point,” a footnote to the plan of early 1832 rather 
wistfully remarked.441 Power personified, the office of governor was the ultimate guarantee 
of colonial authority, hence the importance attached to the position by the South Australian 
promoters. 
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But if the ramified republican sentiments of the early 1832 plan had begun to lose 
some of their force in the face of Colonial Office objections, it is also the case that a latent 
radicalism remained. In this frame, the succession of plans and prospectuses issued by the 
South Australian Land Company need to be put into dialogue with one another, relative shifts 
in tone and emphasis reflecting the inevitable tussle of negotiations with Whitehall. For in 
spite of modifications, the final draft charter submitted to the Colonial Office by the Company 
in 1832 still cleaved to the idea that the promoters would be vested with significant 
authority.442 It was a pedigree that would ultimately lead to irreparable conflict with the 
Colonial Office’s legal advisors. Unwilling to take heed of criticisms numerous, the 
longstanding critique of political patronage and corruption that guided the colonial reformers 
was not something that could be simply discarded without a major rethink. The irony, of 
course, was that the problem they identified was the obstacle that they failed to surmount. 
Indeed, it was only when the more overtly radical pretensions of the South Australian scheme 
were cast aside that the project began to secure tacit acceptance.  
James Stephen’s blistering attack on the Company’s proposal effectively put an end to 
any hopes that the Colonial Office might greenlight the projection. His much-cited 
memorandum on the Company, what Douglas Pike called Stephen’s “irresistible conclusion,” 
was hardly liable to misinterpretation:  
 
This project is wild and impracticable. There is no reasonable prospect that it 
would be sanctioned by either the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, the Lords 
of the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade, or the Lord Chancellor, the 
concurrence of each of whom would be indispensable.443 
 
Legal disavowal of the scheme was accompanied by political disapproval, the Under Secretary 
of State for War and Colonies R. W. Hay already having suggested as much in correspondence 
with the directors. “Whatever deliberations may have intervened between the original 
suggestion of the measure and the delivery at this office of a charter,” Hay politely but 
 
442 “Draft of proposed Charter for erecting and constituting the Province of South Australia in New Holland and 
for Incorporating the South Australian Land Company,” 9 July 1832, CO 13/1, Colonial Office Correspondence 
South Australia, TNA, Kew. 
443 James Stephen Memorandum, 14 July 1832, CO 13/1, Colonial Office Correspondence South Australia, TNA, 
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forcefully reminded the Company, “they have all taken place upon the assumption, that the 
proposal, when drawn out in its ultimate form, would be found compatible with the 
fundamental principles, to which it is the duty of the king’s government to adhere in every 
grant which they may advise his majesty to pass under the great seal; and it is of course 
obvious that this condition must at all times have been distinctly understood.”444 The South 
Australian Land Company was destined to be yet another unrealised colonial dream, though 
the model of company colonisation would prove remarkably resilient. 
Wakefield was heavily critical of the way the Colonial Office had dealt with the 
Company. In England and America, a text that was theoretically concerned with the political 
economy of Anglo-America but practically invested in the colonisation of South Australia, 
Wakefield chided the Colonial Office for misreading the Company’s proposals, and the 
republican politics of the plan in particular. Of special significance to Wakefield was his belief 
that the Colonial Office misunderstood the nature of the Company’s claim to sovereign 
authority over South Australia. In reference to the assertion that the Company intended to 
erect a republic within a monarchy, Wakefield bluntly retorted that they were wrong-headed. 
“This is a mistake. The only creatures, over which sovereignty could be transferred, are a few 
savages and a great many kangaroos and emues [sic].”445 A blank canvas, in other words, for 
the Company to fill in as they so wished, though in reality an illusion that the Colonial Office 
would seek to disabuse them of, however haltering and incomplete that counterargument 
may have proved to be. 
A defence of the Company was mounted by way of reference to North America, in 
which Wakefield tried to normalise the course taken by the promoters. “In this respect, the 
draft of a charter was a copy from the charters, under which companies founded colonies in 
America. At one of the interviews with Lord Goderich, his lordship had been requested to 
examine those charters, copies of which probably exist in the colonial office. A printed copy 
of them was in the hands of the committee.”446 For Wakefield, as for those involved in the 
day-to-day deliberations of the South Australian Land Company, the desire to wield political 
authority was anything but radical, certainly not by the terms set down in the annals of English 
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colonial history. “The appointment of the governor was vested in the colonies by the charters 
of Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, Rhode-Island, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland,” 
Wakefield implored.447 Why should South Australia prove any different, the implied riposte 
to the Colonial Office seemed to suggest. 
The provisional nature of the Company’s powers in the colony was another aspect of 
the South Australian plans that Wakefield wished to accentuate, and once again he turned to 
North America to help him make his case. “Of course,” he confidently asserted, “if the 
company were to govern for a time, like the London Company, and the Plymouth Company, 
and William Penn, and even the company which founded a colony at Sierra Leone, it was, 
during that time, to have the authority necessary for governing.” The attack on the broader 
republican bent of the proposal also attracted his satirical ire, and like so many of the 
arguments he waged against adversaries, this particular criticism of the Colonial Office traded 
in the absurd. “If the company should revive their project, they would do well to put a House 
of Lords into it; with a Baron Blackswan, a Viscount Kangaroo, a Marquis of Morrumbidgee, 
and Bishop of Ornithoryncus.”448 From America to the absurd and back again, Wakefield’s 
retrospective critique of the Colonial Office’s reception of the South Australian Land Company 
held steadfast to its underlying politics, liberal in sentiment but radical in design. And while 
his comments may at first blush appear to be little more than bitter reflections on the lost 
prospects of a once promising Company, they in fact doubled as a defence for a new scheme 
of private colonial enterprise: namely, the South Australian Association. The Association 
would soon begin to place renewed pressure on Stephen and his colleagues in the Downing 
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South Australia in a North American Mirror  
 
 
Chartered enterprise was nothing new when the colonial reformers began pitching company 
plans in the early 1830s. From the East India Company to the Hudson’s Bay Company, the 
South Sea Company to the Royal African Company, the British had a pedigree in corporate 
colonisation that imperial speculators in the second quarter of the nineteenth century well 
appreciated. This chapter argues that memories of company colonisation in North America 
proved especially attractive to the colonial reformers. It shows how America framed plans to 
systematically colonise South Australia, thereby connecting company colonisation in the 
antipodes to its Atlantic predecessor.       
 In so doing, the chapter deepens historical understanding of the cultural currents that 
underlay the colonial reform movement. I begin with an analysis of the South Australian 
Association, the most powerful lobby constituted to implement systematic colonisation. 
While the social profile of the South Australian promoters narrowed over the course of the 
1830s, the men who composed the 1833 Association were notable for blending active 
intellectual lives with professional occupations in the City. I argue that this characterisation 
of the Association helps to explain why many of them were predisposed to draw on American 
history in legitimating the venture. A form of historicism was common currency among the 
promoters, and so its strategic deployment in the context of establishing a new colonising 
body fits with a milieu unafraid to fuse high ideas with lessons learned in the counting house.  
 The chapter then takes a more general view of how North American precedent 
informed South Australian colonisation. I demonstrate that the legitimating narratives 
employed by the South Australian promoters performed two key functions. On the one hand, 
they supplied a historical and discursive tradition that authorized chartered enterprise in 
Britain’s settler empire in the 1830s. On the other hand, they furnished legal arguments that 
purportedly justified the appropriation of Aboriginal Australian land. The recourse to 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century North America, I argue, reveals a paradox at the heart 
of the systematic colonisation of South Australia. While the colonial reformers were eager to 
invoke the supposed novelty of their theory of colonisation, lauding Wakefield for his 
ingenious system of colonial land management, their textual archive also bears witness to a 
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movement preoccupied with linking their theory to an older, but supposedly lost, tradition of 
colonisation. This was not so much the shock of the new as the reinvention of the old. 
 The chapter then shifts registers to interrogate the often-overlooked South Australian 
Company, a commercial entity that arguably did more than any other body to sustain the 
colony in its fledgling years. I examine the diverse arms of the South Australian Company’s 
operations, which included banking and whaling, to illustrate how systematic colonisation had 
by the late 1830s become above all else a commercial proposition. In rethinking colonial 
reform in light of company colonisation, the analysis seeks to situate the early colonial history 
of South Australia in the long run history of chartered colonisation, a discursive and legal 
connection that the company men driving these projects themselves made.   
 
 
The South Australian Association 
 
 
Of all the private associations and companies formed to implement systematic colonisation, 
the South Australian Association was without peer when it came to the important matter of 
social capital. Rivalling the Australian Agricultural Company and the New Zealand Company 
for parliamentary representation, the Association was able to use backchannels to 
Westminster and Whitehall to promote its interests. But the most notable feature of the 
Association, and the characteristic that most distinguished it from the later South Australian 
Company, was its diverse social profile. Drawing from the pool of men who injected the 
National Colonisation Society with a sense of philanthropic purpose, the Association also 
attracted the attention of a number of intellectuals and public minded individuals. Allied to 
the cluster of merchants and bankers who had begun to attach themselves to South 
Australian affairs from 1831 onwards, the Association was unsurpassed in its ability to draw 
from a wide strata of the metropolitan elite. 
Political clout was among the South Australian Association’s most valuable assets. Of 
the thirty-man provisional committee, exactly half were Members of Parliament.449 The South 
 
449 Members of Parliament for the South Australian Association: Aubrey Beauclerk; Charles Buller; William 
Clay; George Grote (Treasurer); Benjamin Hawes; Matthew D. Hill; William Hutt; J. A. Roebuck; G. Poulett 
Scrope; Edward Strutt; Robert Torrens; Henry Warburton; H. G. Ward; W. Wolryche Whitmore (Chairman); 
John Wilks. See South Australian Association Prospectus, enclosed in CO 13/2, Colonial Office Correspondence 
South Australia, TNA, Kew.  
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Australian Land Company, much enlarged in its parliamentary presence when compared with 
the National Colonisation Society, could boast only ten representatives from Westminster. A 
membership composed of prominent individuals undoubtedly imbued the scheme with a 
sense of prestige, an important element when pitching for public and government support, 
and it is therefore unsurprising that the Association sought to foreground the constitution of 
its social body. The South Australian Church Society, a spin-off association that aimed to 
establish an Anglican church in the colony, thus wrote glowingly of its membership. “For 
carrying into effect this interesting and national work, a Provisional Committee, consisting of 
Members of Parliament, and other persons, known to the public for their talents and probity, 
has been formed, and is now in communication with His Majesty’s Government.”450 
This emphasis on the “talents and probity” of its membership was linked to how the 
Association saw itself. There was nothing unusual about this, however. Indeed, it is a marked 
feature of private colonial enterprise of all stripes during this period that such self-
congratulatory rhetoric appears with almost unbroken regularity every time a new scheme 
was put forward. The Association was especially eager to convey its commitment to public 
duty, as though the men involved had no private ambitions for wealth that could not be 
reconciled with the larger public aspirations of the venture. We find repeatedly in the 
Association’s statements the collapse of individual character into a larger historical schema, 
so as to narrate colonial history through the eyes of those driving these private ventures.
 Such tactics of self-description are on full display in the Association’s draft charter, for 
instance, in which the rhetorical charge of character talk is especially prominent. Like the old 
colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania, which were “founded by private individuals of public 
spirit, prudence and resolution, with no other assistance from government than a charter,” 
the South Australian Association envisaged the creation of a colonial Eden in a supposedly 
empty waste land.451 The compelling image created here is of the resolute colonist sailing off 
into the distance, with little more than a piece of parchment and a pioneering spirit. 
Symbolic imagery was an essential component of company colonisation, although it is 
an aspect of the genre that we are liable to overlook if we do not take the social and cultural 
history of colonial reform seriously. After all, when we strip these projections back to their 
 
450 South Australian Church Society Pamphlet (London: William Nicol, 1834), enclosed in CO 13/2, ibid. 
451 Draft of a Proposed Charter for the South Australian Commission with some Introductory Remarks (London: 
William Nicol, 1834), enclosed in CO 13/2, ibid.  
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core, all relied on convincing potential shareholders and colonists, patrons and politicians, 
that these were companies sitting on a secure source of future profits, in regions of the world 
that were far away and strange. The importance of symbolic heft in this commercial context 
in part accounts for the attention paid to printing and lithography, advertisements in the 
metropolitan and country newspapers, journal articles in the periodical press and handbills 
passed around City taverns, meetings and fêtes, and the renting of grand offices that could 
be held open to the public. These markers of performativity were acknowledgements that 
human trust was up for grabs. As such, the famous meeting of the Association at Exeter Hall 
on 30 June 1834, which lasted seven hours, appears every bit the performance act as an 
evenings’ theatre in nearby Covent Garden.452  
Yet there was a more practical value in having links to the British political class. Just as 
the colonial reformers found it useful to have a reliable mouthpiece in R. S. Rintoul’s 
Spectator, so the easy ear of a minister or Whitehall mandarin could smooth negotiations. 
Particularly important in this respect was J. G. Lefevre (1797–1879), the Undersecretary of 
State for War and the Colonies during the crucial period of discussions between the two 
parties. Significantly, it was outside the confines of regular colonial business that the 
Association’s chairman Robert Gouger tried to sway Lefevre, an off-stage attempt to turn 
personal connection into private gain. At one of their regular lunches Gouger put forward the 
Association’s revised plans, seeking to bypass the normal strictures, if not conventions, of 
negotiation between Colonial Office and colonial association, thus hoping to solicit a 
favourable opinion: “his [Lefevre’s] luncheon came in, and I told him that if he would allow 
me to read to him the heads of the plan more in detail, while he ate his lunch, I should be 
glad.”453 This behind the scenes lobbying, which built on a long-standing personal 
acquaintance, calls to mind the manoeuvres of John Macarthur Junior over a decade before, 
when he sought to tap into an amicable personal friendship with Wilmot Horton in the name 
of the Australian Agricultural Company’s upstart operations. Seen in this light, intimate 
notions such as rapport and social connection appear an effective lubricant, if not a necessity, 
to effective corporate lobbying.        
 
452 [Edward Gibbon Wakefield], The New British Province of South Australia; or a Description of the Country, 
Illustrated by Charts or Views; with an Account of Principles, Objects, Plan, and Prospects of the Colony 
(London: Charles Knight, 1834), appendix II, 149–220. 
453 Journal of Robert Gouger, entry for March 19, in Edwin Hodder, ed. The Founding of South Australia, 114. 
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 Political backing could cut both ways, however. Like the South Australian Land 
Company before it the South Australian Association had a core support base drawn from the 
so-called philosophical radicals.454 Prominent among the radicals were William Molesworth 
(1810–1855), a parliamentarian who was also involved with the New Zealand Company, and 
George Grote, the esteemed historian of ancient Greece. Nor were Molesworth and Grote 
lacking for fellow travellers: among those they could count on for political company were 
Aubrey Beauclerk, William Clay, Jospeh Parkes, John Roebuck, Henry Warburton, and John 
Wilks. The milieu of philosophical radicals was further bolstered by the ebullient presence of 
Charles Buller, a key figure in the company colonisation of South Australia, Western Australia 
and New Zealand. Far from a fringe concern, then, this radical milieu was central to the South 
Australian Association, as it was to the later New Zealand enterprise. 
Such views aroused suspicion in the Colonial Office about just how far the Association 
could be trusted. One of the chief barriers to the success of the Association was therefore 
political. Lefevre, ever the useful intermediary, confided as much in a letter to the Whig M.P. 
William Wolryche-Whitmore on March 17 1834, who’s own political sympathies rendered him 
an effective negotiator with government precisely because he did not share the majority 
viewpoints of those he represented. “It was agreed to postpone the consideration of the 
evidence which might be in the possession of the parties as to the fitness or unfitness of the 
particular tract selected for the purposes of settlement, until it should have been ascertained 
how far the political views of the proposed company and their project of colonization might 
be met with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.”455 
The South Australian Association also attracted several intellectuals and men 
interested in philanthropy and public affairs. This in part built on the theoretical foundations 
of the colonial reform movement, which had initially attracted the interests of political 
economists and so-called “reflecting men.” However, there was a crucial difference between 
 
454 Prospectus of the South Australian Association. 
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the two bodies. Whereas the men of 1830 used the language of land, labour, and capital to 
formulate their arguments in favour of systematic colonisation, Association discourse was far 
more indebted to what might be termed a form of historicism. It is a remarkable feature of 
the colonisation of South Australia that at the very moment the discussion in London turned 
towards the practicalities of colonial reform, to brass-tacks, the discourse propping up its 
claims to legitimacy turned backwards in time with ever greater urgency, to the history of 
American colonisation. It was only with the establishment of the South Australian 
Commission, and the formation of the South Australian Company soon on its heels in late 
1835, that historical analogy began to lose traction, and even then, a historical consciousness 
that had so powerfully shaped the Commission’s early discourse persisted in the occasional 
utterance shot through with the traces of a lingering historical sensibility.  
 Notable among the intellectual set was George Grote (1794–1871), the acclaimed 
classicist and radical M.P. Grote is surely one of the more estimable figures involved in the 
colonisation of South Australia, for the sheer breadth of his intellectual interests and scholarly 
pursuits calls to mind the earlier colonisers of Virginia, who were steeped in the writings of 
Renaissance humanism. As Andrew Fitzmaurice has deftly shown, the promoters of the 
Virginia venture drew on their grounding in the studia humanitatis to make sense of company 
colonisation in the seventeenth-century Atlantic.456 Grote, who spoke French, German, and 
some Italian, as well as Latin and Greek, was an interlocutor with many of the most prominent 
thinkers of the day: David Ricardo and James Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Francis Place, John 
Austin and John Stuart Mill.457 
It was his work as an historian, however, that most distinguished Grote. His 
monumental twelve-volume A History of Greece (1846–1856) transformed the field at a 
moment when the classics in Britain were witnessing a revival.458 As we will see, his historical 
inclinations would help him frame the South Australian Association’s colonial agenda in the 
long run context of British expansion in the world beyond Europe. Equally significant, though, 
was Grote’s background in banking. His professional occupation allowed him to fuse together 
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intellectual pursuits with commercial training, and this is a theme that recurs throughout the 
lifecycle of colonial reform.  
Another member of the Association with intellectual aspirations was William 
Molesworth (1810–1855), a radical parliamentarian who was involved in both the South 
Australian and New Zealand enterprises. Like Grote, Molesworth cultivated a rich intellectual 
life alongside his day-to-day work in Westminster and as Member of Parliament for East 
Cornwall. But whereas Grote was fascinated by the classics, Molesworth turned instead to 
that most modern of seventeenth century thinkers, Thomas Hobbes.459 Just as Wakefield 
occupied his attentions editing Smith’s Wealth of Nations, so Molesworth assiduously 
collected and published an edition of Hobbes’s writings, eleven volumes in all. 
Charles Buller, who comes centre stage in Chapter 7, was also inclined to think through 
some of the biggest issues of the day. Educated at Harrow, before private tuition from the 
historian and essayist Thomas Carlyle, Buller was one of several South Australian promoters 
to have studied at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he earned the rather unlikely moniker 
the “Cornish Voltaire” from the Conversazione Society, otherwise known as the Apostles, the 
famed debating club.460 Admitted to Lincoln’s Inn the same year that James Macarthur Junior 
was holding the first meeting of the Australian Agricultural Company in his chambers, 1824, 
Buller was a renowned orator and raconteur, attracting admiration and opprobrium in equal 
measure. 
This commitment to intellectual endeavour had a practical bearing on how the South 
Australian Association operated, the historical inclinations of men like Grote and Molesworth 
in particular shaping Association discourse. In this light the loftiness of their rhetoric befits 
company men who were as comfortable discussing Hobbes as they were the intricacies of 
chartered colonial enterprise, ancient Greece as much as English colonial policy from the 
seventeenth century to their nineteenth century present. Recognising this marks a key step 
towards making sense of the interface between private and public utterances on company 
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colonisation, and it moreover helps to situate the overtures to American colonial history in 
much needed social context. After all, the period that they were living through saw a dramatic 
widening of the public sphere, with publications like the Westminster Review catering to a 
largely professional readership that wished to cultivate interests in any number of pressing 
social, cultural, and political issues, and where the dichotomy between commercial and public 
life was not as stark as it would later become.461  
It was in this milieu, characterised by practical business endeavour and toil in the 
realm of ideas, that men such as Molesworth could quite contentedly blend together a 
parliamentary career, proprietorship of the London and Westminster Review, and a 
prominent place on the board of two colonisation companies. We sequester these various 
dimensions of Molesworth’s life off from one another at the risk of misunderstanding them, 
for to situate them in each their own box overlooks the more interesting, and historically 
accurate, overlaps between the life of the mind and the inner lives of the men who composed 
these corporations.         
 Historical consciousness clearly lay behind the appeal to America, and George Grote’s 
application of his historical training to the question of company colonisation draws this out in 
exceptional detail. His interpretation of British colonial history, and of its relationship to the 
South Australian enterprise, made explicit that chartered enterprise was the natural mode of 
colonisation for Britons, steeped in national tradition if not character and disposition:  
 
A colony founded by charter is one example of that delegation of authority, which 
in perpetual succession has for ages been a leading principle of the British 
Government; while a colony founded by the Crown is an example of that central 
authority, acting at whatever distance from the seat of government, by means of 
temporary agents, which is a leading principle of the French Government. In either 
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Echoing Wakefield’s later comparison between French and what he called English 
colonisation, Grote deployed a reading of the imperial past to mount an argument in favour 
of a chartered colony. But more significantly it was Grote’s willingness to reshape ideas to fit 
the demands of company colonisation, to fuse together his banking and intellectual interests, 
that betrays the history of ideas that lies behind chartered enterprise. This aspect of Grote’s 
thinking is in keeping with the provisional committee’s commentary on their proposed 
charter, the wording of which was taken from the charter of Georgia. “The substitution of the 
word “commissioner,” for that of “trustee,” is not merely verbal change,” the committee 
informed E. G. Stanley on 21 February 1834, “for it indicates and will draw attention to the 
fact, that the persons acting under the charter would be servants of the supreme government, 
and quite as much subject to its control as the members of any Royal commission.”463 
 Such flexibility on the plane of ideas would ultimately pave the way for the creation of 
the South Australian Colonisation Commission and the legislative framework for the new 
colony. Indeed, it was precisely because the two parties to the negotiation failed to agree on 
the fundamental issue of who was to wield power in the colony–private colonial association 
or the Crown–that the distinctive dual structure of the commission took root. The debate 
between the Association and the Colonial Office over the scope of powers to be delegated to 
the promoters, that is to say, the mode of colonisation, was thus generative in the sense that 
the conflict of ideas led to innovation in the form of the commission.  
However, out of this political contestation, what might be called the politics of ideas, 
a settlement emerged that left open the space for company colonisation, and this space was 
quickly filled by the South Australian Company. Mandated by the terms of the South Australia 
Act, which gave the Commission the explicit power to constitute a land company, George Fife 
Angas and his London agent Samuel Stephens thus fulfilled the long-held ambitions of those 
who harboured visions of antipodean company colonisation.464 But in ways large and small it 
was a vision that had undergone radical change since the first meetings of the National 
Colonisation Society in 1830. A willingness to adapt and incorporate the suggestions of the 
Colonial Office was as much a part of proceedings as any overarching colonial blueprint. 
Chartered enterprise and the contours of company colonisation had proved malleable in this 
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strategic context, but the taproot of all such schemes in the British tradition inevitably went 
back to America. 
 
America and Colonial Reform 
 
Colonial North America was a constant reference point in the colonisation of South Australia, 
as it was in New Zealand towards the end of the decade. If the Swan River Colony (1829) in 
Western Australia was the model to avoid, the antipodean case study in the rear view that 
showed how it could all go wrong, North America was another benchmark, the epitome of 
colonial success. But while the early history of South Australia has long been analysed, how 
and why the colonial reformers invoked North American precedent has been overlooked. 
Regional histories have frequently emphasised South Australia’s origins as a “free colony,” 
untainted by convict transportation, while the broader political and religious inclinations of 
the colony’s early founders and settlers has also been regularly assessed, particularly in 
relation to the 1834 South Australia Act.465 Yet visions of America, I argue, were deeply bound 
up with visions of colonial reform: the conjuring up of North American precedent was all but 
ubiquitous in the context of practical plans to form a British settlement in South Australia.   
For example, the charter submitted to the Colonial Office in 1832 by the South 
Australian Land Company found sustenance in the colonial past. With the significant 
exception of the Swan River Colony in Western Australia, the draft charter confidently stated, 
all “our old and most successful colonies” depended on individual industry and private capital 
for success, not government oversight:  
 
For the partial failure of the Swan River settlement, the Government who founded 
the settlement without any provision for success, is, no doubt, responsible; but 
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then Plymouth and William Penn,–not the Governments of the time,–were 
responsible for the success of the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania.466 
 
The Virginia Company may be a dubious model of colonial success, but that overlooks the 
discursive function that it performed for contemporaries, the weight attached to North 
American chartered enterprise by those invested in creating new colonies in the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century.467 Swan River, in no small part thanks to Wakefield, was 
by the early 1830s synonymous with colonial failure, starving rather than success.468 The old 
company model of the seventeenth century, by contrast, was a tried and tested method for 
settling Englishmen on new world lands. Company colonisation, in other words, may have 
been a lost art but it was also one that could be resurrected to avert the horrors of the Swan 
River Colony or the equally abhorrent system of convict transportation then in operation in 
New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land. 
There were, of course, substantive critiques of company colonisation in South 
Australia, and the question of whether the company could claim imperium loomed large in 
early discussions between the South Australian Land Company and the Colonial Office. The 
Colonial Office was clear that the charter devolved far too much authority to the company. 
As Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War and the Colonies Robert Hay remarked to 
Robert Torrens on 9 July 1832, the charter “would virtually transfer to this company the 
sovereignty of a vast unexplored territory, equal in extent to one of the most considerable 
kingdoms of Europe,” an argument also tendered by James Stephen in one of his 
characteristically insightful memoranda.469 Going straight to the heart of the matter, Stephen, 
the influential legal advisor to the Colonial Office, dismissed as folly the likeness that the 
Company drew between themselves and England’s seventeenth-century corporate ventures, 
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effectively erasing the connection the company had rhetorically forged between antipodean 
and Atlantic company colonisation.470 
Stephen acidly asserted that the Company’s plan was akin to “settling a republic within 
a monarchy,” an unthinkable affront to the integrity of the British constitution. The by-then 
scurrilous example of the East India Company was also cited, with Stephen drawing on the 
history of the Indian empire to refute the South Australian Land Company’s purported claim 
to be acting in the public interest. “They were,” he stated, simply “Gamblers playing for a high 
stake,” oblivious to the wider social concerns that pressed so heavily upon the overworked 
and chronically under-resourced Colonial Office.471 Though far from opposed to companies in 
principle, Stephen and the Colonial Office were nevertheless careful to avoid endorsing the 
erection of unfettered company-states, corporate entities beholden to no one but their own 
sovereign authority, as well they might be.472 The South Australian Land Company, the 
Colonial Office argued, was perfectly entitled to purchase land in South Australia according to 
the Wakefield model, but its powers as a corporation would be limited to land sales.473  
The South Australian Association, which was formed in late 1833, articulated perhaps 
the most ambitious colonial agenda among the plethora of bodies formed in the years that 
followed Wakefield’s Letter from Sydney. Like the South Australian Land Company, the 
association sought a charter, yet it invoked the model of North America more forcibly than its 
predecessor. Composed of well-connected and influential individuals, many with links to the 
City of London and Westminster, among them George Grote, the philosophical radical and 
well-known historian of Ancient Greece, and Robert Gouger, by then a well-established figure 
among metropolitan land speculators, the association was a powerful lobby for colonial 
 
470 James Stephen Memorandum, 14 July 1832, CO 13/1, Colonial Office Correspondence South Australia, TNA, 
Kew. See also Stephen’s discussion of America in GRE/B126/11 and GRE/B126/12, Henry George Grey, 3rd Earl 
Grey Papers, Special Collections, Durham University Library. In a letter from Stephen to Grey, Stephen reflects 
at length on the applicability of North American precedent: “Commentators on colonial or any other history 
who confine themselves to official documents are as sure to go awry as if they entirely overlooked them. In the 
book containing the charters of the old N. American colonies they are put forward as specimens of proposed 
wisdom and liberality by those who either do not or will not look further than the four corners of those 
parchments.” See James Stephen to Earl Grey, 14 March 1850, GRE/B126/12. 
471 Ibid. On James Stephen and the Colonial Office, see A. G. L. Shaw, “James Stephen and Colonial Policy: The 
Australian Experience,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 20 (1992): 11–34; Paul Knaplund, 
James Stephen and the British Colonial System, 1813–1847 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953). 
472 Ibid., 487. On the idea of the “company-state,” see Stern, The Company-State. 
473 James Stephen Memorandum, 14 July 1832, CO 13/1, Colonial Office Correspondence South Australia, TNA, 
Kew. 
 161 
reform.474 If the South Australian Land Company’s plan was plain, even bald, the South 
Australian Association’s prospectus was bold. Published in early 1834, it was well received 
and widely covered in the London press. And it was also much enamoured with the English 
colonisation of America: 
 
All the old and most successful British colonies in North America–Virginia, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Georgia–
were founded by individuals whose public spirit, prudence, and resolution were 
not otherwise assisted by the Government of this country, than as a charter from 
the Crown erected each of those bodies of individuals into a corporation, with the 
authority required for accomplishing, to use the words of those charters, “their 
generous and noble purpose.”  
 
In this respect, the South Australian Association, confiding in the paternal 
goodness of his present Majesty, and trusting that their undertaking will be 
favourably viewed by an enlightened and liberal administration, will endeavour to 
follow the example of the London and Plymouth companies, which founded 
Virginia; of William Penn and his companions, who founded Pennsylvania; of Lord 
Baltimore and his associates, who founded Maryland; and of Lord Perceval and 
his co-trustees, who established the colony of Georgia.475 
 
Gouger’s appeal to company colonisation in North America, however, went far beyond simply 
summoning up the names of William Penn, Lord Baltimore, and Lord Perceval. His explanation 
of the South Australian Association’s guiding principles, for example, was buttressed by 
lengthy citation from the 1732 Charter of Georgia, even going so far as to claim that the 
American charter embodied the essential aims of the antipodean association. “The following 
extracts from the Georgian Charter will, in some measure, explain the objects of the South 
Australian Association, and the means by which it is proposed to accomplish them.” But the 
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example of Georgia also served a functional purpose. Aside from drawing on the same 
assumptions about Indigenous land, namely that South Australia was waste or desert, free 
for the taking, Gouger and the South Australian Association also modelled themselves on the 
corporate structure of the Trustees of Georgia, who were “one body politic and corporate, in 
deed and name.”476  
Historians of South Australia have tended to argue that the colony was distinct, that it 
was an outlier in the antipodes, yet that is not how the very actors involved in attempts to 
found the colony saw themselves, and nor should it be how we subsequently interpret them. 
What Gouger’s reference to Georgia shows, and what George Grote’s related historical 
rendition over a two-hundred-year sweep of chartered colonial enterprise, 1578 to 1791, 
reaffirms, is the imaginative and substantive power that the revival of English colonial history 
over the long run performed for these aspirational colonial capitalists.477 Yet this constant 
shuffling back and forth between the Atlantic and antipodes also reveals a paradox deeply 
embedded in the systematic colonisation of South Australia. The colonial reformer’s plans 
may have been novel in the context of what they called modern colonial policy, that is to say 
post-1776 British colonial land settlement, but it was also derived from the Elizabethan 
“Golden Age” of exploration and settlement in North America. The Indian ocean new world 
was in this sense imaginatively constructed from retrospective impressions of its Atlantic 
counterpart.  
Just as the South Australian Association made overtures to North American precedent, 
the South Australian Colonisation Commission, which oversaw land sales and emigration in 
the nascent colony, turned to the seventeenth-century Atlantic for validation and legitimacy. 
In what was almost certainly a calculated rhetorical move, the Colonisation Commission 
issued a draft charter that ranged broadly over English colonial history, tracing chartered 
enterprise from its origins until the close of the eighteenth century, the high point of 
European exploration in the Pacific Ocean.478 The purpose of situating their plans in a long 
tradition of private colonial enterprise not only imbued the Colonisation Commission’s 
scheme with a sense of prestige, however: it also justified the principles that underwrote it. 
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If Englishmen had successfully colonised new world lands in the Americas with charters in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, why could those on the cusp of settling a new colony 
in South Australia in the nineteenth not follow suit? English colonial history was thus a 
symbolic reservoir that could be tapped to supply authority in the present, a past that could 
be dredged up in the act of extoling the virtues of a far-reaching colonial agenda.  
Yet the draft charter had a more ambitious goal than simply authorising the South 
Australian Commission’s scheme rhetorically, however powerful or grand that appeal may 
have been. At stake, as so often in the antipodes during the 1830s and 1840s, was the very 
real question of dominium.479 Who had it, and by what means? The template of colonisation 
bequeathed by Wakefield to the South Australian Association, as already noted, was founded 
on two assumptions: first, that Aboriginal Country was unproductive waste land, a terra 
nullius in all but name; second, that private enterprise was the appropriate vehicle of colonial 
reform.480 The model of North American colonisation, as captured by the draft charter, 
adhered to both prescriptions and could therefore be used by the Commission to fortify their 
claims to indigenous land. “The plantation of a colony, that is, the establishment of society on 
a distant and desert spot,” the draft charter stated, “requires the exercise of the highest of 
those governing or sovereign powers by which society is anywhere maintained.”481 Like the 
Trustees of Georgia, whose 1732 charter had been cited at length by the South Australian 
Association in its 1834 prospectus, or the colonists of Massachusetts, the Commission 
demanded the sovereign authority to lay claim to unoccupied land, an act the Commission 
deemed inconceivable without chartered rights.482 “It was impossible,” the commission 
argued, “that those private persons should carry their purpose into effect without obtaining 
powers sufficient to constitute and uphold society in a distant place.”483 The implication was 
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clear. If the Colonial Office was not prepared to grant the Commission sovereign authority, 
the colony would not be founded.  
The undivided sovereign authority that the charters conferred on the colonists of 
North America was precisely the sort of power that the South Australian Colonisation 
Commission sought for itself, a yearning borne out by lengthy citation and commentary upon 
England’s old colonial charters. “We find, accordingly, that every one of the charters of our 
old colonies in America erected a kind of sovereignty, bestowing upon a single person, or 
several persons incorporated as one, a degree of authority which was supreme, so far as 
related to the country about to be colonized.”484 The North American charters thus had legal 
as well as rhetorical significance, indeed the two were intertwined. The almost deferential 
way in which the world of William Penn and the Virginia Company were summoned up in the 
practical task of soliciting the Colonial Office’s sanction for the systematic colonisation of 
South Australia reveals much about how they understood their own ventures. The context of 
colonial North America in the seventeenth century and South Australia in the year of the New 
Poor Law, 1834, may have been separated by a hemisphere and nigh on two hundred years 
of history, but that did not render visions of America any less intoxicating for ambitious 
individuals actively engaged in thinking through the space between the political economy of 
colonisation and actual antipodean land settlement. 
 
George Fife Angas and the South Australian Company 
 
 
“For some time it has been contemplated by a few gentlemen to establish a Joint Stock 
Company, for the purchase and improvement of land in this Colony,” announced a  circular 
issued in early September 1835 by Bartlett and Beddome, soon to be solicitors of the newly 
formed South Australian Company.485 The time-frame alluded to by Bartlett and Beddome’s 
circular, however, only told part of the story, for since the inception of the South Australian 
Land Company in 1831, colonial reform and company colonisation had developed in lockstep. 
The circular that was distributed around London in the fall of 1835 was undoubtedly part of 
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this longer story, as I show below, but it also marked the beginnings of an altogether different 
approach to the systematic colonisation of South Australia. 
The South Australian Colonisation Commission, which was created in 1834 from the 
ashes of the South Australian Association, presided over the new “province” of South 
Australia, together with oversight from the Colonial Office, in a peculiar power sharing 
arrangement.486 However, as is well known, the Commission struggled to sell the necessary 
requirement of land (in addition to raising a loan to guarantee the financial security of the 
new settlement ) proscribed by the South Australia Act, that would enable them to establish 
the colony.487 It was in this context that “three or four gentlemen” came forward with a 
“desire that other gentlemen of capital should join them and secure the whole of the 34,000 
acres thus offered, and concur in making the purchase, if thought advisable, the basis of a 
Joint Stock Company.”488 The chapter now turns to the men of capital who founded this 
company, the South Australian Company. Led by the merchant George Fife Angas, the 
Company made a critical contribution to the economic and social development of the colony.
 Established in October 1835, the South Australian Company was born out of calls for 
a company to shore up the fragile operations of the Colonisation Commission.489 The South 
Australia Act of 1834 had stipulated that the Commission needed to sell £35,000 worth of 
land if it was to proceed, in addition to raising a loan of at least £20,000 to demonstrate that 
it would live up to its billing as a self-sustaining colonial settlement.490 However, after an initial 
volley of interest by land speculators, it had become increasingly clear that the land sales 
would likely prove an insurmountable barrier to the fulfilment of the Act if a change in course 
was not adopted.491 
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Angas, who had been a founding member of the Commission, had long been sceptical 
of how it conducted its business, in particular decrying its overly theoretical approach to the 
matter at hand. As he confided to Robert Gouger in a scathing letter, once he had left that 
body for this new venture, the Commission seemed intent on operating in a manner more 
consistent with the National Colonisation Society, rather than as an entity tasked with the 
practical implementation of the provisions encoded in the parliamentary act. “I do not make 
any pretensions to a deep knowledge of the Science of Political Economy, although I have 
paid some attention to the subject–but I apprehend the duty of the Commissioners is to carry 
the Act into execution, and not to concoct new principles of Economics.”492 For Angas, as for 
the other men of enterprise who gathered to form the South Australian Company, the 
execution of systematic colonisation was just that: the delivery of the promises held out by 
the reforming impulse first crystallised in Wakefield’s Letter. Colonial reform was first and 
foremost a practical endeavour, and ideas came emphatically second place. 
Especially perplexing to Angas was the Colonisation Commission’s seemingly 
intransigent commitment to maintaining a high price on land, even in the face of evidence 
that suggested this was unlikely to encourage the investment they so desperately needed. 
This insistence on a high price for colonial waste land simply did not square with Angas’s 
calculus of the situation, notwithstanding the theoretical imperative given to the measure in 
Wakefield’s published writings.  “I expressed considerable apprehension that the Capitalists 
of this country, would refuse to purchase Land in the Projected Colony at 12l. per acre when 
it was so near other Colonies where land might be obtained at less than half the price, while 
I acknowledge the extreme importance of obtaining the very highest-price possible, to 
prevent mischiefs which had destroyed the Swan River Colony.”493    
 Yet, there is a more complicated backstory to the 1835 Company that we need to keep 
in mind. It is worth noting, for instance, that Angas was ambivalent about company 
colonisation throughout most of this period, and he was especially critical of Robert Gouger’s 
proposed land company. The resuscitated calls for a company were in fact led by, first, Robert 
Gouger and, second, by Samuel Stephens, with Angas only entering the fray with any real 
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conviction later on.494 Perhaps jaded by his experiences in the Company of 1832, Angas 
appears to have been reluctant to involve himself in further company speculations, only 
belatedly founding the South Australian Company when all other possibilities seem to have 
come to nothing. 
In point of fact, Angas never entirely subscribed to the principle of company 
colonisation, one of the more intriguing ironies of early South Australian history. “Such are 
the principles and views of the South Australian Company, briefly stated,” he noted in a letter 
to J. G. Lefevre on 17 November 1835, little over a month after spearheading its creation. “In 
the abstract, I am opposed to Public Companies with exclusive privileges, but this case affords 
a manifest exception to the general rule.”495 Again, for Angas, the subversion of theoretical 
principles to the demands of business was just an aspect of the world as it really was. There 
was little room for moral scruples or handwringing over ideological purity, as Wakefield would 
later display when he lamented the perceived shortcomings of the various attempts to 
implement his theory.496 
Robert Gouger appears to have been the first person to seriously entertain the revival 
of a land company. The first intimations of this may be traced back to correspondence 
between Gouger and Angas in June 1835, the same month that he pitched his ideas to the 
Colonisation Commission. “The price of land is now changed to £1. Per acre and as I fear there 
will be great difficulty in raising the £35,000 upon so high a price at the beginning, the 
establishment of a Joint Stock Land Company for the purchase of land in the colony, improving 
it with a view to resale, and for the advance of the means required on the colonial revenue 
securities, will I think be very desirable measures.”497 He was especially eager to solicit Angas’s 
advice, although perhaps less willing to heed it. “But how is the matter to be arranged? Can 
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you point out persons who would undertake the arrangement of such a Company? And how 
can they proceed even one step without an An [sic] Act of Parliament? These are important 
questions, but they may perhaps be got over when the matter is looked closely into.”498 
Angas had a number of reservations, however. What explains Angas’s ambivalence 
towards Gouger’s plan? Angas’s concern was not so much with the company model itself, but 
with the type of company to be formed. Pressing on Angas’s mind was the need to diversify 
the Company’s operations away from just land, something that we see clearly imprinted in 
the South Australian Company’s early operations before the principle of commercial 
“concentration.”499 It was a point that Angas had forcefully made at a meeting of the Board 
of Commissioners at the Adelphi, most likely in June 1835: “a simple Land Company just seems 
impracticable,” he observed, arguing that the economics informing the company option only 
made sense when commercial ambition was sufficiently broad.500  
He was also sceptical that Gouger was the right person to lead a company, citing his 
inexperience as a major shortcoming. In truth, Angas appears to have been rather dismissive 
of Gouger’s grounding in the ins and outs of colonial commerce. “Having to write to Mr. 
Gouger on the subject of the Joint Stock Co: it is not necessary to enlarge here,” he blithely 
noted in a letter to Rowland Hill on the prospects of getting up a revived land company for 
South Australia. More biting still was the frank assessment he made of Gouger’s willingness 
to see the course, and he was also critical of Gouger’s marginalisation of the City. As he 
rhetorically asked Hill in the same letter, June 10 1835, “Has Mr Gouger seen his way through 
the difficulties of establishing a Public Company?”501 The implication was that more care was 
needed, and also a better grasp of the world of money. “I received a letter from a Mr. Hull an 
opulent Quaker at Uxbridge who had read the book on So. Aust Province. He is quite pleased 
with the scheme. Should proper caution be made I cannot doubt on succeeding in the 
establishment of a very select Public Company to assist in the object we have in mind.”502
 A parallel proposal was devised by Angas’s London agent and the first manager of the 
South Australian Company, Samuel Stephens. Relatively little is known about Stephens, who 
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went on to enjoy a less than successful career in the colony, but he was a pivotal figure in the 
early formation of the Company. Stephens and Gouger failed to see eye to eye on the matter, 
however, and the bitter nature of the rivalry between the two men shows how contested 
company colonisation could be at the individual level. Gouger, Stephens informs us, “wished 
to see my proposals immediately, and as by some means or other everybody knew all about 
it, I did not object to his procuring them from Mr. Hill.” Gouger’s reactions to Stephen’s plan 
well capture the crucial interpersonal dynamics lying behind the texts of written proposals 
and draft charters: “After reading them Mr. G. was pleased to say that they were “altogether 
absurd” “would do very well to be laughed at” and so on, he then stated that he had thought 
of a plan for a Compy. while he had been away, and if he liked to try that he had no doubt it 
would succeede [sic]! I asked him for his reasons for laughing at my propositions, and of 
course he immediately said he must go!”503 
Angas and his criticisms of Robert Gouger never wavered. Responding to Gouger from 
his country home in Devon, August 6 1835, Angas conveyed mixed feelings about Gouger’s 
proposed plans for a South Australian land company:   
 
Your note of yesterday is before me & in reply I have only to say, that if you are 
confident of succeeding with your plan for the Establishment of a Land Company 
by all means proceed with it. Be assured that I am not disposed to move a finger 
in opposition to it, on the contrary I shall be one of the very first to acknowledge 
the high value of your services to the Colony in a successful issue of the permanent 
establishment of a respectable Company that will purchase the requisite amount 
of land, & employ the Emigrants, and provide the capital necessary for the 
working of the Colonial Government. Unless these objects be accomplished … the 
Colony will assuredly prove a failure.504  
 
This was hardly a ringing endorsement, certainly not a statement of his desire to join Gouger 
in his proposed plans. 
 
503 Samuel Stephens to George Fife Angas, 27 July 1835, PRG 174 1, Letters Relating to South Australia 1832–
1842, Angas Papers, State Library of South Australia, Adelaide.  
504 George Fife Angas to Robert Gouger, 6 August 1835, PRG 174 13, South Australian Colonisation Commission 
Papers 1831–1848, Angas Papers, State Library of South Australia, Adelaide.  
 170 
What drew Angas back into the fold of company colonisation, then, was a strategic 
decision designed to break the impasse that threatened to derail the entire project of colonial 
reform. Unable to entice enough willing buyers to invest in South Australian land, which had 
now become a millstone around the Commission’s neck rather than its primary asset, they 
reluctantly agreed to Angas’s proposal to form a Company to relieve them of the burden. 
Accordingly, Angas and his associates Henry Kingscote and Thomas Smith jointly agreed to 
purchase, at a considerable discount, the remaining one hundred and two land orders, thus 
fulfilling the Commission’s duties with respect to the preliminary land sales, with the intention 
of transferring these to the Company as soon as it was established.505 The land so purchased, 
at 12/- an acre, would constitute the core plank of the Company’s commercial affairs, but 
Angas and the rapidly constituted board of directors had more ambitious views in mind for 
Company and colony.          
 As stated in the Prospectus of the South Australian Company and reiterated in 
condensed form in the “Plans and Principles of the Company,” which was submitted to J. G. 
Lefevre for his inspection in November 1835, the Company wished to move beyond simply 
the buying and selling of land, and in this sense the Company built upon the distance that 
Angas had earlier drawn between his own views on company colonisation and those 
articulated by Robert Gouger.506 Angas was in any case confident that the Company would be 
held in high esteem, the basis of which I will analyse below, and he consequently attempted 
to reassure Lefevre and the Colonial Office of this conviction by reciting their credentials as a 
public body. “The Government will doubtless attach some importance to the ability of the 
gentlemen who propose making this experiment; I can only say, that they may be trusted, if 
any confidence may be placed in men! For I know them well; at least I think my judgement is 
well founded.”507        
 Significantly, Angas foregrounded the Company’s wealth of commercial experience 
when suggesting the need for official approval. “The only thing necessary to set this machine 
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to work is, for His Majesty’s Government to grant Letters Patent, or a Charter to the Company, 
whose Directors have been selected with great care as able, experienced men of business, of 
high character and respectability, and with no inconsiderable share of property.”508 As it 
happened, the Company would receive neither and it would have to content itself with a deed 
of settlement, in spite of several attempts to revive their earlier aspirations. Nonetheless, 
these “men of business” would go on to transform the political economy of South Australia, 
and so it is to their operations and social history that we now turn. 
 
The Social Context of the South Australian Company 
 
To a greater extent than perhaps any of the other colonisation companies that emerged 
during this period, the South Australian Company was influenced by the views and beliefs of 
its principal founder, George Fife Angas (1789–1879). Angas, a deeply religious merchant and 
banker of some repute in the City of London, was well acquainted with joint stock investment, 
in particular joint stock banking. The sector had flourished after 1826 when legislative changes 
challenged the monopoly position of the Bank of England, thereby supplanting the older 
partnership model and encouraging the creation of the commercial banks.509 Angas had 
turned to banking seriously in the late 1820s, after a precocious demonstration of his abilities 
as a teenager when he set up a savings bank to service the employees of his father’s 
coachmaking factory.510 Building on these formative experiences, Angas went on to co-found, 
at the very moment he was guiding the South Australian Company through its infancy, the 
influential Union Bank of Australia (1837), which supported merchants and business 
enterprise across the Australian colonies. It was this social network of Anglo-Australian 
banking and merchant capital that gave shape to the South Australian Company.511 
Angas was joined on the board by the bankers Raikes Currie (1801–1881) and 
Christopher Rawson (1777–1849), both of whom had forged successful careers on the English 
banking scene. Rawson, one of the elder statesmen of colonial reform, was a director of the 
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Union Bank of Australia and served as chairman of Rawson’s Bank between 1836 and 1843, 
before it was converted into the Halifax and Huddersfield Union Banking Company. 
Underscoring the importance of family connections, a thread that runs throughout the larger 
story of company colonisation, Rawson was part of a family network with strong ties to English 
banking. Equally suggestive is the fact that he cut his teeth in service to the East India 
Company, and we will see much more of this when we examine the collective biographies of 
the men involved in the Western Australian Company and also the New Zealand Company.512  
No less influential within the banking world was Raikes Currie, a partner in Curries & 
Co. and Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. Like Rawson, Currie also had family connections to the world 
of company colonisation, his maternal grandfather William Raikes an influential East India 
merchant. William’s brother, Thomas Raikes, moreover, had also served as governor of the 
Bank of England, the epitome of success in English banking circles.513 Yet, unlike Rawson, 
Currie could also cite direct experience from within the boardroom of a colonisation 
company: he had served as a director of the Van Diemen’s Land Company.  
These banking credentials dovetailed, and often overlapped, with links to the world of 
merchant capital. Prominent among the merchant interest was another duo, John Pirie 
(1781–1851) and John Rundle (1791–1864). Pirie, who we will encounter in the next chapter, 
as he was a director of both the Western Australian Company and the New Zealand Company, 
was one of London’s most successful shipbrokers and a director of the East India Company. 
He was also head of the Oriental Steamship Company and the Lord Mayor of London, further 
establishing his credentials as a pillar of the City elite.514 Yet it is arguably the absence of 
parliamentarians on the board of Angas’s Company that is most noteworthy. Even more so 
than the Western Australian Company, the South Australian Company spoke the language of 
the City of London rather than that of Westminster. Indeed, the only Member of Parliament 
among the founding board of directors was Charles Hindley (1796–1857), the radical cotton-
mill owner.515 If we compare the social profile of the 1835 Company with that of the 1832 
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iteration, which was stacked full of radical parliamentarians, then this distinction becomes 
particularly clear. Rather than flocking to the later concern, most of the parliamentarians who 
were still interested in South Australian affairs instead migrated to the Colonisation 
Commission. 
Not that the lack of parliamentary representation was always welcome. On the 
contrary, it was an aspect of the Company’s social constitution that from time to time 
provoked acute concern. “I feel that our Company does not stand so well in the estimation of 
the Government as it ought,” Angas conceded in a letter to the recently appointed governor 
of the colony John Hindmarsh. “I, as Chairman, am of no importance at the Colonial Office, 
and when you have sailed, I shall have less weight there. You know, I have no powerful 
connections at headquarters, and not being an M.P. I cannot have access to the Government 
as otherwise I might and should have.”516 Angas proposed, as an antidote, to bolster the 
presence of parliamentarians on the board, appealing to J. G. Lefevre as Robert Gouger had 
done three years prior: “With a view to remedy this evil I wrote to Mr Lefevre to express a 
hope that his brother the M.P. would join us and become the Vice President, and that a 
member of the House of Peers who might be appointed President of the Company, while I 
should still retain my office of Chairman of the Board of Directors.”517 It was not an entirely 
wild proposition, as Charles Lefevre had previously served as a director of the 1832 Company, 
but his interest in securing further parliamentary representation appears to have gone 
unfulfilled. 
It was as a commercial enterprise, then, that the South Australian Company most 
readily identified. Samuel Stephens confided as much in relaying the contents of a 
conversation he had with James Stephen to Angas in October 1835. “It seemed to me as if he 
wished the New Compy to form a new Colony elsewhere & to ask for a grant of a Million of 
Acres & settle it as the Old States of America were settled … I said our view was more 
commercial than owning land & that we designed making our Station there a Naval Arsenal, 
for building and repairing Ships, all naval stores & provisions &c &c.”518 While the Australian 
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Agricultural Company also associated themselves with commercial motives, obliquely 
referenced in Stephen’s supposed comments about the million acre land grant, it was 
markedly more pronounced in the case of the South Australian Company. As Angas was to 
later remark, the “South Australian Company though practically the mainstay of the colony 
was theoretically a mere commercial association.”519 This strong sense that the Company was 
first and foremost a commercial endeavour in part explains the deep ambivalence that many 
of the directors attached to the land company label, for they saw their objectives as far 
exceeding the narrow confines of that descriptor. Significantly, it also represented a complete 
inversion of the National Colonisation Society’s conception of itself, which stressed its role as 
chief architect and publicist of the “new” theory of colonisation. 
Quite unlike their counterparts who led the 1824/25 trio, the board of the new South 
Australian enterprise imagined the Company operating on multiple fronts: banking, whaling, 
land, and agriculture. This was avowedly not just a company with designs on buying and 
selling land, as the Canada Company for the most part was, nor was it content to deal 
exclusively in the preparation of a staple commodity for export, as the twin antipodean 
companies sought to do. On the contrary, the South Australian Company’s identity as a firm 
was built around the very diversity of its operations, what the colonial management called its 
“branch” structure.520 
It was a trait that was with the Company from the  beginning, although it also 
paradoxically led to a dramatic narrowing of purpose in the late 1830s, when it became all 
too clear to the Company’s representatives in the colony that it was spreading itself too thin. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the decision to pursue a wide-ranging 
commercial agenda before clawing back its operations was a conscious decision on the part 
of the board of directors, and it is important to do so because it underscores the broad 
ambitions of the firm as it was originally set up.      
 A broad brief was established at the first gathering of prospective directors on October 
9 1835. Assembled at 19 Bishopsgate Street Within, soon to be home to the new Company 
and just down the road from the famous London Tavern, social lubricant for so many of the 
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companies under study in this dissertation, a number of “Gentlemen interested in the 
formation of a Joint Stock Company for Agricultural and Commercial pursuits in the new 
Colony of South Australia” discussed their plans for a fresh venture in commercial 
colonisation. Importantly, the small meeting sketched out the rough contours of a plan that 
gave them ample space for latitude. “That a Joint Stock Company be formed for the purchase 
and improvement of Land in South Australia: the pursuit of the Whale Seal and other Fisheries 
in the Gulfs and Seas around the Colony and for such other Commercial and Agricultural 
objects as may be found desirable.”521 It was this last addition that came to define the 
Company’s nascent operations, endowing them with a flexibility of commercial purpose that 
gave the directors and their agents in the colony a wide berth to prosecute any number of 
commercial and agricultural objectives.      
 However, it is important to note that it was a conscious decision to bake flexibility into 
the business enterprise from the outset, perhaps a veiled admission that the information that 
the South Australian speculators had so confidently based their prior predictions of prosperity 
on was not entirely without its imperfections. In any case it seems reasonable to assume that 
the plan was designed with flexibility in mind, rather than the result of a sporadic, scattershot 
approach to developments in the colony. This dimension of the Company’s operating 
procedures was something that the public facing prospectus was not shy about 
acknowledging. “The expediency of entering upon all or which of the above means of 
employing the Capital of the Company, will in the first instance rest with the Directors, and to 
these may be added progressively, such other objects as the Directors shall consider likely to 
promote the interests of the Company.”522 There was, in other words, scope to shift focus if 
deemed necessary, room to rethink the future source of profits as circumstances changed 
and new information came to light. It was to be the self-anointed task of the board of directors 
to devise and implement any such changes.  
And yet the branch system in practice did not operate by way of commercial diktat 
from London. On the contrary, the Company’s openness to multiple branches of business 
arguably invested the manager in South Australia with considerably more power than was the 
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case in companies with more narrowly defined objectives, and the license given under the 
terms of its powers of attorney to its agents on the ground certainly compares favourably 
with, say, the New Zealand Company.523 “You on the spot can best determine the most 
advantageous mode for conducting every branch of each department of our operations,” 
noted the London office in a letter to the Company’s commercial manager in Adelaide, David 
McLaren.524          
 One of the central pillars of the Company’s business profile in its early years was 
whaling, although this ultimately proved a spectacular failure. Quite how bleak their 
prospects fared is vividly captured in the fragmentary jottings of the Company’s whaling 
station at Encounter Bay: very seldom was a whale actually seen, and one feels a strong sense 
of isolation and yearning for better times in these eerily cold despatches.525 John Ayres Mills 
has rightly noted that the data on whaling in South Australia is limited, principally because 
“whatever revenue was generated there was subsumed as revenue to whichever of New 
South Wales and Tasmania or foreign land was home to the vessel that caught the whales 
which provided the products which earned the export revenue.”526 Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the South Australian Company was a central player in the South Australian whaling trade 
in the late 1830s, quickly establishing a presence at Kangaroo Island for shore-based whaling 
and Encounter Bay for off-shore catches.527 
The Company’s manager was equally hopeful that whaling would turn a profit. In a 
letter from Cape Town, 9 March 1837, on his way out to the colony, McLaren discussed 
whaling and the American ships that he had encountered at some length, going to pains to 
stress to the board back in London that he well appreciated the “great importance of the 
Whale Fishery.” It was, he said, “likely to be the most profitable” branch of the Company’s 
operations.528 However, by November 1837, less than six months later, McLaren began to 
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entertain serious doubts about its viability. His letter of November 4 to the London office 
described the whaling and fishing operations as beset by difficulties, and his descriptor of 
choice to describe this department of business was “degraded.”529 It was an early warning 
that would only grow in prescience in the years to come.  
Whaling had been a staple of Company plans from early 1835. It was there, for 
instance, in the correspondence that Angas had with Stephens, before the South Australian 
Company was established. Moreover, it was prominently discussed in early Company 
literature and internal correspondence. The prospectus expressly stated that it was one of 
the Company’s key lines of business, for example: “The pursuit of the Whale, Seal, and other 
Fisheries, in the gulfs and seas around the Colony; and the curing and salting of such fish as 
may be suitable for that purpose.”530 Yet why the emphasis on whaling?  
Angas himself seems to have had a personal interest in whaling, and we know this 
because he collected a number of prospectuses and newspaper articles on its commercial 
potential. Among his collection, for example, was Samuel Harvey’s “Prospectus of a Black 
Whaling Establishment For South Australia,” and the “Prospectus of a Joint Stock Company, 
For the Purpose of Refining Sperm Oil, Bleaching Wax, and the Manufacture of Wax, Sperm, 
and Composition Candles, to be called the Liverpool and Manchester Sperm Oil Refining 
Company.”531 A merchant’s calculus as to future profitability seems the most reasonable 
explanation behind Angas’s interest in these companies. Whaling in the Southern Ocean, 
along with agriculture and the newly booming wool trade, supplied the most lucrative 
investment opportunities for metropolitan capitalists in the 1830s, and so testing its 
prospects was hardly a far-fetched idea for a capitalist seeking to establish a commercial 
company on the other side of the world.      
 After all, whaling had been prosecuted in Encounter Bay since 1802, well before plans 
to form permanent settlements on land began to emerge in the early 1830s. There was 
considerable interest in the region from American and British whalers in particular, and we 
need to see the South Australian Company’s attempts to establish a whaling station in South 
Australia in the context of this larger economic network of Southern whaling. This allows us 
 
529 Edward McLaren to Edmund J. Wheeler, 4 November 1837, ibid. 
530 Prospectus of the South Australian Company.  
531 Angas also possessed a prospectus of the Liverpool South Pacific Fishery Company. See PRG 174/11, South 
Australian Company 1834–1847, Angas Papers, State Library of South Australia, Adelaide.  
 178 
to better place South Australia alongside New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land, and New 
Zealand in the frame of the global whale and fisheries trade.532    
 The Company rationalised the whaling arm of its business by pointing to previous 
success in the area, and what might yet be revealed in the bays and seas of South Australia. 
Indeed, the prospectus was explicit about anchoring their ambitions to the commercial 
potential of whaling in the region (and the reports that they read thereof): “The Bays and 
Gulfs of South Australia are well known to be a favourite resort of the Black Whale, and only 
a little distance from the coast is the principal fishing-ground. From the port of Sydney alone, 
upwards of sixty sail of vessels are annually fitted out for the Black and Sperm Whale fisheries; 
and the success which has hitherto crowned their efforts, has fully equalled the expectations 
of the Colonists.”533 
But the whaling branch soon became untenable, saddled as it was with losses. 
Edmund J. Wheeler, writing from the  London office, suggested as much. In a letter of 14 
March 1839 to the Company’s commercial manager in Adelaide, David McLaren, Wheeler 
reiterated the board’s views that the whaling industry was in jeopardy. “In former despatches 
I have mentioned the Directors’ sentiments upon the Whale Fishery & those instructions 
convey ample authority for its discontinuance its profit be but problematical. In the event of 
your return to England the Board would by all means abandon it, & confine their operations 
to the Bank, the Flocks & herds, & the Lands.”534 
Strikingly, McLaren used the poor oil and bone returns of 1838 as a pretext for arguing 
in favour of a local board in the colony, an outcome that was achieved in 1842 with the 
establishment of the Board of Advice. “Were such a Board in existence now, I should submit 
to their most deliberate consideration, the propriety of continuing or relinquishing the 
Whaling trade, in all branches–I have no doubt on my mind, that the Bank–the flocks and 
herds–& the land, will afford full employment for the Company’s capital, and will each yield a 
very profitable return,–the question then is, should we continue with a trade where profit is 
quite problematical, and divest a portion of our funds from trades where success is 
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certain.”535 Earlier hopes for a flourishing whaling trade had evidently been mugged by reality 
in the fledgling colony, the ambitions of the board for whale oil being largely unmet. “In every 
vessel a supply of oil casks will be sent that you may have plenty in stock,” the London office 
had sanguinely remarked just one year earlier.536 A shortage of oil casks was certainly not a 
problem, but rather a lack of ideas about what to do with them. 
More significant still was the attention heaped on banking, ultimately the most 
successful branch of the Company’s operations. As already discussed, the most salient feature 
of the Company’s social profile was the banking and merchant interest, so it is perhaps 
unsurprising that they directed their efforts to the creation of a bank almost immediately 
upon landing in the colony, famously transporting a “framed banking-house, iron chests,” and 
everything else on the Coromandel.537 As late as January 1838, two years after the first 
Company arrivals, the commercial manager could still complain that the “Bank business is yet 
done in a tent,” though the prospect of moving into a storehouse in a few weeks’ time as 
“originally intended” no doubt quelled any sense of lingering discontent.538 
 And yet in spite of the rough and ready approach to housing the bank, the Company 
invested significant hopes in its prospects. The more McLaren saw of the banking branch the 
more he concurred with the “opinion expressed in England, that this is the department which 
of all others we ought to prosecute with energy & vigour.”539 That sense of energy and vigour 
was channelled towards a number of different functions, all of which were outlined in the 
Company’s 1839 circular that promoted the aptly named Bank of South Australia.540 At the 
most fundamental level, the bank all but ensured that the Company would play a key part in 
shaping the new colony’s political economy, effectively furnishing it with something 
approximating monopoly powers over commercial activity.  
Chief among the duties of the bank was the all-important task of accepting deposits. 
“For the benefit of the labouring Classes, the Directors have given instructions to their 
Manager in the Colony to receive the smallest Deposits; which, upon reaching £1, will be 
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allowed Interest for, at the rate of £5 per cent. per annum, after the manner of Savings 
Banks.”541 Such basic functions assumed great significance in the context of a new colony on 
the far side of the world, the ability to deposit one’s money in a savings bank transforming 
daily life for those seeking to start over in new surrounds. 
It was precisely the question of money, and of its circulation in particular, that pressed 
upon the minds of the Company’s agents in South Australia, and so we see a recurrent worry 
about the adequate provision of specie. Writing from the bank’s base at Kingscote on 
Kangaroo Island, where the first permanent banking mission was established, McLaren wrote 
repeatedly to the directors about the need for an ample supply of currency. “A supply of 
specie must be had here, and at Adelaide, to a considerable amount,” he noted in a letter of 
9 March 1837. The need for specie, which McLaren would underscore time and time again in 
his correspondence with the London office, was intricately tied to how the Company 
conceived of its role in the colony.542  
Boasting a large capital and ambitious to create a thriving agricultural and commercial 
settlement, the Company wished to encourage private enterprise in the colony, hence the 
decision by the bank to issue the so-called “Kingscote notes.”543 Allied to the provision of 
paper currency was the injection of capital in the form of loans, and the Bank rightly 
recognised that without a fiscal stimulus the smooth operation of the colonial economy would 
be held back. Commerce, quite simply, was not possible without a resident bank: “the 
pecuniary means of almost all the resident colonists, are so limited, that the Bank must furnish 
the capital, on which others trade, and supplying the Capital, as Bankers. We create 
commercial rivals of ourselves, as merchants.”544 
This ability to dispense with loanable funds to interested parties shored up the 
Company’s position in the colony, and it meant in particular that they played an outsize role 
in propping up the real economy. The historiography on colonial Australia has tended to focus 
on authority and power as wielded through political institutions, most notably along the axis 
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of the Colonial Secretary’s office and the office of the Governor. The scholarship of Alan 
Atkinson and John Hirst has been especially suggestive here.545 However, there is a need to 
complement the findings of this pathbreaking work with a more rigorous assessment of 
authority through the lens of imperial political economy.  
Returning to the South Australian context, we can see that the Bank held the account 
of the colonial government, for example, extending capital advances when so required, in 
much the same way that it furnished capital to colonists and small traders innumerable. 
Likewise, the Bank serviced the personal account of George Gawler, Governor of South 
Australia between 1838 and 1841. The prodigal Gawler posed all sorts of challenges for the 
bank, his custom calling upon diplomatic touch as much as technical expertise. Gawler’s 
current account had grown to £686-9-2 in debit, a extraordinary sum at the time.546 “Some 
delicacy is required in the management of this a/c, more than usual, in consequence of the 
position of the Col. & the Coy. We do not, however, think it right to make any allusion to this 
a/c, except it be largely overdrawn, when we hint that we are anxious to remit, & we ask for 
Bills in liquidation. We hold no security, nor have we been consulted as to whether the acct. 
might or might not be overdrawn.”547 
Just how important the Bank became is well illustrated by the role it played once it 
split from the South Australian Company. Once independent of the South Australian 
Company, the South Australian Banking Company continued to prosper, even supporting the 
corporation that spawned it. Such was the reliance of Angas’s Company on the new banking 
institution, that the manager was compelled to place a limit on its borrowing. “From the 
experience we have had of the making of your account, & from what we know of your wants 
in the Colony, for the conduct of the operations entrusted to your management, we consider 
that you should not require from us, at any one time a greater amount than ten thousand 
pounds (£10,000) & we should therefore prepare you to understand your Current Account 
fixed at that limit.”548 Such cordiality, however, concealed a more hard-edged appraisal of the 
South Australian Company’s operations. In a letter from the London office of the bank to its 
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manager in Adelaide, Edward Stephens spoke bluntly of the old Company. “Now that the two 
Companies are distinct you will come to a knowledge of the true state of things. The South 
Austr. Co will then stand on its own merits. I don’t say this to disparage that Co. in your 
estimation, but to shew you what a millstone it has been around the neck of the Bank, & how 
its sins of omission & commission have been laid to our charge.”549  
 
The Interior Life of the South Australian Company 
 
But how did the directors of the South Australian Company understand what they were 
doing? How did they describe their commercial ambitions? In the first instance the board 
invoked the land company model as an appropriate template for what they sought to achieve 
in the antipodes, and they followed in the footsteps of the Van Diemen’s Land Company and 
the South Australian Land Company in invoking the Canada Company as an especially 
promising example of the genre. By the time South Australian company colonisation finally 
got off the ground towards the end of 1835, the Canada Company had been operating for 
almost a decade, and with some success. If one compares its relative performance with the 
antipodean trading companies analysed in Part 1, it is not hard to see why the South 
Australian speculators looked to the Canadian venture rather than their Australian 
counterparts. Whereas the companies in New South Wales and Tasmania had struggled to 
settle into their operations, the Canada Company was in rude health.550 
Like the company plan that Robert Gouger submitted to the Colonial Office in June 
1835, the South Australian Company placed great weight on the Canada Company’s 
profitability, and central to this perceived profitability was its system of land sales. It was an 
example that the Company was even willing to enshrine on the prospectus. “That very 
extensive profits may, even under circumstances less favourable than these, be realised by 
the purchase of land in a new country, and the improvement and erection of buildings upon 
it, has been demonstrated by the success of the Canada Company, and is confirmed by the 
experience of every one acquainted with our Colonies.”551 
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And yet the prominent place that the South Australian Company gave to the Canada 
Company on their prospectus belies how they actually saw themselves. Indeed, the directors 
had an altogether more complicated relationship with the land company model than their 
initial posturing would seem to suggest. The land company, of which the Canadian enterprise 
was but the most successful contemporary example, had been part of the South Australian 
discussion since 1831, when a proposal was put forward that united Wakefield’s theory about 
colonial land with the company form. But the South Australian Company was not content to 
simply style itself as a transplant of the Canadian company in Southern seas. Just as Wakefield 
and his disciples touted the novelty of the so-called systematic colonisation, so the directors 
of the South Australian Company conceived of themselves as a novel type of colonisation 
company. Of this much Angas was clear: “We desired to make an experiment in that respect 
which has no precedent. I maintain that there is no precedent in the history of colonization, 
in this or in any other country, of any Society attempting the introduction of a body of tenants 
who would take farms on leases, and under such advantageous circumstances as we have let 
our farms in the present instance.”552 
In truth, there is good reason to be sceptical of Angas’s professions to novelty. As 
already discussed, the Canada Company had for some time been operating a remarkably 
similar leasing policy. Moreover, it was a commercial strategy that had aroused the attention 
of the Van Diemen’s Land Company, who advised their agent in Hobart to investigate the 
matter. As I detail below, Angas took a personal interest in the Tasmanian enterprise. Yet 
irrespective of that fact, the important point to emphasise is that Angas felt compelled to 
trump the credentials of his own firm vis-à-vis other colonial corporations. Key here was the 
rapidly evolving financial press, analysed by Mary Poovey through the lens of cultural 
history.553 Throughout the period under discussion in this dissertation the publication of 
financial and business news was growing year on year, in part a reflection of the increased 
importance of the City in the context of industrialisation. A distinct component of this news 
flow was coverage of overseas trade, and so anyone with a vested interest in colonial 
commerce would clearly have had an incentive to keep a close eye on what was being 
reported. The directors of the South Australian Company would have been able to procure 
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information on the other colonial companies operating at this time, as would anyone else 
keeping tabs on colonial markets. 
Readers of The Financial and Commercial Record, for example, which included George 
Fife Angas, would have been able to compare and contrast the share prices of any number of 
colonial enterprises, among them many with a direct stake in Britain’s settler colonies. The 
issue of 24 May 1836, for example, which we know Angas would have read as it is preserved 
in his personal archive, lists the share price of the Canada Company, the Australian 
Agricultural Company, the British American Land Company, and the South Australian 
Company.554 Likewise, a later addition, that of 6 March 1840, also collected in Angas’s archive, 
includes all of the above with the addition of the New Brunswick Land Company, the New 
Zealand Land Company, and the Van Diemen’s Land Company. Taken together, the listings 
from the financial press are testament to the overlapping commercial landscape in which 
these companies operated in.555 They may not have all shared the same aims and intentions, 
but they did share the same market.      
 Nonetheless, the South Australian Company seemed intent on distancing itself from 
the settler corporations of 1824/25. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the bubble that 
followed the boom heightened public hostilities towards joint stock investment. For tactical 
reasons then, association with the likes of the Australian Agricultural Company or the Canada 
Company was not necessarily in the Company’s best interests. Angas was well aware of the 
opprobrium that had been heaped on these companies. For example, he kept a copy of a 
broadsheet article entitled “Projects and Bubbles. Loans and Schemes for the Absorption of 
Capital in the Years 1824–1825,” which earmarked colonial companies as a discrete category 
in the wider market flare up.556 Perhaps more to the point, the crash cost him a considerable 
amount of personal wealth.557       
 Angas likewise possessed a copy of an article printed by William Wentworth’s 
Australian Patriotic Association that critiqued the labour model of the Australian Agricultural 
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Company, and which also charged it with the abuse of monopoly powers. “On the 
Transportation of Convicts,” which was published in Sydney on 31 May  1839, was on the 
surface an argument in favour of the continuation of transportation but it packed a further 
punch by decrying the distorting influence of the Australian Agricultural Company in New 
South Wales.558 These companies were tangled into a competitive commercial network that 
encouraged comparison and benchmarking, and the South Australian promoters were just as 
guilty as their antipodean and Canadian peers in negatively indexing the other settler firms in 
relation to their own enterprise.  
Angas’s note on the “Probable causes of the difficulties which have delayed the 
Establishment of the New Colony,” written around the first week of September 1835, similarly 
identifies the other colonisation companies as chief barriers to its progress. “The renewed 
attacks of the public press since the conditions of the loan were published, especially the 
“Times” has done great injury, & the openly acknowledged hostility of the existing joint Stock 
Companies in London for the growth of wool & other purposes in New South Wales, & Van 
Dieman’s Land [sic] …  form such a phalanx of opposition as cannot possibly be equally met 
by any influence & power, short of the strength of the British Government itself.”559 
The Company was hardly alone in wishing to open up space between themselves and 
those of the 1824/25 boom. In February 1835, during the formation of the South Australian 
Colonisation Commission, Robert Gouger had indicated much the same desire in a letter to 
Angas. After apprising Angas of his fellow commissioners, “Colonel Torrens–Mr George 
Palmer of the firm Palmer, Mackellop & Co.–Mr Jacob Montifiore [sic]–Mr Mills–Mr Wright, 
the banker of Henrietta Street,–and yourself,” Gouger gestured towards the imminent 
appointment of one of the Under Secretaries of State. “I incline to think Mr Stephen will be 
the one selected, because he is not liable to be removed from office by a change in the 
administration. This intention is not at all to be regretted–the addition of the name of the 
Under Secretary of State gives the matter still more the form of official business than ever, 
and being thus at once distinguished from the schemes of 1826, will not only facilitate the 
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issue of bonds, but tend to bring us emigrants of repute.”560   
 Equally suggestive is the comparison that Angas drew between the South Australian 
Company and the New Zealand Company. It is a historiographical commonplace to assess the 
two colonies side by side, and there are strong historical grounds for doing so.561 However, it 
is important that scholars stay alert to distinctions between the two antipodean settlements, 
particularly when contemporaries registered them (regardless of whether such statements 
were fanciful or not, anchored in historical fiction as much as historical fact). In an 
unpublished pamphlet of 1865 Angas reflected on his involvement in colonial affairs at some 
length, traipsing through the history of company colonisation from the perspective of one of 
its key architects.          
 “On Saving New Zealand from the French” spells out a number of intriguing 
distinctions between South Australia and New Zealand. “In South Australia,” Angas wrote, 
“the case had been different both as regarded the natives and as regarded foreign powers. 
The sovereignty of England in that quarter was universally recognised, and there was no 
complicated aboriginal claims on the soil. Moreover the Crown was there nominally 
represented by the Commissioners appointed under the Act of Parliament for founding the 
colony.” For Angas, the South Australian Company, despite its prominent place in the colony’s 
establishment, was a spur to the local political economy, not the creator of it. As he pithily 
remarked, the “South Australian Company though practically the mainstay of the colony was 
theoretically a mere commercial association.”562       
 The New Zealand endeavour had even greater pretensions. “For Wakefield and his 
friends to have formed an exactly similar company to colonise New Zealand and to ask for it 
the exercise of sovereignty in the name of Great Britain would have been a very incongruous 
impolitic step.”563 Notwithstanding the fact that the New Zealand Company’s early 
manoeuvres did amount to an incongruous and impolitic step, at least as far as the Colonial 
Office saw it, the contrast set up by Angas served to highlight aspects of the South Australian 
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venture that he believed marked it out from the Wakefieldian experiment in the islands of 
New Zealand.          
 However, like the old colonies of North America, the New Zealand Company was 
invoked in both negative and positive frames of reference, standing in for what the Company 
could aspire to as much as denoting a mode of colonisation deemed unsuitable or ill-advised. 
For example, in correspondence with J. G. Lefevre in December 1841, the year that the New 
Zealand Company finally secured its charter of incorporation after protracted negotiations, 
offers and withdrawals, Angas bemoaned the better treatment supposedly meted out to the 
New Zealand promoters. “You were present when Lord Glenelg expressed his consent to give 
me a Charter for the South Aus Compy when I should require one. And now have we not fairly 
earned one? The New Zealand Company has got a Charter! What has that Compy done to 
what ours has done towards Colonization?”564 As we will now see, the act of securing a charter 
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From Australind to the Islands of New Zealand  
 
Western Australia and New Zealand may at first glance appear to have little in common, and 
yet both were settings for company colonisation in the late 1830s and early 1840s. This 
chapter explores that curious connection. Western Australia has always been something of 
an outlier in Australian historiography, and no more so than during the colonial period.565 As 
the first free colony in Australia, the Swan River Colony was established in 1829 in what is 
now Perth, although it quickly languished.566 In a dramatic about turn the Colony of Western 
Australia (as it styled itself from 1832) began convict transportation in 1850, ten years after 
the practice had been stopped in New South Wales and just three years before it ended in 
Van Diemen’s Land.567 Yet if the regional inflections of Western Australian colonial history call 
for a sensitivity to local dynamics, there are also clear parallels to be drawn with both South 
Australia and New Zealand. As I show, the Western Australian Company was set up by a small 
band of capitalists with links to the other arms of colonial reform. Moreover, the attempt to 
plant an ill-fated colony called Australind mirrored the designs of the other Wakefieldian 
settlements in Australasia. Although unsuccessful, its short history sheds much light on settler 
colonial expansion during this pronounced uptick in imperial speculation. 
In New Zealand, at precisely the same time, another London-based enterprise was 
settling into the business of colonisation, with the New Zealand Company going on to play a 
leading role in the creation of no less than six settlements: Port Nicholson (1840), Wanganui 
(1840), New Plymouth (1841), Nelson (1841), Otago (1848), and Canterbury (1850). While the 
Wakefield-inspired New Zealand Company has long been analysed by historians of the British 
Empire, very little has been written about the Western Australian Company’s Australind 
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colony on the banks of the Leschenault Peninsula.568 And yet, as the historical geographer and 
historian of Western Australian land settlement J. M. R. Cameron has recently remarked, the 
“Australind settlement was one in a string of similar settlements beginning with South 
Australia in 1836 and culminating with the occupation of the Canterbury Plains (New Zealand) 
in 1850 which were influenced directly or indirectly by Edward Gibbon Wakefield and his 
theorising about systematic colonisation.”569  
Taking this observation as my starting point, the chapter offers the first comparative 
analysis of the Western Australian Company and the New Zealand Company. In doing so, it 
shows how Western Australia was central to colonial reform, an analytical unit that is 
commonly understood to refer exclusively to South Australia and New Zealand.570 I begin by 
piecing together the different threads of this shared history, which were intellectual as much 
as personal. This entails an analysis of the New Zealand Association, forerunner to the later 
joint stock company. A comparison of how the projections dealt with race and indigenous 
peoples follows. Whereas the New Zealand Association broke with South Australian practice 
by foregrounding the Māori in its colonial plans, the Western Australian Company never 
prioritised native peoples to the same extent. I conclude the opening section by showing how 
the joint stock form decisively entered the New Zealand conversation in 1837, before drawing 
some final parallels between the two entities. 
The chapter then moves to a discussion of the social profile of the two businesses. 
Interlocking boardrooms bear out the social connections between the Australind and New 
Zealand ventures, as do the numerous links to the City of London’s wider merchant 
community. The mobility of directors is infrequently commented upon in historical 
treatments of the colonial reform movement, and yet the flow of people and ideas between 
boardrooms shows how company colonisation cannot be studied in isolation from the 
broader institutional ecology of the City. This is amply expressed in the personal crossings 
between antipodean company colonisation and that of its more famous peer, the East India 
Company. To the extent that the directors of the Western Australian Company and the New 
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Zealand Company were networked into London’s merchant community, both looked to 
Leadenhall Street for personnel and practical advice.  
The chapter closes with reflections on what I call brokers of knowledge, the shared 
network of solicitors, bankers, and trusted advisors that made company colonisation possible. 
While company crossings at the level of the boardroom are clearly important, so too were the 
connections that united these companies to the professional services ecosystem of the City 
of London. Drawing on insights into the work done by their shared solicitor, Robert Few, and 
also the advocacy of counsel, Charles Buller, the analysis foregrounds the commercial circuitry 
that tied everything together. If the Western Australian Company and the New Zealand 
Company were united by an origin story and the presence of arch colonial reformers such as 
William Hutt and Edward Gibbon Wakefield, they also drew sustenance from the same set of 
knowledge brokers. Often overlooked, these commercial agents were nonetheless crucial to 
company colonisation. The analysis deepens our understanding of how colonial reform in 
London worked on a day-to-day basis.  
 
A Comparison of Two Companies 
 
Company Colonisation in Western Australia and New Zealand emerged in the mid-to-late 
1830s, off the back of plans to systematically colonise South Australia. Scholars have noted 
the overlaps between South Australia and New Zealand often enough, but the place of 
Western Australia in analyses of colonial reform is infrequently registered. However, the 
social constitution and guiding principles of the Western Australian Company parallel that of 
the New Zealand Company to such a degree that its omission from historical accounts distorts 
our understanding of Wakefieldian colonisation. As Angela Woollacott reminds us, 
Wakefield’s involvement in the expansion of Britain’s settler empire “has often been studied 
discretely,” with historians of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand tending to examine colonial 
reform in relation to their respective national historiographies. “Looking across colonial 
boundaries,” however, “helps us to see broader patterns in Wakefield’s visions, and points to 
their significance.”571 As I show, an appreciation of these companies in comparative context 
helps to better clarify key aspects of the relationship between colonial reform and company 
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colonisation, in particular the importance of shared social and capital networks centred on 
the City of London.         
 Turning to the physical space occupied by the promoters of a company settlement in 
Western Australia, we find immediate connections with both the South Australian and New 
Zealand branches of colonial reform. At a meeting on Wednesday April 10, 1838, a number of 
individuals involved in antipodean colonisation met in the rooms of the New Zealand 
Association, on the fringes of Covent Garden, to discuss Western Australian affairs. With 
William Hutt in the chair, a director and future chairman of the New Zealand Company, as 
well as a member of the South Australian Colonisation Commission, it was clear that links 
between the various bodies descended from the top down. Assisting Hutt as acting secretary 
was James Irving, whose hand is familiar to all historians of the New Zealand Company for he 
also acted in that capacity for the New Zealand enterprise.  
After exchanging pleasantries and listening to a brief overview by Hutt, the 
congregation unanimously agreed to a resolution that stated their intention to submit to 
government a formal plan to found a colony in the region: “That the gentlemen whose names 
follow, be requested to act as a Committee (with power to add to their number) for the 
purpose of framing and submitting to the Government, a plan for developing the natural 
resources of Western Australia, by means of rendering that Colony as attractive as possible 
to British Settlers, of providing funds for the emigration of laborers, and of enabling Capitalists 
to make purchases of Land in this Country without becoming Settlers in the Colony.”572 That 
November, after protracted negotiations with the Colonial Office, the “Committee discussed 
the propriety of forming a Land & Emigration Company, and a plan was suggested by the 
Honorary Secretary as the basis upon which it might be founded; it was Resolved, that the 
attempt should be made.”573 As we will see, it was a plan that echoed that pursued by the 
New Zealand Company, from whom they also derived many of their personnel.  
 Although the Western Australian Committee’s plans were slow to evolve over the 
course of 1838 and 1839, a reconstituted company built on the foundations paved by the 
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committee during the preceding two years.574 Much as the New Zealand Company 
incorporated many of the core ideas and people involved with the New Zealand Association 
(analysed below), so the Western Australian Company applied the insights gleaned from the 
committee room in establishing the new joint stock colonisation company.575 Thus, on 11 May 
1840, after several false starts and aborted attempts, Western Australian company 
colonisation began in earnest, with the inaugural board room meeting that outlined first 
principles and company ambitions.  
Convened in rooms rented from the South Australian Colonisation Commission, an 
arrangement that they would maintain throughout the Company’s existence, the clique of 
capitalists and land speculators who assembled that mid-May afternoon revived the idea of 
private colonial enterprise that had first been suggested as far back as 1828 when James 
Sterling and Thomas Moody sent a request to the Colonial Office to form a chartered 
association “similar to those formerly adopted in the settlement of Pennsylvania and 
Georgia.”576 Its first resolution, the opening salvo in what would prove to be a fraught 
commercial experiment, was simple and to the point: “That a Company shall be formed for 
the purpose of purchasing Lands in Western Australia; for the resale of the same; for the 
General Improvement thereof as the Directors of the Company for the time being shall deem 
desirable or expedient; and for aiding Emigration thereto: and that this Company shall be 
called the Western Australian Company.”577 It was also a template that informed the New 
Zealand Company, who in turn had drawn on the set of colonial principles first applied in 
South Australia.         
 Plans to implement the principles of systematic colonization in New Zealand began to 
take root in 1836. Following a rift with Robert Gouger and the South Australian Colonisation 
Commission in 1835, Wakefield began to publicly extol the virtues of New Zealand. In 
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evidence before the 1836 Select Committee on the Disposal of Lands in the British Colonies, 
for instance, Wakefield spoke glowingly of New Zealand’s potential as a British colony. New 
Zealand, Wakefield argued, was not only a good site for British settlement—it was the best 
site: “Very near to Australia there is a country, which all testimony concurs in describing as 
the fittest in the world for colonization; as the most beautiful country, with the finest climate, 
and the most productive soil; I mean New Zealand.”578 Wakefield’s praise for these otherwise 
obscure South Pacific islands attracted the attention of Francis Baring, a member of the select 
committee and scion of the famous Baring banking dynasty. So struck was Baring by 
Wakefield’s testimony, he arranged for further conversation on the topic. The ensuing 
dialogue proved successful and plans for the systematic colonisation of New Zealand quickly 
emerged under the auspices of the London-based New Zealand Association.579 
On May 22, 1837, at its first meeting, the Association agreed to publish a small 
pamphlet to inaugurate proceedings, entitled A Statement of the Objects of the New Zealand 
Association.580 In the pamphlet, which was written by Wakefield, the Association rehearsed 
the now familiar tenets of colonial reform: land would be sold at a minimum price of 12s. per 
acre, with the proceeds of said land sales channelled into an Emigration Fund to convey 
labourers to the new colony.581 South Australia was explicitly referred to in the pamphlet.582 
This system, the New Zealand Association maintained, was ripe for replication. However, a 
key distinction marked the New Zealand Association’s plans out from those pursued by its 
counterpart in South Australia: namely the discursive space now reserved for the Indigenous 
inhabitants of New Zealand, the Māori.  
Whereas the systematic colonizers in the South Australian setting had initially ignored 
the local population altogether, the New Zealand Association’s plan from the beginning 
emphasised the benefits that systematic colonisation would confer on both the European 
arrivals and the Polynesian people who were already there. “With a view to the same end,” 
Wakefield wrote with one eye on South Australia, “it is proposed to adopt the same means in 
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the present instance, with this difference only–that out of the fund received as the purchase-
money of land, it would be necessary to deduct the amount paid for land to the native tribes. 
This deduction, however, from the Emigration Fund, would probably be compensated by the 
facility of obtaining native labour for hire.”583     
 Māori labour may not have turned out to be important to the New Zealand Association 
(and what became the New Zealand Company), but a depiction of the native inhabitants as 
capable of improvement through social intercourse with British settlers certainly was. While 
the legal fiction that Australia was unoccupied guided policy in Britain’s island-continent 
across the Tasman Sea, the Association recognized that they would need to treat with the 
Māori for title in land, as they had “so far advanced beyond the savage state as to recognise 
property in land.”584 There was nothing especially notable about the adjudication. As Stuart 
Banner observes, the agricultural capacity of the Māori had been favourably commented 
upon since Banks and Cook first weighed in on the customs of Pacific peoples.585  
Waste land, therefore, could not simply be claimed: it had to be bought from its prior 
occupants.586 The shift in approach in New Zealand in this sense entailed a more serious 
consideration of indigenous people, if only to appease the Colonial Office and missionary 
lobby. “No plan of colonization ought to be encouraged, or even tolerated,” Wakefield now 
wrote, “that does not begin with the principle of upholding the rights and improving the 
condition of the aborigines.”587 This “inalienable right” to their tribal lands could only be 
extinguished through sale at a fair and just price. Of course, what exactly this just price was 
remained unclear (and controversial).588 In justifying the change, Wakefield exemplified the 
blending of stadial theory with an assumption of European racial superiority that was a 
distinctive feature of late Enlightenment thought in Scotland.589 Yet for Wakefield, it was the 
Māori’s capacity for civilisation rather than their race that predominated. According to him 
the Māori possessed “a natural capacity for civilization” and “may be brought to adopt the 
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language, usages, laws, religion, and social ties of a superior race.”590  
 Despite the significant modifications of systematic colonisation evident in the 
Statement, Wakefield’s subsequent writings on New Zealand manifested an even bolder 
engagement with indigenous society. Wakefield worked on his British Colonization of New 
Zealand with the secretary of the Association John Ward, while he simultaneously published 
the first instalments of his four-volume edition of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.591 Here 
was an account of the Pacific that began to resemble much more closely the Enlightenment 
prototype that he had initially truncated in the context of writing about New South Wales and 
South Australia. Gone was the earlier omission of the extra-European world, and in its place 
a colonial schema that prioritised the “improvement” of Māori through integration into 
settler society. 
Wakefield and Ward now put forward a colonial plan for New Zealand that prioritised 
assimilation between the two races. The Māori, they argued, were presently in a “state of 
transition from savage to civilized life,” and their stadial assent would be encouraged by close 
contact with British settlers.592 They proposed a system of native reserves, whereby a 
proportion of all land purchased from chiefs would be set aside for Māori (the New Zealand 
Company would settle upon a quota of one-tenth).593 “The model of racial amalgamation,” 
Damon Salesa writes, “would be etched on the landscape, speeding the process of civilization 
and amalgamation, providing everyday opportunities for social and sexual intercourse.”594 It 
was this policy of racial crossings that distinguished the New Zealand Association’s scheme 
among the other plans embarked on under the imprimatur of colonial reform.  
It is worth widening our frame of reference to consider racial discourse and practices 
of racialised politics across the British imperial world in the 1830s, not least because in the 
years after the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 a Select Committee convened to report on the 
impact wrought by empire on indigenous peoples in settings as diverse as Newfoundland, 
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New South Wales and the South Sea islands.595 The immediate impetus for the Select 
Committee lay in frontier violence in the eastern reaches of the Cape Colony, in which war 
between settlers and the Xhosas erupted in late 1834 after European encroachment upon 
tribal lands. Disturbed by the willingness of the governor to kowtow to settler interests, which 
in effect legitimated colonial expansion into Xhosa territory, the missionary societies on the 
spot appealed to metropolitan interest groups to reassess British policy vis-à-vis indigenous 
peoples more generally.596  
 The Select Committee, the final report, and its implications for British imperialism 
have been extensively studied.597 Tabled in June 1837 after two years of hearings the final 
Report was unsparing in its criticism of the treatment of native inhabitants at the hands of 
British settlers.598 Yet, as scholars have been careful to point out, the Report did not amount 
to a rejection of empire.599 The brand of enlightened humanitarianism espoused by Buxton 
and his milieu was rather an attempt to mollify the worst excesses of British imperialism. Alan 
Lester and Fae Dussart have aptly described the intellectual and political project of the Select 
Committee as a form of “humanitarian colonization” insofar as it aimed to curb colonization 
through conciliation with Christian characteristics.600 
In relation to the Australian colonies, the creation of the Aboriginal Protectorate in 
the Port Phillip District (New South Wales) marked the transition to a more interventionist 
genre of protection politics, in which Aboriginal peoples would be cared for by missionaries. 
Established in 1839, the Port Philip Protectorate was in fact anticipated by the institution of a 
similar office in South Australia (1836) and, later, replicated in Western Australia (1839). A 
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Protectorate of Aborigines in New Zealand was formed in 1840, with George Clark Jnr 
appointed the first Chief Protector.601 The New Zealand promoters well understood that the 
Christian humanitarian lobby needed to be appeased, and so they forged their own blend of 
protection talk: the most obvious illustration of which can be seen in the incorporation of 
evidence that was given before the Select Committee on Aborigines.  
Having fielded heavy criticism after the publication of the Statement, the updated text 
was now packed with fulsome praise for the missionaries resident in New Zealand.602 It was 
the “distinguished” and “honoured” work of the missionaries, Wakefield and Ward wrote in 
the afterglow of the Select Committee on Aborigines, that explained the evident progress of 
the Māori in the attainment of civilization.603 They drove home the point with a “beautiful 
essay” on the native inhabitants specially commissioned for the book, which was written by 
the Reverend Montague Hawtrey.604 Ever mindful of optics, Wakefield even attended 
Islington Church with two Māori men: a powerful symbol of how he used the physical mobility 
of indigenous others to underscore the virtues of so-called civilized colonization. As Philip 
Temple notes, Wakefield’s display of cross-cultural piety was tantamount to “stalking the lion 
in its own den.”605  
In making the emendations to the text, Wakefield and Ward drew heavily on the 
testimony of Dandeson Coates, Secretary to the Church Missionary Society, and the 
Reverends’ John Beecham and William Ellis.606 Political pragmatism was no doubt behind the 
decision to quote the testimony of figures such as Coates, one of the Association’s staunchest 
opponents. The incorporation of material from the two Select Committee Reports on 
Aborigines gave a much-needed humanitarian gloss to their plans for New Zealand. At the 
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very least, the Association hoped it would put a stop to the charge that they were not 
interested in protecting Māori. 
There is good reason to doubt the strength of conviction that lay behind the New 
Zealand Association’s arguments about the improvement of the Māori, not least because 
Wakefield himself disowned his earlier comments when called upon to testify in front of a 
Select Committee on New Zealand in 1840. As Wakefield observed at the time, the notion 
that the Māori possessed a bare sovereignty in tribal territory was a ruse that should no longer 
be maintained:  
 
… as far as I understand the capacity of these people, they do not know what 
sovereignty means, either small or great. The extent of the sovereignty has 
nothing to do with the question; it is the thing itself; they do not know what it 
means.607 
 
The Western Australian Company likewise adopted a policy of indigenous protection, yet the 
outlines of the Company’s racial policy differed from that adopted in the New Zealand case in 
two significant respects. Angela Woollacott has written insightfully about how the racial 
dimension of the Western Australian Company’s plans “belie assumptions that the white-
settler colonies … were seen as categorically different from the mercantile colonies in India, 
at least in the early to mid-nineteenth century.”608 Citing the employment of Aboriginal 
Australians by settlers in Australind, as well as the presence nearby of Indian labourers, 
Woollacott has issued an important challenge to Wakefield scholars about the racial crossings 
that underpinned systematic colonisation. That said, we need to be careful not to read too 
much into the Western Australian Company’s pronouncements on race as it was always 
peripheral to white emigration.        
 The directors of the Western Australian Company were certainly curious about the 
indigenous Noongar people whose land formed the basis of their colonial settlement. They 
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purchased 150 copies of George Grey’s Vocabulary of the Languages of Australia, for 
example, while they were under no illusions that there had long been prior occupants. As in 
South Australia and New Zealand, assessments of the local population were invariably 
attuned to patterns of cultivation (or lack thereof). Grey was once again the Company’s guide, 
but this time it was his 1839 account of a journey between Gantheaume Bay and the 
Arrowsmith River that supplied the on the spot evidence: “nothing in Australia had given me 
such an idea of the antiquity of the aboriginal inhabitants as this large tract of ground, fuller 
of holes than a sugar plantation, all of which had been dug by the natives to extract their 
favourite yams.”609 They also liaised with the Aborigines Protection Society, another mirror 
to the New Zealand Company, while one of the Company’s directors, Henry S. Chapman, 
penned a promotional tract that devoted a chapter to the indigenous people of the region 
that likewise mimicked its counterpart in the New Zealand Association’s earlier British 
Colonization of New Zealand.610  
And yet there is little to suggest that the Company took these pronouncements all that 
seriously. Whereas the New Zealand promoters recognised that the Māori would need to be 
central to their proposals, principally to win over a Colonial Office sceptical of British 
intervention, the Western Australian Company faced no such dilemma. When read in the 
context of the Company’s papers and commercial concerns, the protection talk adopted by 
the Western Australian directors appears to be a diluted version of that espoused by the New 
Zealand venture. They may have dealt with the Aborigines Protection Society, but they never 
envisaged a program of racial amalgamation. Moreover, the vague promises given to the 
Colonial Office about indigenous rights in land did not amount to a policy of native reserves, 
as was the case in New Zealand, far less an explicit commitment to uphold a principle of native 
title.611 Rather, the Company’s infrequent utterances on Aboriginal Australians are more 
plausibly regarded as tacit concessions to the new spirit of indigenous protection that 
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developed in the late 1830s. The Company from time to time cast themselves as benevolent 
colonisers, yet beyond that the Company was always more concerned with itself. The 
disproportionate attention that it devoted to land grants and the politics of European 
settlement attest to that fact.  
In any case, an insight into how contemporaries viewed the matter in relation to the 
the Western Australian Company is well captured by an account of the Company’s settlement 
that was published in 1842, entitled Western Australia, Containing a Statement of the 
Condition and Prospects of that Colony, and Some Account of the Western Australian 
Company’s Settlement of Australind.612 “Compiled for the Use of Settlers,” the tract, written 
by Alfred Gill, follows the template of other company statements issued around the same 
time, although it is noticeably more clipped than the equivalents published by the South 
Australian and New Zealand promoters. 
“They are a wandering race,” Gill wrote, “living in the woods without houses or fixed 
habitations of any kind, and devoid of all places of strength for refuge or defence, roving from 
place to place as caprice or the hope of prey may incite them. Being still in the hunter state, 
they require large tracts of territory for their support.”613 On one occasion even citing the 
authority of William Robertson, whose History of America (1777) is surely the classic in the 
stadial history canon of the colonial world, Gill also remarked that Aboriginal Australians did 
not cultivate the land, a point that contrasts unfavourably with near contemporary European 
depictions of Māori. “They are devoid of even those simple arts and appliances which have 
been found elsewhere among the rudest savages … No attempt at cultivating the soil seems 
ever to have been undertaken by them, and on one account this might have been expected, 
for not a single root or fruit has been discovered, which promises to reward the exertion even 
of European culture.”614         
 An additional aspect of the Western Australian Company’s plans makes it stand out 
from the South Australian and New Zealand branches of colonial reform, namely the Indian 
orientation of the Company’s early vision. That the Company looked to India is reflected in 
the portmanteau of Australia and India in the choice of name for the settlement: Australind. 
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Recent work by Angela Woollacott has deepened our understanding of this aspect of the 
Company’s plans.615 India had of course loomed large in early European interaction with what 
Ernest Scott once called the “Western lobe” of the continent, and strikingly it was the joint 
stock trading company that precipitated these early encounters with both the Dutch East 
India Company and the English East India Company active in the region.616  Pamela Statham-
Drew has likewise demonstrated that the first governor of the Swan River Colony, James 
Stirling, had strong personal links to India, while a newer strain of historical writing has 
persuasively connected Western Australia to the maritime world of the Indian ocean.617  
These threads uniting Australia and India were similarly in evidence in the 1830s. As 
Woollacott observes, in 1837 a “group of investors in Calcutta met to establish a joint-stock 
company called the Australian Association, to develop trade between India and the Australian 
colonies.”618 This of course was exactly what the Western Australian Company wished to do. 
It appointed agents in India to sell land orders, circulated its prospectus and various 
publications there, and sought to import valuable specie into Western Australia from the 
region. While all this was done on a small-scale, the Indian connection to the Australind 
enterprise should remind us that the webs of imperial commerce often connected regions of 
Britain’s sprawling empire that are frequently analysed apart.619 As I show in the second half 
of the Chapter, the links between the Western Australian Company and the New Zealand 
Company, on the one hand, and the East India Company, on the other, show that company 
colonisation in the antipodes was in constant dialogue with the pioneer of the genre. 
 
Systematic Colonisation and Joint Stock Capital 
 
While recent scholarship has greatly enriched our understanding of the New Zealand 
Association and the New Zealand Company’s views on indigenous proprietary rights, less 
remarked on is the contested evolution of how company colonisation might proceed. Yet, a 
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close reading of the archival traces on New Zealand at the time shows how various iterations 
of corporate colonial governance were worked through and proposed. Shaunnagh Dorsett 
has observed that the Association’s 1838 Bill for the Provisional Government of New Zealand 
“set forth a local governance structure and jurisdictional arrangements reminiscent of the 
factories or Presidencies of the East India Company,” for example, while the Association’s 
earlier pronouncements on colonisation all gave credence to chartered enterprise.620 
Although contemporaries would point out the flaws in the Association’s appeal to corporate 
precedent, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the colonial reformers saw in the 
corporate form a mode of colonisation that could be harnessed towards public ends.621 
 This proclivity towards the corporation is well-captured in The British Colonization of 
New Zealand, which situated the New Zealand Association’s schemes in the long history of 
corporate colonisation. Historians have tended to focus on the arresting second chapter, 
“Civilization of the New Zealanders,” which catalogues the supposed benefits that systematic 
colonisation would confer on Māori, but significantly less scrutinised are chapters five and six 
which work through the fundamentals of how colonisation would in fact proceed.622 The 
“Mode of Colonizing British Territory” and “Government of the Settlements,” respectively, 
outline a vision of corporate colonial governance that is often lost in accounts of early colonial 
New Zealand.  
Taking inspiration from America and the East India Company, which in the opinion of 
the antipodean promoters established principles worthy of emulation in the islands of New 
Zealand, the New Zealand Association outlined an intention to organise themselves into a 
corporation. Any notion that this was to be a joint stock company, however, was quickly 
jettisoned, though this would ultimately scupper the Association’s plans when pressed for 
clarification by the Colonial Office. “The work, then, of forming and regulating the settlements 
would be confided, without regard to any private interest, to a few persons of station and 
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character, selected from amongst the originators and most zealous patrons of the 
undertaking.” The self-styled “Founders of Settlements in New Zealand,” would, it was 
asserted, derive their colonising mandate from an Act of Parliament once approval from the 
Crown had been forthcoming, with any vacancies to be filled by representatives chosen by 
that authority. What is more, the powers entrusted in the Founders would be extensive: 
 
They would form a corporation, and would be authorized to make treaties with 
the native tribes for cessions of territory and all other purposes; to administer 
upon lands ceded to the Crown, the whole system of colonization, including the 
receipt and expenditure of the colonial funds; to establish courts in the 
settlements for the administration of British law … to provide for the defence and 
good order of the settlements by means of a militia, a colonial force of regulars, 
and a colonial marine; to delegate portions of their authority to bodies or 
individuals resident in the settlements; and to appoint and remove at pleasure all 
such officers as they may require for carrying the whole measure into effect.623 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the Colonial Office reacted with alarm at the Association’s 
proposal. As was the case with the draft charter submitted by the South Australian Land 
Company in 1832, or the South Australian Association’s similarly ambitious colonial agenda in 
1834, the New Zealand Association’s plan was dismissed as impractical. This was so even 
before the publication of The British Colonization of New Zealand. Having outlined their plans 
in writing, the Association began to pitch their plans to the government directly, thereby 
bypassing the Colonial Office. They translated their Statement of Objectives into a draft 
parliamentary bill, which was accordingly passed to Lord Melbourne, then Prime Minister, 
with Lord Howick, a minister sympathetic to systematic colonisation, also involved in 
preliminary discussions.624         
 However, it was folly to think that Melbourne, or indeed Howick, would be able to 
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endorse the bill without first consulting the Colonial Office. Melbourne duly pressed Lord 
Glenelg to supply his views on the New Zealand bill, which the congenitally dithering Glenelg 
in turn passed to Stephen for comment.625 Stephen’s initial thoughts on the bill, which are 
captured in a minute that he recorded for Lord Glenelg on June 16 1837, were devastating in 
their brevity. Aware that Glenelg would likely need to favour Melbourne with a quick 
response, hardly one of his strengths, Stephen crystallised his objections to the bill in a pithy 
formulation that left no doubt as to where he stood with respect to the New Zealand 
Association: “two conclusive objections to the scheme as it now stands. 1st It proposes the 
acquisition of a sovereignty in New Zealand which wld. Infallibly issue in the conquest and 
extermination of the present inhabitants. 2nd. These suggestions are so vague and so obscure 
as to defy all interpretation.”626       
 Stephen’s position on the draft bill can be seen in much more detail in his private 
correspondence with Howick. Bluntly stated, Stephen regarded the New Zealand plan as a 
“repetition of the South Australian experiment,” and not in the way that the Association had 
originally intended. Far from endorsing their scheme for the systematic colonisation of New 
Zealand, Stephen used South Australia to argue against the foundation of another 
Wakefieldian settlement. Like the history of chartered enterprise in Britain’s American 
colonies, then, South Australia could be cited in support of contradictory positions. Strikingly, 
Stephen drew on North American history to do just that, invoking the very precedent that the 
colonial reformers had so liberally hitched their plans to: “I suppose this is the first occasion 
on which it was ever proposed to authorise a body of private members to determine, by 
purchases to be hereafter made by them, what should be the limits of the British Empire. 
When Penn made his purchase from the Indians, he bought property for himself, & not 
sovereignty from the Crown.”627 What is more, Stephen recognised that there was a 
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fundamental problem with how risk would be apportioned. “In former times,” Stephen 
observed, “when persons proceeding to found new Colonies received charters either as 
Corporate Bodies, or as Proprietors, the scheme was conducted at the risk of their capital. 
This project is to be carried on at the risk of the public revenue.”628 Familiar with the history 
of private colonial enterprise, Stephen well knew that joint stock investment would at least 
ensure that government would not have to bear the brunt of financing the expedition. Risk, 
as well as reward, would need to fall under the New Zealand Association’s ambit.  
An additional concern coloured Stephen’s reflection on the draft bill, namely the 
impact that it would have on New Zealand’s indigenous inhabitants. In keeping with the 
findings of the recently published Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines, Stephen 
tendered a strong claim against British intervention.629 He argued that colonisation was 
possessed of an inherent logic to exterminate indigenous peoples, and that every means 
should be adopted to avoid it. If anyone doubted the validity of such a claim, Stephen 
reasoned, they need only consult British imperial history to get hold of adequate 
documentation to disprove them of the notion. It was a position that anticipated the 
essentials of Patrick Wolfe’s much later elimination of the native thesis:    
 
The settlement of a British Colony in New Zealand, and the extermination of the 
existing population, are events which cannot be shown to follow each other. The 
contact between civilized & uncivilized men in every other part of the globe has 
hitherto produced this effect ... It is needless to trace the links in this chain of 
sequences, but every one who has attended to the subject will perceive that this 
evil is inherent, and not accidental.630  
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In any event, the dissolution of Parliament rendered the Colonial Office’s objections a moot 
point until the final months of 1837, often portrayed as among the most important for British 
policy in relation to New Zealand. This is so because it was in late 1837 that Whitehall 
belatedly recognised the need to assert its authority over New Zealand. While the precise 
manner in which imperial power would be projected over the islands remained unclear, there 
was nevertheless some consensus that something had to be done.631  
Here, I wish to identify a no less consequential development: the embrace of joint 
stock colonisation that solidified itself in debates between the New Zealand Association and 
the Colonial Office. Strikingly, it was the Colonial Office, and not the Association, that first 
suggested the joint stock form. Lord Glenelg conveyed his preference for this option when he 
commented upon the Association’s revised proposal in November 1837. “The Company 
would be required,” he remarked, “before entering upon the transaction of Business, to 
provide themselves with a certain subscribed Capital, of which some definite Portion should 
be paid up before any Authority is exercised by virtue of the Charter.”632 The Association 
would have nothing to do with it, rather preferring to see themselves as acting entirely in the 
public interest. Indeed, they explicitly ruled out the notion that they should constitute 
themselves as a corporation “founded on a private pecuniary Interest in the Individuals 
composing the Body Corporate.”633 If there was any doubt about the Association’s 
commitment to upholding what they saw as a crucial distinction between public and private 
objectives, the refusal of a charter on the grounds that joint stock capital collapsed the 
necessary space between them put paid to it.634 The Colonial Office need not have been so 
worried: the Association’s revived attempt at passing a parliamentary bill in 1838 was 
dispensed with in the House of Commons 92 votes to 32.635 Part of the problem was the 
tactical decision to push ahead without government support. As Mark Hickford notes, an 
“incorporative or facilitative political process that had commenced in June 1837 had 
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failed.”636 Yet it is also the case that dialogue between the two parties buckled because of a 
reluctance by the Association to recognise the necessity of joint stock colonisation. The New 
Zealand promoters would not make the same mistake twice.  
While the New Zealand Association collapsed after the heavy defeat in the Commons, 
the speed with which successive New Zealand colonisation companies were formed over the 
next two years shows how the joint stock principle now held sway. In August 1838, a New 
Zealand Colonization Association was formed that updated the Association’s proposals to fit 
the mould of a joint stock company. This was followed by a panoply of other companies: The 
New Zealand Society of Christian Civilization led by Robert Torrens; the Scots New Zealand 
Land Company led by Patrick Matthew; and the New Zealand Land Company, which ultimately 
became the New Zealand Company in late 1839. Perhaps anticipating the difficulty that future 
historians would have in piecing together the chronology of all these different schemes, 
James Stephen rather wistfully suggested to George Lyall of The New Zealand Society of 
Christian Civilization that, pending a more settled notion of how the British government 
intended to treat the islands, might not the “various projectors of plans of that nature … meet 
together to ascertain the practicability of their all cooperating in some one scheme.”637 
Whether hopeful or not, the key point to underline is that the late 1830s were a period of 
active reflection about company colonisation in New Zealand, some of it sophisticated and 
almost all of it self-interested.638 It was in the context of these 1837 debates between the 
New Zealand Association and the Colonial Office that the balance of favour was decisively 
tilted towards joint stock colonisation. As the next several years were to show, this had 
profound consequences for the trajectory of settlement in the islands.   
 However, it is important to note that plans for a company settlement in New Zealand 
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had origins in the eighteenth century. Long before Wakefield and the colonial reformers 
averted their gaze from South Australia to the New Zealand archipelago, a number of 
projections had been tabled that proclaimed the merits of the company model. Merchants in 
London and New South Wales in particular were curious about the economic potential of New 
Zealand, most especially for its whaling and flax. Given the commercial appeal of what was 
then a burgeoning market for European trade, it is hardly surprising that company plans were 
hatched in London that envisaged the profitable exploitation of natural resources in the South 
Pacific. Indeed, ever since the remarkable 1771 proposal by Benjamin Franklin and Alexander 
Dalrymple, the Scottish geographer and first Hydrographer of the British Admiralty, a steady 
stream of company plans had found their way to the Colonial Office.639 Like Dalrymple and 
Franklin’s Plan for Benefiting Distant Unprovided Countries, the initial spate of company 
projections emphasised trade over emigration, many of them explicitly advocating a factory 
model à la the East India Company.640       
 A notable surge of capitalist interest in New Zealand occurred in the 1820s, at the very 
moment that antipodean company colonisation was gathering momentum among 
speculators interested in the agricultural value of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land. 
Simeon Lord’s repeated attempts to establish a trading company in the islands bears ample 
testimony to the sort of interest in New Zealand that emanated from some quarters of 
London’s merchant community in the early nineteenth century. After an initial endeavour was 
aborted because of the 1810 Boyd Massacre, in which seventy Europeans were killed and 
eaten by Māori in Northern New Zealand, Lord tried to revive his fortunes by establishing the 
“New South Wales New Zealand Company,” a business intended to “establish such 
settlements and factories at New Zealand as might be thought advisable, or likely to answer 
the intended purpose of procuring and preparing the New Zealand hemp and flax plants 
suitable for this, or any other markets.”641 Although Lord and his associates were unable to 
raise the necessary capital, a recurring problem among the early wave of company 
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1908), 323–327. 
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speculations in New Zealand, it was a model that would in large part revive itself over the 
following decades.          
A still more significant attempt at company colonisation was prosecuted by the 1825 
New Zealand Company, what the distinguished chronicler of New Zealand history A. H. 
McLintock some fifty years ago called one of the “minor enigmas of New Zealand history.”642 
Although the documentary evidence for the 1825 company is slim, it was to play a key role in 
the subsequent revival of corporate colonisation in the islands of New Zealand towards the 
close of the following decade. As Helen Taft Manning has remarked, the Company 
bequeathed many of its directors to the later iteration, among them Lord Durham and George 
Lyall.643 Moreover, the 1825 Company was in fact incorporated into the Wakefield enterprise 
by means of a formal “union” between the two companies.644 As the various company 
projections show, the colonisation of New Zealand was often framed in terms of chartered 
enterprise. The company model was neither unusual in the context of British imperialism, nor 
in the case of speculation about the islands of New Zealand. It was a tried and tested method 
of colonial expansion. 
Old as the company model may have been however, it was the more recent imperial 
past that most decisively informed both the Western Australian Company and the New 
Zealand Company. These two ventures were, in the final examination, designed to replicate 
the principles of colonisation first tested in South Australia, thereby avoiding what the 
colonial reformers believed was nothing short of calamity on the Swan River.645 It is well 
known that the New Zealand promoters drew on South Australia to endorse their vision of a 
new colony in the South Pacific, albeit with inconsistency and frequent contradiction.646 Two 
further points merit attention, however. First, it is necessary to note that the New Zealand 
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colonisers were acutely aware of what had transpired in Western Australia during the early 
1830s. Indeed, in a key sense the company colonisation of New Zealand defined itself against 
Western Australia, with the Swan River Colony widely regarded by the promoters of the New 
Zealand Company as an illustration of colonial policy gone awry. In no small part because of 
Wakefield and his peers, Swan River quickly became a byword for disaster–both in Britain and 
the Australian colonies.647 As he caustically remarked in volume 2 of England and America, 
the secular bible of the systematic colonisation of South Australia, the allocation of land 
grants in Western Australia was “so great that waste land is not the trouble worth accepting 
it.”648 It was a sentiment that reappeared in the New Zealand case. Swan River, according to 
the British Colonization of New Zealand, was a most useful “example to deter.”649 
Second, and much less well understood, is how the Western Australian Company 
mimicked the New Zealand Company’s views on both South Australia and the Swan River 
Colony. We know, for instance, that the directors of the Western Australian Company kept a 
copy of the South Australia Act in their office, having paid 3 shillings for it, and that they 
alluded to it in their prospectus.650 “Her Majesty’s Government having determined to apply 
to it [Western Australia] the principles of colonization, which have had such eminent success 
elsewhere,” they duly observed, with a clear understanding that readers would draw the 
South Australian inference for themselves, “the Western Australian Company has been 
formed to co-operate in those views.”651 The Company’s draft prospectus was even more 
explicit in the use it made of South Australia, and it also referenced Swan River. Written by 
William Hutt, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, and John Chapman, the first two of whom had been 
involved in the colonial reform movement since its inception in 1830, the draft prospectus 
poured scorn on Swan River. “It cannot be denied,” they wrote, “that Western Australia, as a 
Colony, has not, since its establishment, made any rapid or material advance. This result is 
principally to be attributed to errors committed in the disposal of land–the want of 
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combination in the investment of British capital there–and the superior facilities hitherto 
afforded to Emigration by Government to other points of Australia.”652  
Notwithstanding the supposed natural advantages enjoyed by the area around Swan 
River, they continued, “Western Australia has almost remained stationary, whilst the 
comparatively recent Colony of South Australia has risen into a degree of importance, & 
attained a state of prosperity not less astonishing than advantageous to those who embarked 
in the formation of that settlement.” The discrepancy in the fortunes of the two colonies was 
reinforced by a bucolic depiction of Adelaide: “Its principal town, Adelaide, already possesses 
streets, squares, churches, markets, banks, 700 or 800 stone or brick houses, with 6000 
inhabitants although less than four years ago its site was a desert, distant 600 miles from any 
habitation of civilized man.” The Western Australian Company heralded a change in fortunes, 
or so the promoters claimed. “A new era, however, has happily commenced. Her Majesty’s 
Government have determined to apply to the older colony [Western Australia] the principles 
of colonization which have had such eminent success in South Australia; the Western 
Australian Company has been formed to co-operate in those views.”653   
 The joint opinion on the relative merits of South Australia over the Swan River Colony 
was undergirded by social links between the two bodies. The fact that the Western Australian 
Company possessed copies of the New Zealand Magazine and the New Zealand Journal spoke 
to more than an intellectual curiosity in the New Zealand enterprise, as did the Company’s 
decision to advertise in the New Zealand newspapers.654 It also reflected the company 
crossings made by directors and brokers of knowledge, such as solicitors and bankers, in 
which people, as much as ideas, moved between boardrooms. It is to the business history of 
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Interlocking boardrooms bear out the intimate relations between the Western Australian 
Company and the New Zealand Company. Most significant among the many personal links 
between the two enterprises was the involvement of William Hutt and Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield. In the case of Wakefield this is especially noteworthy, as prior to the establishment 
of the Australind venture, he had limited his involvement to that of an informal advisor and 
publicist. He had not previously been listed as a company director, and so the publication of 
the Western Australian Company’s prospectus in 1841 represented a change in approach.655 
The leading theorist of colonial reform was now publicly aligned with company colonisation, 
even if those well-acquainted with Wakefield’s behind the scenes manoeuvres had for some 
time been abreast of his comings and goings into the New Zealand Company’s office.656 
 It is clear that the Western Australian Company deferred to Wakefield on matters of 
strategic importance, as was the case with both the New Zealand Association and the New 
Zealand Company. At a meeting of the board of directors on 15 May 1841, for instance, the 
Company decided to postpone the writing up of the prospectus until Wakefield had cast his 
eyes over it.657 They likewise tasked Wakefield with overseeing the lithographed maps of the 
colony, shrewdly recognising that he was possessed of a discerning eye for colonial imagery. 
An aesthetic appreciation of colonial iconography has been much less remarked on than 
Wakefield’s more obvious prose contributions to booster literature, yet there is ample 
evidence from the company books to suggest that contemporaries ascribed to him just such 
a skill set.          
 That said, it is hardly surprising that the Western Australian Company should turn to 
Wakefield when considering the content and layout of their prospectus. After all, he was the 
original architect of systematic colonisation and a pivotal figure in the promotion of both the 
South Australian and New Zealand iterations. What is more, Wakefield’s gifts of persuasion 
were well recognised by virtually all he came into contact with, including his many 
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detractors.658 The authority wielded by Wakefield on such matters is well brought out by his 
correspondence with James Edward Fitzgerald, first secretary of the Canterbury Association, 
during the course of 1849. Advising Fitzgerald on how to best approach the New Zealand 
Company for potential support, Wakefield made a point of stressing the need for precision 
and social tact: “My Dear Fitzgerald, The Letter to the N.Z. Company being the first step–the 
foundation of every thing … ought to be very fully considered, &, I think, concerted with some 
of the leading Directors. It ought to express the whole design; &, above all, there should not 
be a word in it which you might subsequently wish to alter.”659     
 When Fitzgerald followed up that December in light of a promotional article that he 
was writing, Wakefield again displayed a sure-footedness on the strategic considerations of 
colonial lobbying. After repeatedly inviting Fitzgerald to his home in Reigate, Wakefield circled 
back to his key point about the need for a respectable body of founders. “I have made a few 
corrections on the proof. You ought to have more bankers to receive subscriptions,” including 
at least one prominent name in the City. The following week, in the course of praising 
Fitzgerald for his “well written” article and once again imploring him to see Rintoul, Wakefield 
suggested that he “should at once open a book for the names of members,” before 
proceeding to list the names of men that he believed would be most suitable for Fitzgerald’s 
purposes.660  
However, there is a pressing need to move beyond an appraisal of influential figures 
such as Wakefield and Hutt as their outsize role can obscure broader social dynamics. The 
merchant capital connection well illustrates the point. Both the Western Australian Company 
and the New Zealand Company cultivated important institutional affiliations with the City of 
London’s merchant community. Often overlooked by scholars of colonial Australia and New 
Zealand, merchant capital played a far more significant role in the development of settler 
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colonialism than most studies have hitherto acknowledged.661 As recent work by Jan Holcomb 
on colonial New South Wales has convincingly demonstrated, merchants were an important 
presence in Sydney Cove from the 1790s onwards. In laying the foundations of private 
enterprise and commercial society, colonial merchants helped shape economic life in Britain’s 
antipodean colonies.662 Yet, as important as these local colonial networks undoubtedly were, 
it was ultimately London that held everything together. The central node in Britain’s sprawling 
commercial empire, the City’s merchant houses were unrivalled in the influence they could 
muster.            
 Just as George Fife Angas’s South Australian Company tapped into London’s 
mercantile world for credit and people, so the New Zealand Company and the Western 
Australian Company drew liberally from the same well. Charles Enderby (1798–1876) 
exemplifies this tendency. A director of both the Western Australian Company and the New 
Zealand Company, Enderby had long family ties to the Southern Ocean, his grandfather 
Samuel Enderby having founded one of the eighteenth century’s most illustrious sealing and 
whaling companies, Samuel Enderby & Sons.663 As Herman Melville vividly recalled in his 1851 
classic, Moby Dick, the Enderby family enterprise was “a  house which in my poor whaleman’s 
opinion, comes not far behind the united royal houses of the Tudors and Bourbons, in point 
of real historical interest.”664 Company colonisation, like colonial affairs more generally, was 
stamped strongly with the imprint of family. Building on this familial lineage, Charles Enderby 
turned to the Southern Ocean as the source of his future profits. The architect of one of the 
more curious experiments in company colonisation during this period, Enderby founded the 
Southern Whale Fishery Company in 1846. The recipient of a Crown charter, the Company 
boasted a large land grant on the remote Auckland Islands, establishing a short-lived 
settlement at Hardwicke.665        
 Jacob Montefiore (1801–1895) was another merchant on the board of the Western 
Australian Company with roving interests in colonial trade. A director of the Bank of 
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Australasia and a member of the South Australian Colonisation Commission between 1835 
and 1839, Montefiore was also an avid investor in the railways, both at home and abroad.666 
Alongside his son Leslie Jacob Montefiore (1830–1909), Jacob established Jacob Montefiore 
and Co., a railway company in Melbourne, Victoria, while in Britain he invested heavily in the 
London, Salisbury and Yeovil Junction, all of which attests to a sense of comfort with the 
vicissitudes of commerce. Part of a prominent Sephardic Jewish family, their father Eliezer 
Montefiore (1761–1837) a significant figure in the Barbados trade, Jacob went into business 
with his more well-known younger brother, Joseph Barrow Montefiore (1803–1893), 
founding J. Barrow Montefiore & Co., a trading house in Sydney with significant capital at its 
disposal.           
  Joseph had emigrated to New South Wales in 1828 with the intention of investing in 
the burgeoning pastoral industry, but he soon found himself channelling his money and 
attention towards that staple of colonial reform: South Australian land.667 Ever the curious 
merchant, Joseph also visited New Zealand in 1830: “My Object was mercantile. I chartered a 
Vessel to make a Tour of the Island, and to visit every Place I possibly could, for the Purpose 
of becoming acquainted with the Island, its Productions, its general Character, as well as with 
the Habits, Manners, and General Disposition of the Natives; and I had some Intention of  
forming extensive mercantile Establishments throughout the Island.”668 From Barbados to 
New Zealand, the dry interior of South Australia to the distant coast of Western Australia, the 
Montefiores were a family that saw the empire whole.    
 However, the Western Australian Company could also call upon the advice of men as 
comfortable with maritime commerce as they were with colonial real estate. Emblematic of 
this aquatic breed was Thomas Henry Buckle (1779–1840), a partner of the London shipping 
firm Buckle, Buckle, Bagster and Buchanan, and a wealthy merchant and businessman of 
Mark-Lane, an important thoroughfare in the City of London that connected Fenchurch Street 
to Great Tower Street. It is unlikely that Thomas Henry was a stranger to company 
colonisation, for his brother Henry Buckle had been the solicitor of the 1825 New Zealand 
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Company and was a director of both the reincarnated New Zealand Company and the Union 
Bank of Australasia. Nor could he claim to be oblivious to the sorts of profits that could be 
made in the antipodes: Buckle’s shipping company did a significant portion of its business in 
chartering vessels for convict transportation to New South Wales.669  
 Shipping was also prominently represented among the board members of the New 
Zealand Company, who even had their own committee dedicated to the subject. Joseph 
Somes (1787–1845) looms particularly large in this account of company colonisation and its 
links to merchant capitalism, not least because by the late 1830s he was by some accounts 
the largest private ship owner in the world. A governor of the New Zealand Company and 
investor and sometime attendee upon board meetings of the Western Australian Company, 
Somes had inherited the family shipping business alongside his older brother, Stephen. 
Building on an early life spent at sea, criss-crossing the World Ocean, Somes capitalised on 
the breakup of the East India Company’s fleet, much enlarging the family stock.670 More than 
most, even in this great age of international shipping, Somes was a man who well appreciated 
the ebbs and flows of global trade: after all, it was quite literally his life’s work. 
Notably, Somes was to deploy his hard-earned knowledge to great effect in the name 
of company colonisation. Illustrative of how practical experience in the shipping industry 
intersected with the requirements of imperial commerce, Somes was to guide and govern the 
New Zealand Company through choppy waters. For example, it was Somes who arranged with 
George Lyall, another prominent London merchant with a shipping pedigree, “the amount of 
stock to be assigned to the old [1825] company” in light of its incorporation into the New 
Zealand Company of 1839. Not that he overlooked the more prosaic facets of business life: 
Somes frequently chaired committee meetings.671 
Yet it was when Somes applied his shipping knowledge directly to company business 
that his influence was most pronounced. Famously for New Zealand historians, it was Somes 
who chartered the Tory to the New Zealand Company, the first company ship to set sail for 
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New Zealand.672 Like his fellow shipping merchant George Fife Angas then, who was at this 
very moment working assiduously in the South Australian Company’s office just around the 
corner at Bishopsgate Street, Somes conceived of company colonisation in terms of what he 
knew best: international shipping. Recognising that the New Zealand Company boardroom, 
like that of its Western Australian counterpart, was networked into London’s merchant 
community forces us to rethink the relationship between merchant capital and the settler 
revolution. Often conceived of in terms of the making and breaking of native title, the 
involvement of London’s shipping community instead prompts us to consider a maritime 
context that draws us back to the City of London. 
 
The East India Company and Colonial Reform 
 
 
Echoes of the East India Company reverberated through the boardrooms of these two settler 
companies. Both drew on personnel with experience in company colonisation in the Indian 
ocean world, while direct appeals were made to the corporation in Leadenhall St for advice 
on best practice. To the extent that the directors of the Western Australian Company and the 
New Zealand Company were networked into London’s merchant community, both looked to 
the East India Company as an illustration of successful corporate colonisation.673 Given the 
recent passing of the 1833 Charter Act, however, which had greatly curtailed Company 
powers, it was in many respects a strange strategic choice. After all, the East India Company 
was by this point under sustained scrutiny, with the renewal of its charter dependent on the 
repeal of its monopoly rights.674 Nonetheless, for all the opprobrium that the corporation 
attracted, it was by some margin the most venerable exemplar of the genre. For this reason 
alone, it is not entirely surprising that the Western Australian Company and the New Zealand 
Company should seek to align themselves with their distinguished forebear.   
However, the influence of the East India Company was significantly greater in the New 
Zealand case. This is partly explained by the Company’s inheritance of personnel from the 
Australian Agricultural Company (see Chapter 3). As discussed earlier, the social profile of the 
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New South Wales venture was characterised by dual representation from parliamentarians 
and East India directors, and these arguably constituted the social spokes on which their 
relative clout among the 1824/25 bubble companies turned. This is a pattern that we also see 
replicated in the New Zealand Company, though not in the Western Australian Company.
 Direct representation on the New Zealand board from East India directors attests to 
the formative role that the so-called Indian interest in London had on antipodean company 
colonisation. Among the New Zealand promoters, for example, Russell Ellice, George Lyall, 
John Pirie, and James Pattison were members of the East India Company, while a significant 
contingent was involved in East India trade more generally.675 The quintessential company 
man, Lyall became a director of the East India Company in 1830, before serving as chairman 
for two stints in the 1840s: 1841–3 and 1844–6. Like many on the board of the New Zealand 
Company, especially those with ties to the East Indies, Lyall could recite a family genealogy 
that connected him to the international shipping industry. His father John Lyall (1752–1805) 
was a merchant and shipowner, of whose business he would eventually inherit. But it was the 
broader social milieu that Lyall moved in that ultimately brought him into the orbit of the 
colonial reformers. A member of the Political Economy Club and an on-again, off-again M.P. 
for the City of London, Lyall took an active interest in mercantile affairs and shipping policy.676 
These were impeccable credentials in the world of colonial reform, public profile and 
mercantile experience brought seamlessly together.    
 However, the connections binding the New Zealand Company to the East India 
Company went well beyond a pool of shared directors. The predominance of the merchant 
interest on the New Zealand board renders the strong presence of the East India trade 
unsurprising. After all, Britain’s Indian empire was by this point the dominant source of 
overseas wealth for merchants and traders in the City of London.677 Among the directors of 
the New Zealand Company with a background in East Indian commerce was George Palmer 
(1772–1853), a Conservative MP for South Essex and a prominent figure in the shipping 
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industry. Having served in the navy of the East India Company for over a decade, Palmer 
established himself in the East India trade by becoming a partner in the family-firm, Palmer, 
Wilson & Co.678         
 Palmer was joined on the board of the New Zealand Company by other East India 
merchants, among them: William Wolryche Whitmore, John Abel Smith, and Stewart 
Marjoribanks. As Helen Taft Manning noted many years ago in relation to the 1825 New 
Zealand Company, the “importance of the first New Zealand Company turned, in fact, not on 
any valid claim to government support but on their distinguished membership which 
represented various groups in the City of London closely connected with the East India 
Company and other firms doing business in the Far East.”679 The same can be said of the 
Wakefield-inspired New Zealand Company, from whom the 1825 body formed a considerable 
rump.            
 The East India Company was on occasion cited by the New Zealand Company directors, 
though far less prominently than the chartered companies of the seventeenth century 
Atlantic. Indeed, it is notable that the East India Company was most frequently referenced 
alongside discussion of North American company colonisation. Edward Gibbon Wakefield, for 
instance, saw fit to endorse an argument about the importance of local authority through 
appeal to both America and the East India Company. After dwelling at length on the 
constitutional arrangements of the Carolinas and Maryland, Wakefield extended his message 
with due reference to the Indian empire:        
  
It was the same with the East India Company, whose shareholders were a body of 
opinion here, having a personal interest in making themselves acquainted with 
the affairs of a distant province, and in controlling the directors ...680 
 
Yet it was not just the directors who leaned on the history of company colonisation for 
legitimation–its office staff also invoked chartered enterprise in discussions with potential 
recruits. In seeking the patronage of Viscount Grey (Lord Howick) in late 1845, a critical 
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juncture in the Company’s history, the secretary Harrington sought to soothe any anxieties 
that Grey might have with the comfort of historic precedent:  
 
The beneficial effects of an arrangement of this nature were exemplified in the 
English Colonies of America, and in the formation of our vast and singular Indian 
Empire–viewed in this light it may be said with truth, that Joint Stock Companies 
for public purposes, the invention of our ancestors, and the result of their 
practical wisdom and love of justice,–recommend themselves to reason, as suited 
to the emergencies incident to all projects of colonization; and are filing objects 
of favor with persons of the highest political eminence, many of whom … have 
been in former times Members [of Parliament] and active promoters of such 
associations.681 
 
It was likewise an analogue that those outside of the company made. George Fife Angas, for 
one, made the comparison, or at least correctly identified their pretensions. “Early in the 
spring of 1837 a New Zealand Association was formed and the ambitious little coterie of 
theorists set to work in emulation of the East India Company.”682 The New Zealand Company 
and the history of chartered enterprise were in this way frequently linked together.
 However, the East India Company did not only figure in company discourse. On 
occasion the directors of the New Zealand Company reached out to their Indian peer to 
establish best practice, much like the Western Australian Company consulted the New 
Zealand enterprise when thinking through the specifics of company colonisation (see below). 
At a meeting of the Shipping Committee in late 1841, for example, the Company decided to 
write to both government and the East India Company on the subject of cabin passage 
money.683 When their contact in the Marine Department of that company, a Mr. Mason, failed 
to reply in a timely fashion, the directors wished for a follow-up note to be delivered: “That 
another letter be addressed to Mr. Mason, of the East India House, begging his early attention 
to the request of the Court, for information as to the practice of the East India Company in 
 
681 Thomas Cudbert Harrington to Viscount Grey, 18 November 1845, GRE/B147/8, Henry George Grey, 3rd Earl 
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683 Meeting of the Shipping Committee, 14 December 1841, CO 208/187, New Zealand Company Papers, 
Committees 1841–1843, TNA, Kew.  
 221 
respect of such payment.”684 The East India Company was not just a guide for policy on the 
high seas. Returning to matters closer to terra firma, the Company’s Land Committee decided 
in March 1841 to adopt the East India Company’s payment policy for surveyors. “That the 
plan of the East India Company be adopted in the payment of the Salaries of the Chief 
Surveyor and Assistants namely the Salaries to commence from the date of arrival in the 
Colony (with a quarter’s salary presented as an outfit), and to be payable quarterly from that 
period.”685 From sea to land, the East India Company proved a valuable template for how to 




Company colonisation was a hostage to imperfect information. A persistent source of anxiety 
for the directors in London was accurate and up to date news from their agents in the 
colonies, hence a fixation on how reports were to be transmitted back home. In the 
instructions issued to William Wakefield, the Company’s first Principal Agent, in 1839, the 
board spelled out the importance of establishing an efficient flow of information between 
London and the antipodes. “It is impossible,” they noted, “that you should furnish the 
Company with too much information, or with information of too varied a character. We shall 
be anxious to know all that you can possibly learn upon every subject of inquiry ... We suppose 
that you will keep a daily journal of observations, and that in this journal you will as far as 
possible mention whatever may attract your notice.”686 
This interest in information flow extended to how news would be interpreted in the 
Company’s Broad Street offices. At a meeting of the board on 5 May 1840, for example, it was 
resolved that “on the arrival of Colonial Despatches, the Secretary do summon a Special Board 
either for the same day, or the day after at farthest;–that the Despatches be opened in the 
presence of at least three Directors, and that no publication thereof do take place on any 
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685 Meeting of the Land Committee, 18 March 1841, CO 208/186, Minutes of Committees (II) 1840 to 1843, 
New Zealand Company Papers, TNA, Kew. The Land Committee’s resolution was relayed to the Court of 
Directors that same day via a report. 
686 “Instructions from the New Zealand Land Company to Colonel Wakefield, Principal Agent of the Company,” 
CO 209/4, Colonial Office Correspondence New Zealand, TNA, Kew. 
 222 
account without leave of such Board.”687 Such concern with procedure, with the 
particularities of day-to-day business operations, was no idiosyncratic quirk on the part of the 
directorate: it was a pragmatic way of combating the tyranny of distance necessarily thrown 
up by long distance colonial enterprise. 
The Company also relied on purveyors of specialist knowledge who were based in the 
City. Economic historians of chartered enterprise have taught us to think about the “principal-
agent question,” but the metropolitan networks that sustained company colonisation have 
been much overlooked.688 And yet flows of information and knowledge often emanated from 
the very heart of empire, and in ways that shaped company decision making in concrete 
terms. Indeed, the shared network of bankers and solicitors who supplied their services to 
the cluster of colonisation companies I study were central actors in the formulation of 
company policy. As such, these trusted advisors and professional services personnel, whom I 
collectively call brokers of knowledge, were a key link in the practical implementation of 
systematic colonisation. If the board of directors was the driving force of company 
colonisation, shaping business strategy and much else besides, the brokers of knowledge 
constituted the commercial circuitry that tied everything together. 
Banking was of course a necessity for the companies, and here it is telling that they 
hired the same bankers: Smith, Payne and Smiths, the larger of the two banks who served 
them, and Wright & Co., a small private bank that operated out of Henrietta Street, where, 
incidentally, their shared solicitor, Henry Few, was also based.689 Frank Broeze alerted us 
some time ago to the part played by Smith, Payne & Smiths in driving private colonial 
enterprise, and while we still lack a sustained treatment of the banks’ imperial interests, it is 
clear that banking and company colonisation drew ranks from the same social circles. John 
Abel Smith, for example, who was a director of the Australian Agricultural Company, the New 
Zealand Company, and the Western Australian Company was a named partner in the banking 
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firm that represented all three colonial companies–quite the overlap.690 Meanwhile John 
Wright, of Wright & Co., famously hosted 11 men to dinner at his Hampstead home one 
March evening in 1839 to talk through the practicalities of company colonisation, before 
preceding to act as joint banker to both firms.691       
Yet the connections went beyond sources of credit, important though they clearly 
were. The Western Australian Company also appointed agents who had worked for the New 
Zealand Company, in one of the more obvious instances of organisational mimicry. For 
example, Thomas Woollcombe, who acted as the New Zealand Company’s agent in Plymouth, 
was hired to fulfil the same function for the Western Australian Company from his base in 
Devonport.692 What is more, the social network that existed between the two firms 
undoubtedly made it easier to seek advice, which the Western Australian Company duly took 
advantage of. Writing from Western Australian House, on the same street as their intended 
addressee, Thomas Buckton asked for a list of surveyors’ instruments used by the New 
Zealand Company to map their settlement at Port Nicholson (Wellington).693 Such acts of 
outreach were not always welcome, however. When the Western Australian Company 
contacted George Rennie of the Otago Association, an offshoot of the New Zealand Company, 
to see whether it wished to fold itself into the Australind enterprise, Rennie was quick to 
rebuke him.694  
An important point of contact between the Western Australian Company and the New 
Zealand Company was their shared solicitor: Messrs. Few, Hamilton, and Few of Henrietta 
Street, Covent Garden. Though further research is needed in order to establish the scope and 
scale of Few, Hamilton, and Few’s legal operations, it is clear from contemporary press 
cuttings that the firm played an active role in colonial affairs, for example, advising the North 
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American Colonial Association of Ireland concomitantly with its involvement in the company 
colonisation of Australind and New Zealand.695 
Robert Few, for whom we lack biographical information, was a constant presence in 
the boardrooms of both companies. Indeed, with the possible exception of a small coterie of 
trusted advisors called upon to dispense counsel in times of crisis or strategic repositioning, 
Few is perhaps the most frequent visitor to the New Zealand Company’s office. Given the 
seemingly perpetual ensnarement of the Western Australian Company in legal disputes over 
the validity of their title to land in the Leschenault Peninsula, Few likewise played a prominent 
role in the life of that firm.696 A silent presence in histories of colonial reform, this named 
partner of a Covent Garden law firm nonetheless shaped the development of company 
colonisation in the minutest of details. 
That solicitors were active behind the scenes of company colonisation is hardly 
surprising. From advising companies on everything from the correct interpretation of specific 
points of the law to the drafting of powers of attorney, charters of incorporation, and deeds 
of settlement, legal knowledge was a requisite part of doing business. While recent 
scholarship has convincingly demonstrated how the entanglement of law and empire was 
fundamental to global politics during this period, the part played by commercial lawyers in 
the creation of colonial capitalism is less well understood.697 A snapshot of Robert Few’s 
involvement with the Western Australian Company and the New Zealand Company gestures 
towards the sorts of stories that await those willing to plumb the depths of the corporate 
archive. 
Few was active in the Australind venture from the beginning. The account books, for 
instance, show that Few, Hamilton & Few received a regular stream of payments from March 
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1840 onwards, including overseeing the printing of the Company prospectus in mid-April.698 
We know that Robert Few personally attended to the Company because his presence is noted 
in the account and minute books. This was similarly the case in relation to Few, Hamilton & 
Few’s work for the New Zealand Company: “Mr Few,” who was present at the board meeting 
of 24 October 1839, “was instructed to give the requisite notices for application to Parliament 
in the ensuing session for an Act of Incorporation, in case the same should be necessary.”699 
It was Robert Few then, on behalf of his firm, who acted as the key conduit of legal expertise 
to the colonial reformers.         
 Not that commercial solicitors could act alone, however attentive or diligent they may 
have been. Few’s first billable, March 31 1840, shows how such brokers of knowledge 
regularly acted in concert with other third parties, in this case with the Western Australian 
Company’s banking representative, Mr. Payne. On “Attending Mr. Hutt,” we learn, he was 
informed of the “intention to form this Company and requested … to act on their behalf,” 
before being instructed to meet with Payne the next day to attend to preparations for the 
“transfer of Col. Lautour’s Interest to the company.”700 This vitally important melding 
together of banking and legal advice, a common refrain in the life of any business enterprise, 
neatly captures what is a frequently overlooked dimension of company colonisation: the 
procurement of technical expertise.       
 Few’s services were called upon most often during moments of transition or flux. Yet 
quite aside from guiding the Company through difficult decisions, Few was also tasked with a 
range of routine duties. Much of what befall the life of a company solicitor, then as now, 
tended towards the mundane, and Few was as often to be found preparing generic company 
documents as he was thinking through the nuances of a complex land dispute. A particularly 
pressing task for the new Company was the issuing of shares, and Few oversaw its execution 
at each stage of the process: from preparing the form of Scrip certificates to advising on calls, 
from keeping detailed lists of shareholders to regularly updating the so-called “Moiety of 
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Contribution,” Few & Co made sure that everything was in order, or at least legally sound.701 
Likewise, when the Company decided to print and send 15,000 land orders to Calcutta and 
Madras, it was to Few that they once again turned to for guidance; he was promptly instructed 
to draw up the necessary documents.702  
The organisational structure of the firm was another domain that fell under Few and 
Co’s ambit. When the board wished to amend their composition, they gave their solicitors a 
wide brief: “That Mssrs. Few & Co be requested to advise the Directors whether they are 
authorized to modify the Direction as at present constituted by diminishing the number, or 
by submitting the persons for any of those whose names appear in the Resolutions of the 22nd 
May fit the alternative, by what course of Proceeding: also, whether they have authority to 
increase the number of Directors beyond twelve.”703 At the next meeting, Tuesday 14 July 
1840, Few confidently stated that the only way to execute such a change in the directorate 
was to summon a special meeting of proprietors.704   
Few was kept no less busy by the New Zealand Company. As had been the case in the 
Western Australian example, Few was often to be found at the Company’s office talking 
through paperwork and protocol. Whether drawing up a generic boilerplate or giving the 
“requisite notices for application to Parliament in the ensuing session for an Act of 
Incorporation," Few was frequently in the room when the details of business operations were 
up for discussion.705 Yet Few’s participation in the boardroom could, on occasion, expose him 
to a world far beyond the humdrum lot of a typical Covent Garden solicitor.  
 At a meeting of the Board of Directors on 24 October 1839, a key moment in the early 
history of the New Zealand Company, Few was called in to advise the Company on how to 
proceed vis-à-vis claims to sovereignty over the islands: “Mr Few was introduced and read 
the Draft of a Case for the opinion of Counsel, which was approved, subject to certain 
 
701 Account brought forward by Few, Hamilton & Few, 336A/43, Accounts–Receiving Book 1840–44, Western 
Australian Company Papers, State Library of Western Australia, Perth. On Few in the boardroom, see for 
example Meeting of the Board of Directors, 22 December 1841, 336A/34, Minutes of the Board of Directors, 
Western Australian Company Papers, State Library of Western Australia, Perth. 
702 Meeting of the Board of Directors, 27 July 1842, 336A/34, Minutes of the Board of Directors, Western 
Australian Company Papers, State Library of Western Australia, Perth.  
703 Meeting of the Board of Directors, 13 July 1840, Western Australian Company Papers, Minutes of the Board 
of Directors, 336A/33, State Library of Western Australia, Perth.  
704 Meeting of the Board of Directors, 14 July 1840, Western Australian Company Papers, Minutes of the Board 
of Directors, 336A/33, State Library of Western Australia, Perth. 
705 Meeting of the Court of Directors, 24 October 1839, CO 208/180, Minutes of the Court of Directors, New 
Zealand Company Papers, TNA, Kew.  
 227 
amendments suggested with reference to the question of sovereignty.”706 One week later, 
when the Board of Directors again met to discuss how to press their claims on a recalcitrant 
Colonial Office (as they saw it), Few was similarly present: “Mr. Few attended and reported 
that in consequence of Documents having been put in his possession by the Secretary, since 
the last meeting of the Board, which seemed to present a different view of the question of 
sovereignty–he had not yet been able to prepare the case for counsel.”707 Few’s work for the 
Company was quite clearly anything but marginal, as his presence at this important 
commercial juncture shows. He supplied invaluable expertise to the directors when 
substantive issues were raised, and his advice was valued by the board for precisely this 
reason. In the throes of contention between the Company and the Colonial Office, Robert 
Few helped guide the board through the messy realities of company colonisation as it played 
out in day-to day practice. In so doing, he shaped commercial policy from the inside. 
A more well-known knowledge broker was Charles Buller, author of Responsible 
Government for Colonies (1840). Buller, who we encountered in Chapter 5, was a steadfast 
supporter of both the Western Australian Company and the New Zealand Company: a director 
of the New Zealand enterprise, it was Buller who drafted the Company’s charter of 
incorporation, to take one prominent example.708 As counsel for both, Buller had a core legal 
role to fulfil, although his work on behalf of systematic colonisation often extended far 
beyond the normal remit of a City barrister. When the Western Australian Company needed 
to press its case for a new allotment after Colonel Lautour’s grant was resumed, for instance, 
it was Buller who was appointed to draw up the proposed circular.709 At the same time, and 
as Bain Attwood writes, it was Buller who, “well known for his wit and charm, contrived a 
casual encounter with James Stephen in a London club in the hope that he could persuade 
him to help” when the New Zealand Company found itself mired in a dispute with the Colonial 
Office over title to land in Britain’s newest colony.710    
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 Buller was tapped by the Company to exert his considerable powers of charm and 
persuasion prior to a crucial parliamentary debate on New Zealand in March 1845. In 
moments of pressing strategic importance, the board often made use of its social network to 
garner support in high places. As was the case in 1845, this often entailed the dissemination 
of Company literature through a network of trusted individuals. Jerningham Wakefield, 
Edward Gibbon’s only son and the author of Adventure in New Zealand (1845), a potted 
account of his time in those islands, was therefore “requested to send the Copies of the Book, 
as from himself, to Members of Parliament, according to a List to be prepared.” Timing was 
all important: the yet to be published book was distributed in the days leading up to the House 
of Commons debate. But so too were the individuals who were to receive Wakefield’s text. 
Buller was among the “List of Persons to whom a copy of the ‘Adventure in New Zealand’ was 
sent,” the so-called Cornish Voltaire earmarked for 3 copies for distribution, as well as Disraeli 
and Lord Egerton, Aglionby and Roebuck–exalted company all round.711 The colonial 
reformers were nothing if not an efficient network, and their textual conduits worked hard 
behind the scenes to drum up political support during a moment of acute corporate crisis.  
Buller, who had worked in tandem with Jerningham’s father in the boardroom of the 
Western Australian Company, and who lobbied Howick on behalf of the New Zealand 
enterprise, was clearly trusted in the tight-knit world of company colonisation.712 Friendship 
and common purpose were heightened in moments of conflict between these colonisation 
companies and the Colonial Office, though we need not restrict ourselves to their strategies 
of dispute resolution to make the point. The social currency of rapport was a mainstay of day-
to-day company life.  
Backchannel deliberations also show how the New Zealand Company prioritised the 
views of a select cadre of directors, and how some points of business were regarded as too 
important for open discussion. This is vividly captured by the New Zealand Company’s so-
called “Secret Committee,” formed in early October 1840 with the express intention of 
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deliberating on matters “not desirable to be made public.”713 Whereas the other four standing 
committees during this period, namely the Finance, Land and Emigration, Shipping, and 
Correspondence committees, were “appointed by the Court, in pursuance of the Bye-Laws,” 
with a requirement to enter their proceedings into distinct books, the Secret Committee, as 
befitting a committee thus named, baulked at the notion of transparency.714 
This now not so secret committee proved a useful forum for discussing sensitive 
matters, even if it ultimately had a short shelf-life. On 27 October 1840, for example, the 
Committee met to debate the Company’s general position in relation to the government’s 
assertion of sovereignty over the islands.715 They had certainly had some time to think about 
the issue. A letter from Dudley Sinclair in the Bay of Islands, dated 25 May 1840, had arrived 
at the Company’s office the previous month, 24 September, along with a copy of the two 
proclamations made by Governor Hobson earlier that year, “declaring the Sovereignty of the 
whole of New Zealand to be vested in the Queen.”716 
But it was not until after the publication of Hobson’s proclamations in the London 
Gazette on October 2 that the Secret Committee was formally constituted, although it 
appears reasonable to assume that back channel discussions had been taking place since 
Sinclair’s letter had landed at the Company’s Broad Street office in late September. At the 
first meeting of the Committee, on 5 October, the very day that it was established, the five-
person committee alighted on two key decisions. In the first instance it instructed the 
secretary to “lay a Case on the legal position of the Company” before Buller; second, it 
reached the conclusion that John Abel Smith and Francis Baring should be requested to 
conduct a negotiation with the Government on behalf of the Company.”717 
 These negotiations reveal an important distinction between the New Zealand 
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Company and its Western Australian counterpart, namely that the New Zealand entity 
possessed a political importance that the Western Australian Company never had. However, 
the contest between Company and Colonial Office also draws attention to a larger point about 
company colonisation. As an incorporated company the New Zealand Company made claims 
on both the public and private interest whereas the partnership involved in the systematic 
colonisation of Western Australia was always more peripheral to government in that colony. 
Attending to these distinctions allows us to prise open a more nuanced picture of authority 
in settler colonial contexts in which joint stock capital jostled with the colonial and imperial 
state. The company model mattered, and it did so in ways that confound more modern 


































If this Plan is the highest effort, the most perfect result, of the practical wisdom of the 
[New Zealand] Association, slender indeed are their claims to public confidence. It is a 
reverie in which the classical student might benevolently and safely enough indulge on 
the banks of the Isis or the Cam; but calculated to fill all sober minds with alarm when 
they find it proposed by a public Company, as exhibiting something like a sketch or 
outline of their actual plan of proceeding.718     
(John Beecham, 1837) 
 
 
The global history of company colonisation often reads like a catalogue of ventures destined 
to fail. Vaulting ambition is commonly followed by dashed hopes, the realities of chartered 
enterprise a world away from boardroom rhetoric proclaiming the creation of Edenic new 
worlds. And so it was with the cluster of British companies established in the decades after 
the Napoleonic wars. Where once the company men at the centre of this story spoke loftily 
about their claims on the English colonial heritage, by the early 1850s the conversation 
invariably turned to the practicalities of liquidation and dissolution. It is perhaps fitting then, 
that the directors of these companies should make so much of the Virginia Company as a 
historical analogue. After all, the company settlement at Jamestown is a classic example of 
how corporate colonisation often failed to live up to expectations. If visions of America had 
previously appealed to the colonial reformers as a discursive strategy, the parallels to be 
drawn from on the ground experience may have given them pause for thought. 
 Nowhere are the vicissitudes of company colonisation better captured than in the 
paper records that document the winding up of the New Zealand Company in 1853. Having 
paved the way for British emigration and settlement to both main islands of the New Zealand 
archipelago throughout the 1840s, the Company had by the early 1850s begun a process of 
terminal decline.719 The end was nigh, and the directors knew it. As early as 1846, Edward 
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Gibbon Wakefield had confided in Charles Buller that the Company was irreparably damaged. 
“The New Zealand Company has really no existence as a colonizing body. The whole capital is 
gone; and its pecuniary means consist exclusively of money borrowed from the Government. 
I doubt whether the whole of it, if brought to sale in England or the colony, would fetch 
£10,000. On the other side of the account, the shareholders are out of pocket and in debt to 
the amount of about £400,000.”720 The admission that government money was propping up 
the enterprise was quite a statement from the apostle of private colonial enterprise. 
Company colonisation in New Zealand, like so many other imperial settings, proved a short-
lived affair.    
 Although it formally limped on until 1853, the parlous state of the company’s finances 
meant that it was forced to surrender its charter in 1850. The company’s Broad Street 
premises were sublet, at a loss, in order to recoup costs, while an inventory of furniture was 
arranged. Books and pamphlets, once intended for the company’s library in Wellington, were 
itemised and prepared for donation to the land and emigration commissioners in the colony. 
The company and seal was returned, accountants and lawyers wrapped up loose ends.721 Such 
were the risks attendant on imperial speculation, of course, but it all seemed a world away 
from the hearty pronouncements of Wakefield and the directors of the New Zealand 
Company in the feverish atmosphere of the late 1830s.  
Even in the case of the companies that continued, such as the two agricultural trading 
companies and the Canada Company, original ambition was dialled back in order to secure 
survival.722 The Van Diemen’s Land Company, for instance, was forced to call a Special 
Meeting of Shareholders in February 1851, after it became increasingly clear that its business 
model was unsustainable. It henceforth sold all its livestock, in a pivot away from pastoral 
pursuits towards mining.723 The Australian Agricultural Company fared better, although it too 
was forced to reorganise after a Committee of Consultation appointed by shareholders 
 
720 Edward Gibbon Wakefield to Charles Buller, 3 August 1846, GRE/B79/11, Papers of Henry George, 3rd Earl 
Grey, Special Collections, Durham University Library.  
721 CO 209/120, Colonial Office Correspondence New Zealand, TNA, Kew. 
722 For a comparison of economic performance among the 1824/25 companies, see the conclusions reached in 
LeCouteur, “Colonial Investment Adventure 1824–1855.” 
723 Minutes of the Twenty Sixth Annual General Meeting of Proprietors, 31 March 1851, Van Diemen’s Land 
Company Papers, VDL 202/1, Tasmanian Archives and Heritage Office, Tasmania. Nic Haygarth has noted that 
it was in fact mining that made the Van Diemen’s Land Company. See his “Mining the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company Holdings,” 93–110. 
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demanded a rethink of company strategy.724 While the Canada Company continued to 
prosper, its counterpart in South Australia failed to claw back the early prominence it had 
enjoyed in the colony after the economic slump of the 1840s.725 As critics like Beecham well 
understood, the realities of corporate colonisation were often a far cry from even the most 
well-laid plans. A world, or at least a hemisphere, separated the boardroom from the colonial 
frontier in Britain’s antipodean colonies.       
 And yet a balance-sheet approach to the history of company colonisation risks 
distorting what it instead seeks to explain. Clearly, for the indigenous peoples whose land was 
colonised, the experience of company colonisation was anything but benign. It was 
destructive and traumatic. As Patricia Grace eloquently notes in “Ngati Kangaru,” a short story 
that ingeniously tells the tale of how a Māori family inverted Wakefield’s theory in an effort 
to reclaim their ancestral lands, the company model was central to tribal dispossession.726 
While this study has focused on company colonisation as it played out in London, it is has 
nonetheless tried to situate its findings in relation to the impressive body of scholarship that 
has examined the interaction between Britons and those they encountered in the settler 
colonies.727           
 An earlier tradition of historical writing was considerably more laudatory about the 
companies. A. J. Harrop and J. S. Marais both structured accounts of colonial New Zealand 
around enlightened depictions of company colonisation, for instance, while an even longer 
standing body of work has accorded Wakefield and the colonial reformers prime place in the 
history of the nation. Against the record of indigenous dispossession and corporate violence, 
 
724 Report of the Committee of Consultation, Special General Meeting of Shareholders, 2 April 1857, Australian 
Agricultural Company Papers, ANU 160/2, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Canberra. For contrasting views on the 
Company, compare Pemberton, “The London Connection” with LeCouteur, “Colonial Investment Adventure 
1824–1855.” 
725 Hall, The Canada Company; Robert Thornton, “The South Australian Company: History and Archives,” 
Archives and Manuscripts 15 (1987): 119–126.  
726 Patricia Grace, “Ngati Kangaru,” in the Sky People and Other Stories (Auckland: Penguin, 1994), 25–44. For a 
Māori take on Wakefield and the New Zealand Company, see Ngatata Lowe, “Edward Gibbon Wakefield: A 
Māori Perspective,” in Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the Colonial Dream, 3–10. See also Matui Rei, “Edward 
Gibbon Wakefield: A Ngāti Toa View,” in ibid., 195–197. The Polynesian poet and playwright Alistair Te Ariki 
Campbell (1925–2009) similarly registered the fatal impact of the New Zealand Company on indigenous 
culture. Commenting on Irma O’Connor’s 1928 biography of Wakefield, as part of background reading for a 
television series, Campbell noted that Wakefield’s plans were designed “to shatter Maori society & culture,” 
and to “straight jacket it to capitalism-individualism.” See Alistair Te Ariki Campbell Papers, 91–046–5/10, 
Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington.  
727 There is also the need for a history of private colonial enterprise that adequately accounts for the violence 
perpetrated by corporate actors. My thanks to Benjamin Madley, a noted historian of genocide and colonial 
America, for discussion on this point.  
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this earlier wave of scholarship portrayed the New Zealand Company as the harbinger of 
British civilisation to the islands.728 Australian and Canadian historiography has always been 
more muted on the companies, but even in these historiographical contexts a strain of writing 
persists which touts them as the embodiment of settler virtue and capitalist enterprise.729 
This dissertation has attempted to tell an alternative history of company colonisation. 
It has resisted either valorising or denigrating the company men who orchestrated company 
policy in London, rather preferring to account for how and why the companies they directed 
were able to influence the trajectory of settler colonial expansion between 1820–40. Written 
in the conviction that historical understanding is best achieved by recapturing, as far as 
possible, how contemporaries’ made sense of the world in which they lived, it has worked 
hard to thoroughly contextualise company colonisation against the social backdrop of the City 
of London. It has aimed to deepen our understanding of the relationship between empire and 
capital in a very specific time and place, and in so doing complement the important work that 
scholars more preoccupied with settler/indigenous relations have produced over the past 
thirty years.          
 Three main claims may be said to follow from the history of company colonisation told 
here. The first of these concerns the place of Britain’s settler colonies in the history of 
chartered colonial enterprise. Companies and colonisation, I have shown, were deeply 
connected in Britain’s Age of Reform, their emergence in the City of London both highly 
contingent and strikingly consistent with British imperial practice. Far from an aberration or 
deviation when placed in the long sweep of British imperial history, the settler companies 
that focus this study were in fact of a piece with customary forms of colonial expansion. 
 A tradition that can be traced back to England’s first overseas settler colony at the 
 
728 Harrop, “The Companies and British Sovereignty,” and Marais, The Colonisation of New Zealand. For classic 
statements that depict Wakefield as the supposed saviour of New Zealand, see Paul Bloomfield, Edward 
Gibbon Wakefield: Builder of the British Commonwealth (London: Longmans, 1961); Richard Garnett, Edward 
Gibbon Wakefield: The Colonization of South Australia and New Zealand (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1898). For 
an early overview of this literature, see Helen Taft Manning, “The Present State of Wakefield Studies,” 
Historical Studies 16 (1974): 277–285. 
729 This is especially prominent among works penned by historians working outside of the academy. See 
Bairstow, A Million Pounds, A Million Acres; Gordon W. Beckett, The Van Diemen’s Land Company, 1824–1900: 
An Economic Analysis of Australia’s Oldest Land Grant Company (Jerrabomberra, NSW: Australian Colonial 
Institute, 2003); Lee, The Canada Company.  
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mouth of the James River, company colonisation was integral to the creation of the British 
world.730  
In knitting together the story of company colonisation in the years following Waterloo, 
the dissertation has cast fresh light on a well-documented period in colonial history. In doing 
so, it has demonstrated the significance of company colonisation to the settler empire, and 
of the settler empire to the history of company colonisation writ large. Moreover, the close 
scrutiny of corporate speech acts has revealed that the company men at the centre of this 
story self-consciously positioned themselves in relation to the more well-known companies 
of the seventeenth century Atlantic world.  Taken together, the empirical findings of the 
dissertation challenge the traditional periodisation of chartered colonisation. Typically 
conceived of as an early modern phenomenon, with a brief resurgence towards the close of 
the nineteenth century, the close study of the era of colonial reform reveals that company 
colonisation was in fact a key player at the beginning of the so-called Pax Britannica. The 
inclusion of Britain’s colonies of settlement, furthermore, has opened up a new spatial 
context for assessing the role that corporations played in spearheading European colonialism.
 Second, the dissertation prompts us to reconsider the relationship between Britain’s 
settler empire and global capitalism. In particular, the findings of this study suggest that more 
attention needs to be paid to corporations in imperial settings. Scholars of empire have 
tended to take the state as their key organising category, thereby marginalising or even 
ignoring the business corporation and other non-state actors. However, as I have shown, 
colonial corporations made a significant contribution to British emigration and settlement in 
the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Historians of British imperialism during this 
period have conventionally located their analyses in relation to the inner workings of 
Whitehall and/or the emerging colonial state.731 When scholars have ventured to include non-
state actors, this has invariably been structured around relations between individual settlers 
and indigenous peoples on the frontier, or humanitarian, missionary or philanthropic 
organisations such as the Aborigines Protection Society in the metropole.732 The story 
 
730 Lou Roper, Advancing Empire: English Interests and Overseas Expansion, 1613–1688 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). For a critical examination of British world historiography, see Rachel K. 
Bright and Andrew R. Dilley, “After the British World,” The Historical Journal 60 (2017): 547–68.  
731 Lester, Boehme and Mitchell, Ruling the World; Laidlaw, Colonial Connections. It is important to note that 
Bain Attwood’s book on native title gestures towards private enterprise. However, it retains a focus on the 
slow gestation of imperial policy concerning indigenous peoples. See Attwood, Making Native Title.  
732 Ford, Settler Sovereignty; Nettlebeck, Indigenous Rights and Colonial Subjecthood.  
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recounted here, by contrast, shifts our focus to the colonial corporation, seldom the subject 
of scholarly attention in the nineteenth century British Empire. In doing so, it makes an 
original contribution to settler colonial historiography while also linking the study to recent 
work on corporations in global context. 
At the same time, the so-called “new” history of global capitalism has been 
surprisingly reticent about company colonisation. The literature has instead been 
preoccupied with Atlantic slavery and the circulation of individual commodities such as tea 
and cotton, Sven Beckert’s work nimbly connecting the two together.733 While the subfield 
has demonstrated an admirable willingness to engage with the cultural dimensions of global 
capitalism, it is worth reflecting on whether the history of capitalism can in fact be adequately 
written without due attention to the business corporation. As fresh work by Emily Erikson 
elegantly shows, the joint stock company heralded a transformation in English economic life 
in the seventeenth century. This was especially so because of the wide-ranging impact that 
England’s overseas trading companies had on domestic culture and political economy, their 
Crown charters symbolic of how they mediated between the state and market.734 Although 
historians of capitalism have been slow to examine the corporation, a new crop of studies 
that situate company colonisation in world historical context points the way forward.735 
Further work in this vein is needed, in particular archivally driven scholarship that engages 
with the findings of the new imperial history.736 This study contributes to the larger project of 
restoring company colonisation to a central place in the history of global capitalism.  
Finally, the detailed examination of company colonisation represents the first 
overarching history of private colonial enterprise in the era of colonial reform. While previous 
studies of these companies have documented their contribution to British migration and 
settlement, the company crossings between the two bursts of company formation that focus 
the discussion have escaped scholarly scrutiny. Rather than recapturing the trace of company 
colonisation through a single corporate archive, or through one of the company bubbles that 
 
733 Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (London: Penguin, 2015); Seth Rockman and Sven Beckert, 
eds. Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic Development (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016). On slavery and its place in new analyses of global capitalism, see Trevor Burnard 
and Giorgio Riello, “Slavery and the New History of Capitalism,” Journal of Global History 15 (2020): 225–244. 
734 Erikson, Trade and Nation. 
735 See, most especially, the innovative essays in Gottmann and Stern, “Crossing Companies.” 
736 On the new imperial history, see Stephen Howe, The New Imperial Histories Reader (London: Routledge, 
2010). See also Antoinette Burton, ed. After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2003).   
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originated in London between 1820–40, I have instead tracked the history of company 
colonisation across the period as a whole by traversing between company boardrooms. It has 
thus shifted attention away from the Colonial Office and towards the City of London, and in 
so doing it has demonstrated how metropolitan capitalists drove imperial expansion after the 
peace of 1815. The recovery of this history reframes how we approach the much-studied 
colonial reform movement. 
The company men at the centre of this story envisaged, and briefly realised, a 
corporate empire that stretched across the oceans. While fleeting and transitory, it was an 
imperial project that nonetheless reshaped the settler world in its corporate self-image. From 
their offices in the City, and in its banks and merchant houses, these often-forgotten agents 
of empire reimagined company colonisation for a post-Napoleonic age. Attending to this 
history not only invites us to think anew about settler colonialism, but it also calls into 
question the received notion that the empire was directed by the British state. Rather, the 
recovery of imperial power recounted here instead foregrounds the company boardroom and 
the men who crossed its threshold. The introduction of the company model to the extra-
European world, in the final analysis, would be among the most consequential legacies 
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